• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.339-358
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• 2011

This study analyzes whether there are differences in the level of compensation and pay-performance sensitivity between venture firms and non-venture firms listed on KOSDAQ. To test the above mentioned purpose, this study uses 726 firm-year data listed on KOSDAQ from 2006 to 2009. The results are as follow: First, we find that managers' compensation level of venture firms are higher than non-venture firms. Second, pay-stock performance sensitivity is higher than pay-accounting performance sensitivity in venture firms. Overall, because venture firms give a lot of stock-option to managers, compensation level of venture firms is higher than other firms. Also, venture firms set higher pay-stock performance sensitivity than pay-accounting performance sensitivity to mitigate short-sighted decision.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.85-96
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• 2017

The purpose of this study investigates the relation between corporate life cycle and management compensation. The analysis is performed by comparing the compensation level and pay-performance-sensitivity (PPS) at each life cycle based on Korean data from 2003 to 2014. The results show that regarding compensation level, mature stage has the highest mean value of compensation and compensation level drops after mature stage. In introduction stage, growth and decline stages, compensation is not sensitive to accounting performance. In a while, in mature stage, management compensation varies with accounting performance more significantly than stock performance. In additional analysis, the results indicate that the finding is not designated from growth opportunities and the relation differs when the firm is included in a conglomerate. These findings contribute to the literature by providing additional evidence to understand for compensation and the corporate life cycle studies.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.259-272
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• 2013

This Paper document that managers' cash compensation is more sensitive to negative stock return than positive stock return. Also, this paper analyse that managers' cash compensation react symmetrically to accounting earnings and losses. Since stock returns include both unrealized gains and unrealized losses, we expect managers' cash compensation to be less sensitive to stock returns when returns contain unrealized gains(positive returns) than when returns contain unrealized losses(negative returns). But accounting earnings exclude unrealized gains and include unrealized losses, so managers' cash compensation will react symmetrically to accounting earnings and losses. Analyzing 5,815 firm-year data for 2000-2011, we find that managers' cash compensation reacts asymmetrically to stock retruns whereas managers' cash compensation reacts symmetrically to accounting performance. This finding is consistent with boards of directors seeking to mitigate ex post settling up problem that would arise of managers' cash compensation was equally sensitive to positive and negative stock return.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.151-160
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of CSR on the managers' compensation-performance sensitivity, and to determine whether there are differences in this relationship as the governance structure is more efficient. The sample for analysis was from KOSPI-listed companies in 2011-2017, and regression analysis was performed to confirm the relevance. The results are as follows: First, in CSR company, there was a negative relationship for managers' compensation-accounting performance sensitivity and a positive relationship for managers' compensation-stock performance sensitivity. Second, CSR and the managers' compensation-performance sensitivity vary depending on the type of corporate governance. In CSR companies, when the corporate governance is effective, the managerial compensation system generally complements each other. These results suggest that there is a need to design an effective manager's compensation system within the company in order to induce managers' decision-making in the direction of increasing shareholder profits in a long-term perspective in CSR companies. In addition, if we identify the relationship with the governance structure and reduce or improve the devices that overlap each other, it is believed that it will contribute to enhancing corporate value.