• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.44
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• pp.63-101
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• 2013

This article firstly explores into the concepts, components, and pictures of institutional realization of competition and diversity respectively on the premise that competition and diversity comprise the primary objectives to be pursued by the broadcasting-related laws which provide the concrete measures of media policy, and argues that while the competition objective has differentiation factors, there are also particularities in the diversity value in the broadcasting-related laws as sector-specific competition laws. Then assuming that special competition rules including structural regulatory measures particularly in the broadcasting market are required in order to realize values of competition and diversity harmoniously, this article suggests the following improvement directions for regulations aimed at protection of competition and diversity in the broadcasting-related laws. The first one is with the improvement method for regulations aimed at protection of competition. Regulation on share of audience as an ex ante regulation of status and regulation on prohibited activities as an ex post regulation of conduct may play important roles in substituting the causative regulation while seeking for diversity value. For this purpose, it is needed to develop a concrete method that incorporates diversity-related factors as consideration factors in the standard for determining illegality of prohibited activities by inference to methods of determining illegality in the competition law. The second one is with the improvement method for regulations aimed at protection of diversity. This could be considered from three viewpoints that are the setting of regulatory objectives, the identification of alternative regulatory measures, and the choice of regulatory measures and levels suitable for regulatory objectives. From these viewpoints, the regulatory framework should be improved mainly with institutional measures in which diversity value is used for tools of assessment and analysis, not just remaining as mere rhetorical devices, and whether or to what extent to maintain regulations seemingly unreasonable in terms of harmonization with economic objectives such as competition should be discreetly reviewed.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.14-42
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• 1996

On rationale for government intervention is the failure of competition in the market. Health care markets are characterized by such unique aspects as information asymmetry, prevalence of insurance, and cost-increasing competition based on the adoption of costly medical technology. Therefore, government policy to guarantee a sufficient number of providers in markets may not lead to socially beneficisal outcomes such as higher quantity and lower price. This paper examines the unique nature of health services and its implications for competition, the evidence that competition may not reduce health care ex[enditures, and policy tools that government can use to encourage competition which contributes to supporting a sustainable health care system.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.637-645
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• 2020

A free-market economic system supported by the progress of the Industrial Revolution 4.0 has given birth to a sharing economy with a disruptive business model. In many ways, this business model is more effective, efficient, and makes it easy for businesses and consumers. However, because disruptive innovation is not asymmetrical with the conventional business that sustains innovation, several regulatory issues arise because it is fundamentally very different and cannot be regulated by standard law. Disruptive innovation may create chaos if it is regulated by norms that are used to regulate conventional business. This research was conducted with a normative method, which examines various theories, principles, laws and regulations to get justification for how the law should govern. The findings of this study are: competition law must be designed pragmatically so that it can keep pace with changes in business models that are rapidly changing. For this reason, it is necessary to shift regulatory authority from the Government to business people to make self-regulation, as a rule, that was born from the agreement of the business actors themselves. Self-regulation is considered more effective in maintaining fair competition, so that the market will be more dynamic, and consumers will be more prosperous.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.15 no.12
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• pp.53-60
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• 2017

Purpose - This paper analyzes the effect of the handset subsidy and the Mobile Number Portability subscriber subsidy regulation, which are the main regulation adopted in "Law on the Improvement of the Mobile Terminal Distribution System" (Mobile Terminal Distribution Act), on the social surplus, the consumer surplus and profits of telecommunications carriers. We focus our analysis on whether the service charge competition is stimulated enough so that it can compensate for the loss of subsidies. Research design, data, and methodology - We use simple economic model to assess the impact of the handset subsidy and the Mobile Number Portability subscriber subsidy regulation. Unlike the former researches on this topic, we depart from using Hotelling model, and instead use the switching cost model, which uses switching cost as a parameter of market powers of telecommunications carriers. We also study the effect of the two different regulations when they are adopted both independently and concurrently. Results - If the market powers of telecommunications carriers are over certain threshold, contrary to the regulatory agency's assertion, the service charge competition would not be stimulated enough to compensate for the deduction in the subsidies, and thus the consumer surplus is compromised. Number Portability subsidy, especially, undermines the rival's market power and thus reduces the service charge. On the other hand, the regulations will also increase the profits of telecommunications carriers. However, social surplus is maximized when both of the regulations are present because the regulations reduces the frequency of switching handsets inefficiently. Conclusions - In enacting the Mobile Terminal Distribution Act, the telecommunications regulatory agency asserted that the regulation on subsidies will stimulate service charge competition, and in the long run, enhance the consumer surplus. However, contrary to the regulatory agency's assertion, subsidy regulation, especially the regulation on Number Portability subsidy, reduces consumer surplus. On the other hand, the Mobile Terminal Distribution Act can also increase the profits of telecommunications carriers because it decreases competition among the telecommunications carriers. However, the Mobile Terminal Distribution Act can increase the social surplus because it reduces inefficient switching of handsets.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.125
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• pp.105-117
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• 2006

The policy of th United States...to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.10
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• pp.500-506
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• 2005

With the advent of electric power systems moving to a deregulated retail electricity market environment, calculating distribution service tariffs has become a challenging theme for distribution industries and tariff regulators. As distribution business remains as a monopoly, it is necessary to be regulated. And as multiple distribution companies compete with each other, it would be efficient to adopt competition to the determination of distribution service tariffs. This paper proposes a method to calculate distribution service tariffs using yardstick regulation, which can lead to competition among multiple distribution companies. The proposed method takes into account not only recovering revenue requirements but also the advantages of the yardstick regulation based on long-term marginal costs of distribution network expansion algorithms. A computer simulation is carried out to illustrate effectiveness of the proposed method and it is estimated that the algorithm can be applied to compute the distribution service tariffs under retail electricity markets.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.49
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• pp.237-256
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• 2011

A Liner Conference can be defined as "a group of two or more vessel operating carriers which provide international liner services for the carriage of cargo on a particular route or routes within specific geographical limits and which has an agreement or arrangement within the framework of which they operate under uniform or common freight rates and any other agreed conditions with respect to the provisions of the liner services". This study reviews maritime transport policy regarding liner conference and the changes in the liner market over the decades. Liner shipping industry has long been protected from competition by block exemption. The repeal of the block exemption for liner conferences and the abolition of any special EC antitrust regime for the shipping industry marks an important step in European maritime competition policy. This article examines the origins and the rationale of the EC antitrust immunity granted so far th the shipping industry and explains the causes of this historic changes. The abolition of Regulation 4056/86 and of the EU commitment to the UN Code of Conduct marks an historical evolution in international maritime policy, which will have an influence far beyond the EU.

• 한국디지털정책학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2005.11a
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• pp.231-242
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• 2005

The purpose of this study is to generate a proper regulation improvement direction of the public IT project contract law through the current four contract methods and three methods of the awarding party of a contract method. The research method for this paper is derived from the written materials of the present public IT project contract law. Two problems have been processed in order to produce the results: the current contract methods and the awarding party of a contract method. The current contract methods consist of a competition contract, a private contract, and a supply methodology contract. The methods of the awarding party of a contract display a qualified evaluation regulation, the 2nd step competition bid, a standard cost separation tender, and a contract by a negotiation. The results exhibit that the general competition contract consists of four improvement items. The contract by a negotiation contains five improvement items. The group private contract has one improvement item. And the private contract includes one improvement item. These results implicate that the current public IT project contract law demands better improvement work for the ubiquitous Korea.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.939-969
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• 2017

The interest in social regulation and its influence on innovation are increasing as the society concerns more for environment and safety. There have been plenty of literature about the impact of social regulation on innovation and its mechanism. Majority of research have been influenced by or based on the famous Porter's hypothesis. However, majority of the literature focus on internal factors such as expected benefits from change of regulations, and it is hard to find one studying social regulation's influence on innovation through external factors such as market or industrial structure. This study addresses this issue of the impact of social regulation on innovation by analyzing the case of fire-retardant coating material for steel structure industry in Korea. It scrutinizes the impact of social regulation which affects competition and innovation on substitute competing market, and tries to reveal that there might exist the other path to innovation, besides the way that the expected benefit from compliance of regulation directly drives innovation. As a result of the case study, we have found that changes in social regulation may act like economic regulation and restructure the market segment and this effect may lead to innovation. It can be explained by the fact that expected benefits from compliance of regulation can be a direct source of innovation, as Porter suggested, but the change of industry structure and competitive strength caused by the change in social regulation can also act as a driving force of innovation.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.143-156
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• 2019

Discussion on OTT regulation has become fiercer, as OTT services' impacts on the global and domestic media market have been exponentially growing. In South Korea, it is argued that, on the basis of the similarity between television program and OTT's video content, OTT needs to be regulated in order to protect fair competition and to control sociocultural effects. In many of the discussions, developed countries' cases have been used for supporting OTT regulation. In this paper, we first analyzed the global OTT market trends based on our own categorization of OTT services. then we assessed the validity of the application of the foreign cases in the current OTT regulation debates in Korea. We proposed six OTT types (aggregation, mediation, mediation-aggregation, multi-screen, outlet, and outlet-linear) simultaneously considering service operator' origin, business model, content format, and content delivery. These services have been consistently evolving, and the OTT market has been increasingly competitive especially around content differentiation. Regulators must be wary of hastily introducing competition regulation to the dynamically innovating OTT market. The foreign cases, including the US, EU, the UK, and Japan, hardly seem to be appropriate bases for strengthening OTT regulation. Rather, they were focused more on promoting competition in the domestic media market and enriching the content ecosystem. Therefore, we need to consider revision of the outdated media regulation frameworks instead of fitting OTT under them, and to recognize the priority of securing practical jurisdiction on global service providers before capturing local players into the conventional regulation systems.