• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.40 no.1
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• pp.1-9
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• 2015

Compton cameras overcome several limitations of conventional mechanical collimation based gamma imaging devices, such as pin-hole imaging devices, due to its electronic collimation based on coincidence logic. Especially large-scale Compton camera has wide field of view and high imaging sensitivity. Those merits suggest that a large-scale Compton camera might be applicable to monitoring nuclear materials in large facilities without necessity of portability. To that end, our research group have made an effort to design a large-scale Compton camera for safeguard application. Energy resolution or position resolution of large-area detectors vary with configuration style of the detectors. Those performances directly affect the image quality of the large-scale Compton camera. In the present study, a series of Geant4 Monte Carlo simulations were performed in order to examine the effect of those detector parameters. Performance of the designed large-scale Compton camera was also estimated for various monitoring condition with realistic modeling. The conclusion of the present study indicates that the energy resolution of the component detector is the limiting factor of imaging resolution rather than the position resolution. Also, the designed large-scale Compton camera provides the 16.3 cm image resolution in full width at half maximum (angular resolution: $9.26^{\circ}$) for the depleted uranium source considered in this study located at the 1 m from the system when the component detectors have 10% energy resolution and 7 mm position resolution.

• Journal of the Korean Magnetics Society
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.85-96
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• 2001

Experimental magnetization-temperature curves for melt-spun ribbons of amorphous alloys (Dy$\_$0.33/Fe$\_$0.67/)$\_$1-x/B$\_$x/(x=0 ,0.05, 0.1, and 0.15) and (Sm$\_$0.33/Fe$\_$0.67/)$\_$1-x/B$\_$x/(x=0, 0.01, 0.02, and 0.03) (in atomic fraction) are fitted with theoretical equations based on the mean field theory in order to calculate exchange couplings between constituent elements as a function of the B content. In the case of the DyFe$_2$-B system, the sign of the exchange coupling between Dy and Fe is negative, indicating that the magnetization direction of Dy is antiparallel to that of Fe. The sign of the other two couplings are positive indicating a parallel alignment. The exchange coupling between Fe ions are greatest, while that between Dy ions is negligible. In the case of the SmFe$_2$B alloys, the sign of all the couplings are positive, indicating ferromagnetic coupling between the spins. The exchange couplings between Fe ions, and Fe and Sm are comparable to each other, but they are much greater than that between Sm ions. The high exchange coupling between Fe and Sm, which is considered to occur indirectly, is rather unexpected, but it is considered to be unique characteristics of amorphous Sm-Fe alloys. In both alloy systems, the exchange coupling between Fe ions increases with increasing B content. and this may be explained by the increase of the Fe-Fe separation with increasing B content. The exchange coupling between Fe and RE also increases with increasing B content. As the B content increases, the magnetization decreases over the whole temperature range, and the Curie temperature also decreases.

• Progress in Medical Physics
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.160-167
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• 2015

Radiation exposure from medical diagnostic imaging procedures to patients is one of the most significant interests in diagnostic x-ray system. A miniature x-ray intraoral tube was developed for the first time in the world which can be inserted into the mouth for imaging. Dose evaluation should be carried out in order to utilize such an imaging device for clinical use. In this study, dose evaluation of the new x-ray unit was performed by 1) using a custom made in vivo Pig phantom, 2) determining exposure condition for the clinical use, and 3) measuring patient dose of the new system. On the basis of DRLs (Diagnostic Reference Level) recommended by KDFA (Korea Food & Drug Administration), the ESD (Entrance Skin Dose) and DAP (Dose Area Product) measurements for the new x-ray imaging device were designed and measured. The maximum voltage and current of the x-ray tubes used in this study were 55 kVp, and 300 mA. The active area of the detector was $72{\times}72mm$ with pixel size of $48{\mu}m$. To obtain the operating condition of the new system, pig jaw phantom images showing major tooth-associated tissues, such as clown, pulp cavity were acquired at 1 frame/sec. Changing the beam currents 20 to $80{\mu}A$, x-ray images of 50 frames were obtained for one beam current with optimum x-ray exposure setting. Pig jaw phantom images were acquired from two commercial x-ray imaging units and compared to the new x-ray device: CS 2100, Carestream Dental LLC and EXARO, HIOSSEN, Inc. Their exposure conditions were 60 kV, 7 mA, and 60 kV, 2 mA, respectively. Comparing the new x-ray device and conventional x-ray imaging units, images of the new x-ray device around teeth and their neighboring tissues turn out to be better in spite of its small x-ray field size. ESD of the new x-ray device was measured 1.369 mGy on the beam condition for the best image quality, 0.051 mAs, which is much less than DRLs recommended by IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and KDFA, both. Its dose distribution in the x-ray field size was observed to be uniform with standard deviation of 5~10 %. DAP of the new x-ray device was $82.4mGy*cm^2$ less than DRL established by KDFA even though its x-ray field size was small. This study shows that the new x-ray imaging device offers better in image quality and lower radiation dose compared to the conventional intraoral units. In additions, methods and know-how for studies in x-ray features could be accumulated from this work.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Journal of the Korean Vacuum Society
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• v.22 no.6
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• pp.313-320
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• 2013

The $AlAs_xSb_{1-x}$ step-graded buffer (SGB) layer was grown on the Silicon (Si) substrate to overcome lattice mismatch between Si substrate and $Al_{0.3}Ga_{0.7}As$/GaAs multiple quantum wells (MQWs). The value of root-mean-square (RMS) surface roughness for 5 nm-thick GaAs grown on $AlAs_xSb_{1-x}$ step-graded buffer layer was ~1.7 nm. $Al_{0.3}Ga_{0.7}As$/GaAs MQWs with AlAs/GaAs short period superlattice (SPS) were formed on the $AlAs_xSb_{1-x}$/Si substrate. Photoluminescence (PL) peak at 10 K for the $Al_{0.3}Ga_{0.7}As$/GaAs MQW structure showed relatively low intensity at ~813 nm. The RMS surface roughness of the $Al_{0.3}Ga_{0.7}As$/GaAs MQW structure was ~42.9 nm. The crystal defects were observed on the cross-sectional transmission electron microscope (TEM) images of the $Al_{0.3}Ga_{0.7}As$/GaAs MQW structure. The decrease of PL intensity and increase of RMS surface roughness would be due to the formation of the crystal defects.

• Radiation Oncology Journal
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.283-293
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• 2002

Purpose : A PC based brachytherapy planning system was developed to display dose distributions on simulation images by 2D isodose curve including the dose profiles, dose-volume histogram and 30 dose distributions. Materials and Methods : Brachytherapy dose planning software was developed especially for the Ir-192 source, which had been developed by KAERI as a substitute for the Co-60 source. The dose computation was achieved by searching for a pre-computed dose matrix which was tabulated as a function of radial and axial distance from a source. In the computation process, the effects of the tissue scattering correction factor and anisotropic dose distributions were included. The computed dose distributions were displayed in 2D film image including the profile dose, 3D isodose curves with wire frame forms and dosevolume histogram. Results : The brachytherapy dose plan was initiated by obtaining source positions on the principal plane of the source axis. The dose distributions in tissue were computed on a $200\times200\;(mm^2)$ plane on which the source axis was located at the center of the plane. The point doses along the longitudinal axis of the source were $4.5\~9.0\%$ smaller than those on the radial axis of the plane, due to the anisotropy created by the cylindrical shape of the source. When compared to manual calculation, the point doses showed $1\~5\%$ discrepancies from the benchmarking plan. The 2D dose distributions of different planes were matched to the same administered isodose level in order to analyze the shape of the optimized dose level. The accumulated dose-volume histogram, displayed as a function of the percentage volume of administered minimum dose level, was used to guide the volume analysis. Conclusion : This study evaluated the developed computerized dose planning system of brachytherapy. The dose distribution was displayed on the coronal, sagittal and axial planes with the dose histogram. The accumulated DVH and 3D dose distributions provided by the developed system may be useful tools for dose analysis in comparison with orthogonal dose planning.