• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.1
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• pp.71-111
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• 2003

The key lessons of the very complex modern war can be dangerously misleading to the outsiders. The efforts trying to draw lessons learned from the Iraq War (OIF : Operation Iraqi Freedom) may be biased by the view of point by Americans, because most of war episodes have been come from the Western media coverage. More serious bias can be committed thanks to the differences of warfighting doctrines and military technology between US forces and ROK forces. However, OIF-fought allied commanders and outside military experts said this campaign exemplified 21st-century warfare: swift, agile and decisive, employing overpowering technology to bring relentless violence to bear in many places at once. Even though the campaign evolved differently than anticipated, allied forces regrouped and regained the initiative remarkably quickly, thanks in large part to a new command flexibility, tied to new technology that made possible the more rapid sharing of data. These factors permitted "new air-land dynamic". The things that compel that are good sensors networked with good intelligence disseminated through a robust networking system, which then yields speed. Speed turns out to be a very important factor for conducting "Rapid Decisive Operations" relied on joint "Mass of Effects". ROK forces facing the heaviest ground threat in the world may learn more from Cold War era-typed US Army 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), which operating considerably beyond existing doctrine. 3ID flew its personnel into Kuwait to meet up with equipment already located in the region as pre-positioned stock. During OIF, the division conducted continuous offensive operations over 230km deep battlespace for 21 days. The lessons learned for ROK army to prepare tomorrow's war may be found from 3ID in its training, command and control, task organization, firepower and battlespace management, and logistics.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.157-162
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• 2019

The nature of war includes the concept of war and the purpose of the war, as well as its nature, attributes and personality. The war that started with the history of mankind has started to achieve various purposes. There were also wars that took place to get territory or slaves and resources. There was a war to spread ideology and religion. The cause of war has diversified due to the purpose of various wars. In this study, we analyzed the causes of regional conflicts that have occurred on the earth since World War II. The regional and structural explanations reported in most papers attempting to define the causes of small regional conflicts and new forms of war in each region are not entirely credible. It is clear that the Cold War has intensified civil war. Most of the causes of these wars should be considered to be within the country.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.5-36
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• 2022

The Russia-Ukraine War was a "three-layer compounded war" between the US and Russia, Russia and Ukraine, and Ukrainian government forces and rebels. First, the war is a phenomenon that occurred when the western sphere of influence seeking to maintain and strengthen the liberal international order and the Sino-Russian sphere of influence seeking a new alternative order collided in Ukraine, a geopolitical fault zone. Second, this war is the result of a typical 'security dilemma' phenomenon caused by the 'chain reaction' game of NATO's continuous expansion and Russia's response. Third, the Russia-Ukraine war was caused by the Russian military projection to prevent the military restoration of Donbas region by Ukraine. Until now, the Western world, led by the US, showed unexpected solidarity after the war despite subtle differences in positions. However, the non-Western world, including China, is not participating in the condemnation and sanctions against Russia. This war will be an important turning point in the existence and change of the current international order that has been formed and is operating since the end of the Cold War. The direction of maintenance/restoration, revision/change, and end/transformation of the current international order is highly likely to be determined depending on the development pattern and method of ending the war.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.183-191
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• 2012

Since June 25th 1950, the beginning of the cold war (Korean war), Korean peninsula is still in a state of war. Officially South and North Korean government call a truceafter three years from the beginning day, however both countries are still having several combats in these days. So every Korean citizen male has duty for serving military duty and this lasts even after the serving regular military force, as reserved military. Although South Korea is very small country, the size of military is very large so informing all reserved military takes some time. Since this nation is confronting the enemy and considering the global potential threat, South Korean military needs expedite informing system to call up the reserved military to active duty. In this project, the current informing system has been analyzed and compared with the new method which is using social network service such as Twitter. However mobilization order is very critical. So in our new model there are two ways combined. Using twitter to inform and then use traditional ways to finish the order. This method will provide more efficient and accurate way to cover the call ups.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.31-62
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• 2012

It is a commons sense that the Republic of Korea is a maritime state that depends its survival on International Trade and International Economy. Korea was a peninsula and do it can be both maritime and continental state by its choice. However, after the national division in 1945, South Korea had became a virtual island and pursue a maritime way for national development in the past 60 plus years. Now, South Korea is becoming a world's 12 th largest major trading and maritime state. South Korea has far more ships per capita than any other nations in the world and its economy is heavily depend upon the imports and exports with other nations in the world that pass through the oceans. Therefore, the Koreans regard the security of the sea lanes of communication as vital to the survival of the nation. The SLOC is the life line for Republic of Korea. Since the early 1990s, immediately after the Cold War was over, South Koreans began to recognize the importance of Sea Routes and thus began to build a navy that can handle with the new problems of the post Cold War era. However, the maritime security environments of the Republic of Korea today is shaky and dangerous. Almost every water near the Korean peninsula, some kind of international confrontations are going on. Territorial disputes on Dok do, Senkaku, Scarbrough, Shisha, Nansha and Eodo between and among Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, Phillipines, Indonesia and Vietnam are the examples. In this essay, the author argues that the S. Korean efforts and capabilities to deal with these challenges are not enough and exhorts more efforts and more powerful navy for the Korean people.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.86-104
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• 2005

During the 'Cold War', DoD had focused on the high performance and timely acquisition which enabled quick field out the superior weapons than the enemy regardless of acquisition cost. But, after the cold war, the focus has been changed to the 'cost effective acquisition' of weapon systems because of tremendous investment cost & economic theory. The U.S. DoD has been tried to make 'the most effective acquisition system'(AR, Acquisition Reform) from mid-80's with their enough experienced program data, and as a result, they had launched the new acquisition procedure - DoD 5000 series - in 1996. DoD is continuously doing the study and making several improvements on the procedure after it had been once announced. On Oct 30. 2002, DoD noticed that they cancelled the DoD 5000 series documents(5000.1, 5000.2, 5000.2-R) and 5000.2-R will be reissued as a guide. The most recent version which focused on 1) evolutionary acquisition and spiral development, 2) procedure for future technology systems including software and IT, 3) supplement on the area of efficiency, flexibility, creativity and innovation of old system was issued by May 12. 2003. This article suggests a 'good idea' based on the reviewing of these DoD efforts for our defense acquisition regulation and procedure to go. It includes the CAIV concept application, IPT utilization, T&E method, cost or price based contract etc-all for the effective acquisition.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.47 no.6
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• pp.119-134
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• 2022

A new protectionism caused by the US-China competition and a following new Cold War would have a negative impact on global FDI. In this time, this study researched the effects of the long lasting global openness and liberalization on Korea's Inward FDI. 1,387 foreign invested companies in Korea were analyzed. The results are summarized as follows. First, Korea's FDI has been expanded under the environment of globalization. The IFDI amount and share in GDP increased. Seven countries out of the world top 10 were listed in Korea' the top 10. However, the share of the US and Japan's FDI in Korea's IFDI decreased. Second, non-manufacturing industry became prevalent in Korea's IFDI. Considering it's local market-oriented characteristics, the biggest investment motivation by global companies was Korean market pursuit. The US was more local market-oriented than Japan. Third, cross-border M&A, which became active in developed countries since 1980s, also kicked off in Korea from late 1990s. Global companies managed foreign-invested companies in Korea with shares close to wholly owned. The US had higher share ratios than Japan. The implications by this research are as follows. First, looming protectionism by a New Cold War would negatively affect Korea's IFDI through the adverse function of globalization. Second, Korea's IFDI has been converted to a market pursuit type being mainly leaded by non-manufacturing industry. Since GDP is the largest FDI motive in this type of FDI, the key policy for IFDI promotion is lying in the expansion of domestic market rather than deregulation.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.1-30
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• 2020

The study started with the question, "Is Japan's normalization of nationalization a return to militarism?" Therefore, in order to analyze this, the characteristics of the international system after the inauguration of the Japanese Empire during World War I and World War II and the Abe's 2nd Cabinet in contemporary Japan were compared. Through this, there were some differences in the characteristics of the international system of the two periods, and as a result, it was intended to derive the differences between the two examples. During the prewar period of World War I, the militaristic Japanese Empire suffered great damage from the national pride of being the only power in Asia through the Paris Enhancement Conference, the Washington Navy Treaty, and the London Navy Treaty. However, the Western powers with colonies in Asia still existed in the region, so it was not possible to turn them into immediate power expansion. Meanwhile, World War II broke out in Europe. As a result, the Western powers had to focus on the whole of Europe, and the militaristic Japanese empire became a regional hegemony without missing the international system characteristic of "the hegemony." Unlike in the past militarism, Japan's case of pursuing common nationalization since 2012 has been carried out in the order of Northeast Asia in the composition of the "cold war" new cold war. In particular, Japan is attempting to transform itself into a normal state to strengthen the US-Japan alliance on a self-reliant level due to the lack of quantitative military power compared to the neighboring countries.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.47-72
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• 2009

Since the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia has been aggressively seeking a role and place in the U.S.-led international order. Russia conditionally cooperated with the U.S. global policy, efforts to protect and expand the national interests in Post-soviet region. In this context, Post-soviet space is the arena of the struggle among the world powers. Especially in Ukraine as the Axis power of Post-soviet space, hegemony conflicts so called 'New Cold War' between Russia and western powers including U.S. have appeared. This paper examines what are Russian military security strategy and policy, how these come to fruition in Ukraine, what are important factors of complications and its aspect.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.83-113
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• 2017

After defeat in World War II, Japan's Peace Constitution committed the country to forego the acquisition of offensive military capabilities. However, in the midst of the post-cold war period, Japan began to change its security posture in line with the so-called 'normal state theory', which called for a more robust defense posture and expanded security activities. The second Abe administration promoted these security policies by issuing a National Security Strategy as well as a new National Defense Program Outline(NDPO) in 2013 and by establishing new security institutions such as the National Security Council. The Abe administration also adopted the new concept of a 'Unified Mobile Defense Force' in the 2013 which replaced the 'Dynamic Defense Force' as a new criteria for the Self-Defense Force's acquisition of military capabilities. In this new concept of military capabilities, the Ground Self-Defense Force is planning to replace existing divisions with mobile divisions and to form 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' for the first time in 2018, which has long been taboo in Japan. Japan has experience a Marine Corps in the past. Likewise, an offensive changes in the military strategy can change the spectrum of strategy and 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' plays a big role in this. Furthermore, Japan is increasing the Coast Guard's budget and capabilities in preparation for contingencies around the Senkaku islands (called the Diaoyu in Chinese). The South Korea navy should utilize Japan's changing security posture to deter immediate threat such as North Korea's military provocations and potential enemy threat such as China, Japan, Russia.