• 제목/요약/키워드: attack rate

검색결과 597건 처리시간 0.026초

방사선(放射線) 조사(照射)와 자연저온(自然低溫)에 의한 발아식품(發芽食品)의 Batch Scale 저장(貯藏)에 관(關)한 연구(硏究) - 제(第) 1 보(報) : 감자의 저장(貯藏) - (Batch Scale Storage of Sprouting Foods by Irradiation Combined with Natural Low Temperature - I. Storage of Potatoes -)

  • 조한옥;변명우;권중호;양호숙;이철호
    • 한국식품과학회지
    • /
    • 제14권4호
    • /
    • pp.355-363
    • /
    • 1982
  • 감마선(線) 조사(照射)와 자연저온(自然低溫)에 의한 감자의 상업적(商業的) 저장법(貯藏法) 개발(開發)을 목표(目標)로 Irish cobbler와 Shimabara 두 품종(品種)에 적정선량(適正線量)을 조사(照射)하고 Batch scale로 자연저온(自然低溫) 저장고(貯藏庫)($450{\times}650{\times}250cm;$ 연중(年中) 온도변화(溫度變化), $2{\sim}17^{\circ}C;\;R.H.\;70{\sim}85%$)에 저장(貯藏)하면서 이화학적(理化學的) 변화실험(變化實驗)을 하여 다음과 같은 결과(結果)를 얻었다. 1. 방사선(放射線)을 조사(照射)하지 않은 Irish cobbler 및 Shimabara 품종(品種)은 3개월(個月) 저장후(貯藏後)에 100% 발아(發芽)하였으나 15 Krad 대조구(對照區)에서 Irish cobbler는 9개월간(個月間), Shimabara는 12개월간(個月間) 발아(發芽)하지 않았다. 2. 부패율(腐敗率)은 Irish cobbler에서 9개월간(個月間) 저장후(貯藏後)에 control이 8%, $10{\sim}15\;Krad$ 대조구(對照區)에서 10%, 중량감소(重量減少)는 control이 11.5%, 대조구(對照區)가 $5.1{\sim}5.6%$였으며, Shimabara는 11개월간(個月間) 저장후(貯藏後)에 부패율(腐敗率)은 control이 100%, 대조구(對照區)가 15%, 중량감소(重量減少)는 control이 12.6%(11개월저장(個月貯藏)), 대조구(對照區)가 $6.1{\sim}6.4%$였다. 3. 수분함량(水分含量) 변화(變化)는 $9{\sim}12%$개월(個月) 저장중(貯藏中)에 두 품종(品種)이 다 같이 큰 변화(變化)없이 $72{\sim}82%$였다. 4. 전당(全糖) 및 ascorbic acid는 선량(線量)이 증가(增加)하고 저장기간(貯藏期間)이 경과(經過)함에 따라서 약간씩 감소(減少)하는 경향이고, 유리당(遊離糖)은 반대(反對)로 증가(增加)하였다. 5. Irish cobbler는 9개월(個月) 저장후(貯藏後)에 90%가 Shimabara는 12개월(個月) 저장후(貯藏後)에 85%가 상품적(商品的) 가치(價値)가 있었다.

  • PDF

장기 재령 GGBFS 콘크리트의 염화물 확산 거동 평가 및 확률론적 염해 내구수명 해석 (Evaluation of Chloride Diffusion Behavior and Analysis of Probabilistic Service Life in Long Term Aged GGBFS Concrete)

  • 윤용식;김태훈;권성준
    • 한국구조물진단유지관리공학회 논문집
    • /
    • 제24권3호
    • /
    • pp.47-56
    • /
    • 2020
  • 콘크리트 구조물의 주요 열화 현상 중 하나인 염해는 내부 보강재의 부식을 야기하여 최종적으로 구조적 문제를 야기한다. 본 연구에서는 3가지 수준의 물-결합재 비 (0.37, 0.42, 0.47) 및 GGBFS 치환률 (0 %, 30 %, 50 %)을 고려한 콘크리트를 대상으로 재령 1,095일에 촉진염화물 확산 시험을 수행하였다. Tang's method와 ASTM C 1202에 준하여 각 배합의 촉진 염화물 확산계수 및 통과 전하량을 평가하였으며 선행 연구의 이전재령일 시험결과와의 고찰을 통해 재령의 증가에 따라 변화하는 내구성능 거동을 고찰하였다. 재령일이 증가함에 따라 통과 전하량과 확산계수는 크게 감소하였으며, 특히 GGBFS를 혼입한 배합에서는 잠재 수경성에 의해 OPC 배합 대비 큰 폭의 감소가 나타났다. 또한 OPC 배합의 통과 전하량 평가 결과의 경우, 재령 1,095일에서도 "Moderate" 등급에 포함되는 배합이 존재하기 때문에 OPC를 단독으로 사용하는 경우 염해에 취약한 것으로 사료된다. 본 연구에서는 촉진 염화물 확산계수 평가 결과를 기반으로 시간의존성지수를 도출하고 설계변수를 확률함수로 가정하여 결정론 및 확률론적 내구수명 해석을 수행하였다. 확률론적 내구수명 해석 시에는 MCS (Monte carlo Simulation)을 이용하여 내구성 파괴확률을 계산하여 내구수명을 도출하였다. 확률론적 내구수명은 결정론적 내구수명 대비 낮은 값을 나타내었는데 이는 목표 파괴 확률을 10 %로 매우 낮게 설정하였기 때문이다. 구조물의 용도에 적합한 목표 파괴확률을 설정하고 설계변수별로 적절한 변동성을 고려할 수 있다면 더욱 경제적인 설계가 가능해지리라 사료된다.

한국에서 열대거세미나방 알기생벌 Telenomus remus Nixon (가칭: 밤나방검정알벌)[검정알벌과]의 첫 보고 및 생물적 특성 연구 (First report of Telenomus remus Nixon(Scelionidae), an egg parasitoid of Spodoptera frugiperda(J.E. Smith)(Noctuidae) in Korea and its biological characteristics)

  • 조점래;서보윤;최준열;이관석;서미자;김정환
    • 환경생물
    • /
    • 제40권2호
    • /
    • pp.187-198
    • /
    • 2022
  • 본 연구에서는 국내 옥수수 포장에서 채집한 열대거세미나방 알덩어리로부터 우화한 알기생벌을 형태 및 분자동정하여 검정알벌과(Scelionidae)의 Telenomus remus Nixon (1937) [(가칭)밤나방검정알벌]로 최초로 확인되었다. T. remus 성충의 수명 및 발육기간(알-성충까지)은 기주 종류 및 성별에 따른 차이가 없었다. T. remus 암컷 성충은 우화 후 바로 산란하고, 하루에 1~3개에서부터 최고 37개까지 산란하였으며, 우화 후 1~2일째 가장 많이 산란하였다. 총 산란수는 기주로 열대거세미나방 알을 사용하였을 경우 평균 118.4 (7.0~352.0)개, 담배거세미나방의 알에서는 평균 164.9 (5.0~372.0)개로 담배거세미나방 알을 사용하였을 때 산란수가 많았으나, 유의미한 차이는 없었다. T. remus의 산란 기주 선호도는 담배거세미나방>파밤나방>열대거세미나방 순으로 높았다. 기주 알의 나이에 따라 T. remus의 선호도가 달랐는데, 1~2일 된 알을 선호하였다. T. remus 자손의 암수 비율은 기주와 상관없이 암컷의 비율이 수컷보다 높았으며, 산란 초기에는 암컷 산자의 비율이 높다가 나이가 들수록 수컷 산자의 비율이 현저하게 높았다. 교미하지 않은 T. remus 암컷이 산란하여 부화한 경우, 100% 수컷 성충으로 arrhenotoky type의 단위생식을 보여주었으며, 교미하여 산란한 경우, 암수의 비율은 8.0 : 2.0로 암컷의 비율이 높았다. T. remus는 중복기생자(gregarious egg parasitoid)가 아닌 단독기생자(solitary egg parasitoid)로 판단된다. 본 연구에서 보고한 T. remus의 생물적 특성에 관한 연구 결과는 실험실 조건에서 대량생산을 위한 정보로 활용하거나 생물적방제 프로그램을 개발할 때 활용될 수 있을 것이다.

통일 한국의 적정 군사력에 관한 연구 - 분쟁 시나리오와 상대적 균형전략을 중심으로 - (A Study on Appropriate Military Strength of Unified Korea (Focused on relative balance strategy and conflict scenario))

  • 홍봉기
    • 안보군사학연구
    • /
    • 통권13호
    • /
    • pp.687-738
    • /
    • 2016
  • To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

  • PDF

항공기운항자의 지상 제3자 손해배상책임에 관한 상법 항공운송편 규정의 문제점 및 개선방안 (A Study on the Problems and Resolutions of Provisions in Korean Commercial Law related to the Aircraft Operator's Liability of Compensation for Damages to the Third Party)

  • 김지훈
    • 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
    • /
    • 제29권2호
    • /
    • pp.3-54
    • /
    • 2014
  • 오랜 논의와 노력 끝에 우리나라 상법 제6편 항공운송편이 신설되어 2011년 11월부터 시행되었다. 상법 항공운송편은 국내항공운송으로 인해 발생한 항공 운송인의 손해배상책임 문제와 항공기 운항으로 인해 발생한 지상 제3자에 대한 항공기운항자의 손해배상책임 문제 등을 규율하기 위해 제정되었다. 상법 항공운송편은 관련 국제 조약들과 항공선진국들의 국내입법을 충분히 비교 검토하여 우리 법으로 수용하였기 때문에 국제 기준에 부합한다는 장점도 있지만, 항공기운항자의 지상 제3자에 대한 손해배상책임 규정을 중심으로 다음과 같이 개선해야 할 내용들도 포함하고 있다. 첫째, 상법 항공운송편상 항공기운항자의 지상 제3자 손해에 대한 배상책임 한도액은 피해자에 대한 적절한 배상을 하기에는 너무 낮은 수준으로 규정되어 있어 상향될 필요성이 있다. 따라서 독일과 같이 2009년 체결된 일반위험협약 및 불법방해배상협약의 관련 내용을 수용하여 항공기의 중량에 따른 분류기준을 10단계로 세분화하고 총 책임한도액을 최대 7억 SDR까지 상향시키면서, 인적 손해에 대한 배상책임한도액은 기존의 법무부 검토안처럼 최근의 물가상승률을 반영하여 현 규정의 5배 수준인 1인당 62만5천SDR까지 상향 조정하는 방안을 생각해 볼 수 있다. 이 방안이 한 사고당 항공사에게 일반적으로 보험으로서 보장되는 단일배상책임한도액이나 다양화 된 항공기 제원을 반영하면서도 지상 제3자에게 현실에 맞는 적절한 손해배상을 할 수 있다는 점에서 가장 바람직하다고 본다. 둘째, 항공기운항자는 현 상법 항공운송편상 항공기 납치 공격이나 9 11 테러와 같은 항공기를 이용한 공격행위 등과 같은 항공기테러에 의한 지상 제3자의 손해에 대하여도 무과실책임을 부담한다. 이에 관하여는 항공기운항자에게 지나치게 가혹하고 불합리한 입법이라는 견해가 있지만, 항공기운항자에게도 일정 부분 테러를 방지할 법적 의무가 있고 피해를 입은 제3자 구제 측면에서 그것이 항공기운항자에게 지나치게 가혹하거나 불합리하다고 생각되지는 않는다. 그러나 9 11테러와 같이 조직화 된 테러단체에 의해 항공기가 테러에 이용되어 지상 제3자 피해가 발생한 경우에도 항공기운항자가 피해자들에게 무과실책임을 지도록 하는 것은 불합리하며, 이러한 경우에는 항공기운항자의 책임이 면제되는 방향으로 상법 항공운송편 규정은 개정되어야 할 것이다. 셋째, 항공기사고와 같은 항공기 운항으로 인한 피해의 엄청난 규모를 고려해 볼 때, 다수의 피해자들이 경제적 어려움에 직면할 수 있으므로 항공여객의 인적 손해에 대한 항공운송인의 배상책임 발생 시 적용되는 선급금 지급 규정을 항공기운항자의 책임 발생 사례에도 준용할 필요가 있다고 본다. 넷째, 현행 상법 항공운송편상 항공기운항자의 손해배상책임 규정은 항공기 운항으로 인한 피해가 지상 또는 수면 및 수중에서 발생된 경우에만 적용되고 공중에서 발생한 피해에는 적용되지 않는다. 하지만 다른 항공기의 운항으로 인한 공중에서 발생된 항공기 등의 손해가 지상이나 수면 및 수중에서 발생한 손해와 차이가 있다고 볼 수 없다. 그러므로 상법 항공운송편상 '지상 제3자'라는 용어에서 '지상'이란 용어를 삭제하여 다른 항공기 운항으로 인한 공중에서의 항공기 등의 손해에도 상법 항공운송편상 항공기운항자의 지상 제3자 손해 배상책임 관련 규정이 적용될 수 있게 하는 것이 바람직하다고 본다. 위에서 제시된 상법 항공운송편상 항공기운항자의 지상 제3자 손해에 대한 배상책임 관련 규정의 개선방안 검토와 동 규정의 보완을 위한 지속적인 관심과 노력을 통하여, 상법 항공운송편이 피해를 입은 지상 등의 제3자에게 현실에 맞는 적절한 배상을 할 수 있게 하면서도 항공기운항자에게 과도한 부담을 지우지 않는 상호 간의 이익 균형상 더욱 바람직한 방향으로 발전되기를 희망한다.

배유혈(背兪穴) 안진(按診)에 관(關)한 고찰(考察) (A study on Palpation of the back-shu points)

  • 홍문엽;박원환
    • 동국한의학연구소논문집
    • /
    • 제8권2호
    • /
    • pp.155-173
    • /
    • 2000
  • 한의학의 진단(診斷)에는 망(望) 문(聞) 문(問) 절(切)의 사진법(四診法)과 여러 가지의 변증체계(辨證體系), 즉 기혈진액변증(氣血津液辨證) 장부변증(臟腑辨證), 육경변증(六經辨證), 위기영혈변증(衛氣營血辨證), 삼초변증(三焦辨證), 사상체질변증(四象體質辨證) 등이 응용되어 지고 있으며, 또한 그와 더불어 병상(症狀) 증후감병진단법(證候鑑別診斷法)등이 선택적으로 활용되어 지고 있다. 이러한 광범위(廣範位)한 진단방법(診斷方法)가운데 절진(切診)은 손가락 및 손바닥의 감각(感覺)을 운용(運用)해서 일정부위(一定部位)를 촉지(觸指), 접압(接壓)하는 검사방법(檢査方法)으로써 절맥진(切脈診)과 접진(接診)으로 크게 나눌 수 있다. 이중 안진(按診)이란 손을 사용하여 직접 환부에 촉모(觸摸) 안압(按壓)하여 이상변화를 알아내고 나아가서는 질병(疾病)의 부위(部位)와 성질(性質)과 병정(病情)의 경중(輕重) 등의 내부(內部)의 변화(變化)와 체표(體表)의 반응(反應)을 관찰(觀察)하여 중요(重要)한 변증자료(辨證資料)를 얻는 진단방법(診斷方法)의 한 종류(種類)를 말한다. 또한 접진(接診)에는 안기표(按肌表), 접수족(接手足), 안흉복(按胸腹), 접유혈진법(接兪穴診法)등을 들 수 있다. 배유혈(背兪穴)의 진단법(診斷法)은 경기(經綺)이라는 반응로(反應路)를 통(通)하여 체표(體表)에 발현(發現)되는 압통(壓痛), 자발통(自發痛), 긴장(緊張), 이완(弛緩), 경결(硬結) 및 조색상물(條索狀物) 등의 현상(現象)으로 부터 내부장기(內部臟器)의 병변(病變)을 진단(診斷)하는 방법(方法)이다. 이에 저자(著者)는 접진(接診)의 내용(內容)과 방법(方法)을 연구하면서 십이경맥(十二經脈)의 시동병(始動病) 소생병(所生病)을 알아보고 혈위진단(穴位診斷)의 방법(方法) 및 주의점(注意點)등을 아울러 정리하므로써 다음과 같은 결론(結論)을 얻었다. 1. 유혈(兪穴)은 각(各) 장부(臟腑)의 사기(邪氣)가 주입(注入)하는 곳으로 장병(臟病) 한증(寒症) 허증(虛症)의 의미를 내포한 음성병증(陰性病症) 치료(治療)에 중요(重要)한 곳이다. 2. 유차(兪次)의 촉진(觸診) 즉(卽) 모지(母指)로서 척추극돌기(脊椎棘突起) 좌우측(左右側)을 접압(接壓)하여서 상향(上向)이나 하향(下向)으로 추압지(推壓指)하면 극돌기(棘突起)의 돌(突), 함요(陷凹), 긴장(緊張), 이완(弛緩) 및 압통(壓痛)의 출현부위(出現部位)에 따라 계통별(系統別) 질환(疾患)을 판단(判斷)할 수 있다. 3. 실제(實際) 임상(臨床)에서 환자(患者)의 진단(診斷) 치료(治療)에 있어서 배부접진(背部接診)은 중요(重要)한 진단(診斷)의 한 영역(領域)으로 빠뜨리지 말고 꼭 참고(參考)하여야 할 것으로 사료(思料)된다. 4. 장부질환(臟腑疾患)에 대한 진단방법(診斷方法)의 다양화(多樣化)와 치료영역(治療領域)의 확대(擴大) 및 치료율(治療率)의 상승(上昇)을 위해 배부유혈(背部兪穴)의 정확(正確)한 인식(認識)과 유혈접진(兪穴接診)을 통하여 정확(正確)한 진단(診斷)이 되었으면 한다.

  • PDF

한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로- (The lesson From Korean War)

  • 윤일영
    • 안보군사학연구
    • /
    • 통권8호
    • /
    • pp.49-168
    • /
    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

  • PDF