• 제목/요약/키워드: coalition

검색결과 198건 처리시간 0.021초

초등 과학과 교육과정과 교사용지도서 목표 간의 비교 분석 - 2009 개정 교육과정 3~4학년을 중심으로 - (Analysis of the Alignment between Elementary Science Curriculum and Teacher Guidebook - Examining Learning Objectives in 2009 Grade 3~4 Science Curriculum -)

  • 나지연;윤혜경;김미정
    • 한국초등과학교육학회지:초등과학교육
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    • 제34권2호
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    • pp.183-193
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    • 2015
  • Teacher guidebooks are practical and commonly used resources for teachers to deliver the goals and contents of science curriculum in classroom teaching. Thus, the alignment of teacher guidebooks and science curriculum could be critical to undertake the effectiveness of curriculum implication in science classrooms. This study is to investigate how the learning objectives of science curriculum are implicated in teacher guidebooks by analyzing the dimensions of knowledge and cognitive process in learning objectives in both documents. Grade 3~4 learning objectives (82 objectives in the curriculum, 459 in the teacher guidebook, 541 in total) in 2009 Revised science curriculum and teacher guidebooks were coded and analyzed based on the Revised Bloom's Taxonomy. The analysis focused on how the knowledge dimensions and cognitive processes of the curriculum were emphasized and restructured in the teacher guidebooks to examine the coalition between the two important documents. The study found: 1) the learning objectives in Grade 3~4 in both documents were skewed to certain knowledge dimension (conceptual) and cognitive process (understand); 2) there was a high coalition between unit objectives and lesson objectives in the teacher guidebooks, however, relatively low coalition between the curriculum and the teacher guidebooks; and 3) learning objectives in the curriculum were delivered in teacher guidebooks in various patterns (similar, detailed, additional, in portion, and the same), and 'detailed' and 'additional' were frequently shown. There also appeared new objectives in the teacher guidebooks, which were not present in the curriculum. The findings in this study could provide some suggestions to the current project of developing 2015 Science Curriculum in regard to understanding the dimensions of knowledge and cognitive process of learning objectives and their alignments with textbooks and teacher guidebooks.

Conflicts in Overlay Environments: Inefficient Equilibrium and Incentive Mechanism

  • Liao, Jianxin;Gong, Jun;Jiang, Shan;Li, Tonghong;Wang, Jingyu
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제10권5호
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    • pp.2286-2309
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    • 2016
  • Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet by Service Providers (SPs) to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between each overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as the interaction among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to analyze these interactions, which are collectively called hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-player non-cooperative game, in which overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for this game. Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, in which TE is the leader and co-existing overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, in which players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions. Finally, we apply distinct genetic algorithms (GA) to calculate the values for NE, SNE and the assigned cost for each player in each coalition, respectively. Analytical results are confirmed by the simulation on complex network topologies.

철도구조개혁 과정에서의 이해집단간 갈등탐색에 관한 고찰: 옹호연합모형(ACF)을 중심으로 (Reviews on the Conflicts Among Interest Groups in the Process of Railway Restructuring: Focusing on the ACF(Advocacy Coalition Framework))

  • 이현정;김재영
    • 대한교통학회지
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    • 제33권6호
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    • pp.531-542
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    • 2015
  • 우리나라의 철도산업 구조개혁 관련 논의는 1998년 철도청 경영진단을 시작으로 2005년 한국철도공사의 출범, 2013년 수서발 KTX 법인 면허 발급과 민영화 논란에 이르기까지 지속적으로 이루어져 왔다. 본 연구에서는 철도산업 구조개혁이 10년 이상의 장기성을 통해 이루어진 점에 비추어, 이러한 정책변동은 여러 외적 변수와 장기적인 정책주체들의 상호작용에 기인하여 이루어졌다고 보고, 옹호연합모형을 적용하여 고찰하고자 하였다. 철도산업 구조개혁은 연합(Coalition)간의 합의점을 도출하지 못한 채 정권교체 등의 시점에 보다 우월한 지배연합에 의해 정책이 추진되었다고 볼 수 있으며, 이러한 정책의 성공적인 집행을 위해서는 깊은 갈등관계 속에서의 상이한 정책선호와 도구들을 중재하고 절충할 수 있는 대안을 도출하는 정책중개자의 역할이 중요할 것으로 판단하였다.

재고비용할당을 위한 비례적 접근법 (The Proportional Method for Inventory Cost Allocation)

  • 이동주
    • 산업경영시스템학회지
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    • 제41권4호
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    • pp.220-227
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    • 2018
  • The cooperative game theory consists of a set of players and utility function that has positive values for a subset of players, called coalition, in the game. The purpose of cost allocation method is to allocate the relevant cost among game players in a fair and rational way. Therefore, cost allocation method based on cooperative game theory has been applied in many areas for fair and reasonable cost allocation. On the other hand, the desirable characteristics of the cost allocation method are Pareto optimality, rationality, and marginality. Pareto optimality means that costs are entirely paid by participating players. Rationality means that by joining the grand coalition, players do not pay more than they would if they chose to be part of any smaller coalition of players. Marginality means that players are charged at least enough to cover their marginal costs. If these characteristics are all met, the solution of cost allocation method exists in the core. In this study, proportional method is applied to EOQ inventory game and EPQ inventory game with shortage. Proportional method is a method that allocates costs proportionally to a certain allocator. This method has been applied to a variety of problems because of its convenience and simple calculations. However, depending on what the allocator is used for, the proportional method has a weakness that its solution may not exist in the core. Three allocators such as demand, marginal cost, and cost are considered. We prove that the solution of the proportional method to demand and the proportional method to marginal cost for EOQ game and EPQ game with shortage is in the core. The counterexample also shows that the solution of the proportional method to cost does not exist in the core.

신호교차로 안전성 향상을 위한 사고심각도 모형개발 (A Development of Models for Analyzing Traffic Accident Injury Severity for Signalized Intersections)

  • 하오근;허억;원제무
    • 한국안전학회지
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    • 제23권2호
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    • pp.65-71
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    • 2008
  • As the interest in traffic safety has been increasing recently, social movement is being made to reduce the number of traffic accidents and the view on improving the mobility of the existing roads is being converted into on establishing traffic safety as a priority. The increase of traffic accidents related to an intersection in a state that traffic accidents are decreasing overall may suggests the necessity to investigate the specific causes. In addition, we have to consider them when establishing the measures against traffic accidents in a intersection by investigating and analyzing the influences and factors that may affect traffic accidents. To induce the accident severity model, we collected the factors that affect accidents and then applied the Poisson Regression Model among nonlinear regression analysis by verifying the distribution of variables. As a result of the analysis, it turned out that the volume of traffic on main roads, the right turn ratio on sub-roads, the number of ways out on sub-roads, the number of exclusive roads for a left turn, the signals for a right turn on main roads, and an intersect angle were the factors that affect the accident severity.

Resource Allocation for Cooperative Relay based Wireless D2D Networks with Selfish Users

  • Niu, Jinxin;Guo, Wei
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제9권6호
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    • pp.1996-2013
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    • 2015
  • This paper considers a scenario that more D2D users exist in the cell, they compete for cellular resources to increase their own data rates, which may cause transmission interference to cellular users (CU) and the unfairness of resource allocation. We design a resource allocation scheme for selfish D2D users assisted by cooperative relay technique which is used to further enhance the users' transmission rates, meanwhile guarantee the QoS requirement of the CUs. Two transmission modes are considered for D2D users: direct transmission mode and cooperative relay transmission mode, both of which reuses the cellular uplink frequency resources. To ensure the fairness of resource distribution, Nash bargaining theory is used to determine the transmission mode and solve the bandwidth allocation problem for D2D users choosing cooperative relay transmission mode, and coalition formation game theory is used to solve the uplink frequency sharing problem between D2D users and CUs through a new defined "Selfish order". Through theoretical analysis, we obtain the closed Nash bargaining solution under CUs' rate constraints, and prove the stability of the formatted coalition. Simulation results show that the proposed resource allocation approach achieves better performance on resource allocation fairness, with only little sacrifice on the system sum rates.

가족체계 진단 척도 개발 및 타당화 연구 - Minuchin의 구조적 가족치료 이론에 기초하여 - (The Development of the Family System Diagnosis Scale and Its Validity - On the Basis of Minuchin′s Structural Family Therapy Theory-)

  • 이미옥
    • 대한가정학회지
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    • 제42권3호
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    • pp.179-193
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    • 2004
  • The purpose of this study was to develop the Family System Diagnosis Scale and to examine its reliability and validity. The subscales of the questionnaire included scores on seven constructs. In order to define constructs accurately, a careful review of Minuchin's writings, the writings of other family therapists, and relevant articles on family interaction was undertaken. A pool of 150 items was given to eight family counselors along with a description of Minuchin' s concepts. The counselors were asked to choose the category each statement fit and to rate the degree of fit using the 3-point scale. Using exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and Linear Structural Relationship(LISREL), six subdimensions of individuation and 55 items of FSDS were identified; enmeshmen disengagement(16 items), parent coalition generational coalition(6 items), flexibility rigidity(5 items), spouse conflict resolved unresolved(8 items), mother-child cohesion estrangement(10 items), father-child cohesion estrangement(10 items). 356 adolescents(ages 13∼18), 356 fathers, 356 mothers in Seoul, Busan, Dague, Incheun, Dajeun, Ulsan, and Kwangju were completed the Family System Diagnosis Scale(FSDS). The reliability of the scale was calculated by Cronbach's a Coefficient and the total a = .94 and the calculation for each factor was .87, .60, .77, .80 and .79 respectively.

Differential Game Theoretic Approach for Distributed Dynamic Cooperative Power Control in Cognitive Radio Ad Hoc Networks

  • Zhang, Long;Huang, Wei;Wu, Qiwu;Cao, Wenjing
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제9권10호
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    • pp.3810-3830
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    • 2015
  • In this paper, we investigate the differential game theoretic approach for distributed dynamic cooperative power control in cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRANETs). First, a payoff function is defined by taking into consideration the tradeoff between the stock of accumulated power interference to the primary networks and the dynamic regulation of the transmit power of secondary users (SUs). Specifically, the payoff function not only reflects the tradeoff between the requirement for quickly finding the stable available spectrum opportunities and the need for better channel conditions, but also reveals the impact of the differentiated types of data traffic on the demand of transmission quality. Then the dynamic power control problem is modeled as a differential game model. Moreover, we convert the differential game model into a dynamic programming problem to obtain a set of optimal strategies of SUs under the condition of the grand coalition. A distributed dynamic cooperative power control algorithm is developed to dynamically adjust the transmit power of SUs under grand coalition. Finally, numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm for efficient power control in CRANETs.