To date, we have considered the theoretical views, the standpoint of states and the discourse within the international community such as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space(COPUOS) regarding the Air/Outer Space Boundary Question which is one of the first issues of UN COPUOS established in line with marking the starting point of Outer Space Area. As above mentioned, discussions in the United Nations and among scholars of within each state regarding the delimitation issue often saw a division between those in favor of a functional approach (the functionalists) and those seeking the delineation of a boundary (the spatialists). The spatialists emphasize that the boundary between air and outer space should be delimited because the status of outer space is a type of public domain from which sovereign jurisdiction is excluded, as stated in Article 2 of Outer Space Treaty. On the contrary art. I of Chicago Convention is evidence of the acknowledgement of sovereignty over airspace existing as an international customary law, has the binding force of which exists independently of the Convention. The functionalists, backed initially by the major space powers, which viewed any boundary demarcation as possibly restricting their access to space, whether for peaceful or non-military purposes, considered it insufficient or inadequate to delimit a boundary of outer space without obvious scientific and technological evidences. Last more than 50 years there were large development in the exploration and use of outer space. But a large number states including those taking the view of a functionalist have taken on a negative attitude. As the element of location is a decisive factor for the choice of the legal regime to be applied, a purely functional approach to the regulation of activities in the space above the Earth does not offer a solution. It seems therefore to welcome the arrival of clear evidence of a growing recognition of and national practices concerning a spatial approach to the problem is gaining support both by a large number of States as well as by publicists. The search for a solution to the problem of demarcating the two different legal regimes governing the space above Earth has undoubtedly been facilitated and a number of countries including Russia have already advocated the acceptance of the lowest perigee boundary of outer space at a height of 100km. As a matter of fact the lowest perigee where space objects are still able to continue in their orbiting around the earth has already been imposed as a natural criterion for the delimitation of outer space. This delimitation of outer space has also been evidenced by the constant practice of a large number of States and their tacit consent to space activities accomplished so far at this distance and beyond it. Of course there are still numerous opposing views on the delineation of a outer space boundary by space powers like U.S.A., England, France and so on. Therefore, first of all to solve the legal issues faced by the international community in outer space activities like delimitation problem, there needs a positive and peaceful will of international cooperation. From this viewpoint, President John F. Kennedy once described the rationale behind the outer space activities in his famous "Moon speech" given at Rice University in 1962. He called upon Americans and all mankind to strive for peaceful cooperation and coexistence in our future outer space activities. And Kennedy explained, "There is no strife,
The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.