• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.97-158
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• 2010

The purpose of this paper is to research on the contents and improvement of national legislations relating to space development in Korea to make the sustainable progress of space development project in Korea. Korea has launched its first satellite KITST-1 in 1992. The National Space Committee has established "The Space Development Promotion Basic Plan" in 2007. The plan addressed the development of total 13 satellites by 2010 and the space launch vehicle by 2020, and the launch of moon exploration spaceship by 2021. Korea has built the space center at Oinarodo, Goheng Province in June 2009. In Korea the first small launch vehicle KSLV-1 was launched at the Naro Space Center in August 2009, and its second launch was made in June 2010. The United Nations has adopted five treaties relating to the development of outer space as follows : The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968, the Liability Convention of 1972, the Registration Convention of 1974, and the Moon Treaty of 1979. All five treaties has come into force. Korea has ratified the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue and Return Agreement, the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention excepting the Moon Treaty. Most of development countries have enacted the national legislation relating to the development of our space as follows : The National Aeronautic and Space Act of 1958 and the Commercial Space Act of 1998 in the United States, Outer Space Act of 1986 in England, Establishment Act of National Space Center of 1961 in France, Canadian Space Agency Act of 1990 in Canada, Space Basic Act of 2008 in Japan, and Law on Space Activity of 1993 in Russia. There are currently three national legislations relating to space development in Korea as follows : Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act of 1987, Outer Space Development Promotion Act of 2005, Outer Space Damage Compensation Act of 2008. The Ministry of Knowledge Economy of Korea has announced the Full Amendment Draft of Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act in December 2009, and it's main contents are as follows : (1) Changing the title of Act into Aerospace Industry Promotion Act, (2) Newly regulating the definition of air flight test place, etc., (3) Establishment of aerospace industry basic plan, establishment of aerospace industry committee, (4) Project for promoting aerospace industry, (5) Exploration development, international joint development, (6) Cooperative research development, (7) Mutual benefit project, (8) Project for furthering basis of aerospace industry, (9) Activating cluster of aerospace industry, (10) Designation of air flight test place, etc., (11) Abolishing the designation and assistance of specific enterprise, (12) Abolishing the inspection of performance and quality. The Outer Space Development Promotion Act should be revised with regard to the following matters : (1) Overlapping problem in legal system between the Outer Space Development Promotion Act and the Aerospace industry Development promotion Act, (2) Distribution and adjustment problem of the national research development budget for space development between National Space Committee and National Science Technology Committee, (3) Consideration and preservation of environment in space development, (4) Taking the legal action and maintaining the legal system for policy and regulation relating to space development. The Outer Space Damage Compensation Act should be revised with regard to the following matters : (1) Definition of space damage and indirect damage, (2) Currency unit of limit of compensation liability, (3) Joint liability and compensation claim right of launching person of space object, (4) Establishment of Space Damage Compensation Council. In Korea, it will be possible to make a space tourism in 2013, and it is planned to introduce and operate a manned spaceship in 2013. Therefore, it is necessary to develop the policy relating to the promotion of commercial space transportation industry. Also it is necessary to make the proper maintenance of the current Aviation Law and space development-related laws and regulations for the promotion of space transportation industry in Korea.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Traditional Landscape Architecture
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• v.40 no.1
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• pp.26-42
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• 2022

The purpose of this study is to examine and understand the area and the original outer boundaries of Hamchunwon(含春苑), which was the outer royal garden of Gyeonghuigung Palace, which existed before the site of the Russian legation. The results of the study are as follows. First, examining the 3 types of drawings prepared for securing the Russian legation's site and constructing a new building, it was confirmed that two low peaks, which appear to be the original terrain of Hamchunwon, existed in the north and south directions inside the site. According to the initial plan of the of the legation's site, it appears that the entrance of the legation building is connected to the Saemunan-ro in the northwest. However, according to the report made at the time when the Russian temporary minister Veber purchased the legation's site, it was recorded that the site already had a narrow entrance and a dirt road in place, and hence, it was connected to Saemunan-ro. This fact makes it possible to learn that the line of movement for officials and the original gate were located to the northwest of the site planned as the entrance of the legation building towards Hamchunwon. Second, the site was created by cutting the top of the high hill at the time of the construction of the legation building, and as a result, a two tiered staircase typed terrace was built. The ground on which the main building and the secretary's building, etc., were erected was made by cutting the highest peak and solidifying it flat, and a large quantity of soil was used for grading. In the case of the northern area of the main building, the traces of leveling the terrain by cutting the mountains are apparent, and an observation typed garden with a walking path and pavilion was formed by utilizing the physical environment equipped with an easy view. This may be considered as a use which is consistent with the topographical conditions of creating an outer royal garden to block the civilian views on a high terrain overlooking the palace. Third, Hamchunwon's fences were partially exposed in the photos from the 1880s through the 1890s, which demonstrate the spatial changes made around the US, UK, and the Russian legations. As a result of the photo analysis performed, Hamchunwon occupies the northern area of the Russian legation's site, and it is estimated that the north, west, and east walls of the legation resembled those of Hamchunwon. The area to the south of the Russian legation was originally a place made available for civilian houses, and it was possible to examine the circumstances of purchasing dozens of civilian houses and farmlands according to various materials. Fourth, Hamchunwon, which was formed as the outer royal garden of Gyeongdeokgung Palace of Lord Gwanghaegun, lost its sense of place as an outer royal garden when the entire building of Gyeonghuigung Palace was torn down and used as a construction members during the reconstruction of Gyeongbokgung Palace, and faded away as the site was sold to Russia around 1885. The area where Hamchunwon used to be located transformed into a core space of the Russian legation where the main building and garden were located after the construction of the new building. Hence, Hamchunwon, which was limited to the northern area of the Russian legation, does not carry the temporal and spatial context with Gyeongungung Palace and Seonwonjeon which were constructed after 1897, and it is determined that the view of Seonwonjeon as Baehoorim or Baegyeongrim is not valid.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.