• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.519-544
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• 2016

This paper examines quantile dependence and directional predictability between the foreign exchange market and the stock market in Korea. Instead of adopting a multivariate model such as a vector autoregressive model, a multivariate GARCH model or a combination of both models, we apply the cross-quantilogram recently proposed by Han et al. (2016). Considering various quantile ranges, we investigate various spillover effects between two markets. Our findings show that there exists an asymmetric bi-directional spillover between two markets and the interdependence between two markets implies that one market has significant predictive power on the other.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.138-156
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• 2021

The aim of this article is to describe direction of Sino-Russian relations toward a new epoch - as the decision-making centers of both countries define them - indicating the commitment to building the future international order. It includes the synthesis of evolution of relations, descriptions of cooperation building of mutual confidence by both sides in variety of institutions; analyses of geo-economic relations emphasizing their geostrategic dimension and finally dynamics showing how two great powers want to achieve new areas of cooperation focused on building multipolar world order which is the essence of "new epoch". The argument goes towards recognizing the relationship as a "hhybrid alliance". This hybridity is a structural factor that can constrain the use of new dimensions of asymmetric interdependence as political leverage especially by United States against the two non-western powers but also facilitate to use it against West.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.105-121
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• 2019

This study applies diverse game theories to the US-China Trade War. The US-China Trade War can be analyzed as a game situation because the strategic decision-making process to maximize one's profit while considering the reaction of the other party is a game situation. However, related research suffered from some mistakes in applying the US-China Trade War as it is to classic game theory, because while the prisoners dilemma is based on the situation of No Communication, No Trust, No Cooperation, the US-China Trade War has a precondition different from that of prisoners dilemma, since it mutually communicates information and negotiation is repeated several times in a cooperative situation. The result of the trade negotiation will likely end as 'cooperate-cooperate'. Further, considering trade volume, trade interdependence, bargaining power based on economy, and the scale of damage caused by the Trade War, the US-China Trade War is progressing with the bargaining power of the US being higher than that of China. Since the current US-China Trade War is in an asymmetrical situation under the dominant bargaining power of the US, it is likely to reach 'US defect-China cooperative' in the long run.