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http://dx.doi.org/10.14400/JDC.2021.19.3.151

The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Relationship between CSR and Managers' Compensation-Performance Sensitivity  

Hwang, Seong-Jun (Dept. of Business Administration, Pusan National University)
Ryu, Su-Jeon (Dept. of Business Administration, Pusan National University)
Publication Information
Journal of Digital Convergence / v.19, no.3, 2021 , pp. 151-160 More about this Journal
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of CSR on the managers' compensation-performance sensitivity, and to determine whether there are differences in this relationship as the governance structure is more efficient. The sample for analysis was from KOSPI-listed companies in 2011-2017, and regression analysis was performed to confirm the relevance. The results are as follows: First, in CSR company, there was a negative relationship for managers' compensation-accounting performance sensitivity and a positive relationship for managers' compensation-stock performance sensitivity. Second, CSR and the managers' compensation-performance sensitivity vary depending on the type of corporate governance. In CSR companies, when the corporate governance is effective, the managerial compensation system generally complements each other. These results suggest that there is a need to design an effective manager's compensation system within the company in order to induce managers' decision-making in the direction of increasing shareholder profits in a long-term perspective in CSR companies. In addition, if we identify the relationship with the governance structure and reduce or improve the devices that overlap each other, it is believed that it will contribute to enhancing corporate value.
Keywords
CSR; compensation-accounting(stock) performance sensitivity; governance structure; complement relationship;
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