• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.247-265
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• 2014

In this paper I will undertake three tasks: first, to identify the difference between John Rawls's liberal conception of liberty and Will Kymlicka's; second, to briefly examine the problems with liberal conception of liberty; finally, to propose a certain alternative that will be able to make liberal conception of liberty more meaningful In Kymlicka's view, Rawls seems to fail to make the best defence of freedom of choice because he wants to explain of individual freedom on the basis of Kant's moral theory about liberty. Kymlicka thinks that it is not a desirable way of defending liberal conception of liberty. According to his liberal theory, Rawls's defence of freedom of choice might make us think that we should have our freedom of choice for its own sake because freedom is the most valuable in the world. So Kymlicka wants to provide stronger argument to defend freedom of choice in liberalism. He insists that it is our projects and tasks that are most important things in our lives. Furthermore, he argues that we should conceive our freedom of choice as a precondition for pursuing those projects and practices that are valued for our good lives. Now I want to look at two concepts of liberty in liberalism with Rawls's theory and Kymlicaka's. In this paper, I shall look at criticisms of the liberal account of freedom of choice. These would give us a certain chance for understanding true freedom.