• Journal of Digital Contents Society
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.1145-1150
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• 2018

In order to realize the new diplomatic development for the establishment of 'Asia Fate Community', Xi Jinping has adopted a "One Road, One Belt" policy. Based on five core philosophies, One Road, One Belt with neighboring countries has been established to full-sided cooperation and mutual benefit relations. In this paper, I would like to suggest some suggestions on how to use China's One Road, One Belt policy and Korea's Eurasian Initiative in Development strategy of tourism contents. First, The bridge role of Korean companies should lead to the development of tourism contents. Second, the promotion of tourism contents development for Chinese individual tourists should lead to another tourism contents. Third, we need to find ways to win joint orders with local companies in China so that they can lead to tourism contents. Fourth, seeking active use of workers and international students living in Korea. Fifth, the development of tourism contents based on cooperative relationship with North Korea.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.20 no.7
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• pp.169-184
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• 2020

This paper analyzes the implications of the change in the way China conducts public diplomacy, through an in-depth study of international education programs promoted under China's public diplomacy strategy. The leadership of Xi Jinping is now trying for China to become the top power in the world, not just a G2 country, based on China's economic growth over the past 40 years. Also, as a vision for the goal, the leadership is presenting the dream of the great revival of the Chinese nation. Currently, the international education program promoted at the level of public diplomacy in China is operated in an active, mid- to long-term manner within the national strategy, away from the past passive and responsive method. In other words, while China's past international education program was a passive model for dispelling the "Chinese Threat Theory," China's current international education program is evolving into an active model that can promote the "Chinese" order in the world.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.1-16
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• 2017

China has achieved rapid economic growth in the late 1970s with economic reform and open-door policy. China's economic growth began initially in the eastern coastal areas and from the 2000s expanded to the western and northeastern regions where the economy was relatively underdeveloped. In particular, in 2013 'One-Belt One Road' initiative proposed by Xi Jinping, the current General Secretary of the Communist Party of China is not only a key strategy for China's advancement into the world and also provides important opportunities for the development of these backward regions. Inland Port is the inland logistics hub and plays a crucial role in enhancing access to maritime ports as well as access to adjacent inland countries. Therefore, a number of inland ports have been developed and operated in order to enter into overseas markets and secure resources in the northeastern and western regions of China. This study aims to examine the role and development of inland port in 'One-Belt One Road' scheme. In conclusion, 'One-Belt One Road' will further increase the role of inland port, and in response, the development of inland port will play a pivotal role in one belt one road initiative. In this respect, Korean companies need to consider plans to participate in the development and operation of inland ports in China, which would provide opportunities to spread Northern markets including China, Russia, Central Asia, Eastern Europe.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.143-151
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to provide the future development of the PRC Marine Corps by analyzing the changing functions via its historical development. The PRCMC is an elite regular military forces and was established by the Central Military Commission(China) in 1953 in order to project the national military power toward the enemy's territory by overcoming maritime obstacles such as seas and lakes. The PRCMC is relatively smaller personnel strength compared with the whole size of the PRC military forces. Thus its functions were limited in the areas of amphibious and land operations, island and land defense against Taiwan before the PRC pursues expanding policy toward outside. However, in the 2000s, China pursues its policy for obtaining absolute national interest so that its functions are rapidly enlarged into defense of the forward naval bases, and those for evolving its power toward outside according to not only the island territorial dispute with Japan, but also Xi Jinping's active expanding policy what we call 'the one belt and one road'. So its personnel strength is slowly increased. If the increasement of the PRC Navy and Marine Corps would develop into the level of which they can contain the status and influence of the US military power in Asia-Pacific area, it is possible that the security environment of the North-east Asia including the Korean peninsula will be fluctuated. Consequently, the ROK also needs to reevaluate the functions and the size of the joint strength of the ROK Navy and Marine Corps considering the transition of the changing security environment.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.31-43
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• 2017

The article is devoted to the theoretical and practical analysis of Chinese global leadership. The concept of leadership is applied as a methodology, which involves identifying the main factors, such as strategic power, the attractiveness of political institutions, the ability to provide acceptable ideas and the presence of allies that contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the country's leadership potential. The authors also describe the relevance of Chinese global leadership and analyze its domestic, economic and international causes. Moreover, the ''Belt and Road'' initiative is defined as the main mechanism for providing the influence of China on the global level which is now being changed its quantitative component, namely the increasing attention to the security aspects of this initiative. In addition to that, it is important to note that China maintains its economic and political positions in Africa, Central Asia and South-East Asia. Africa has a special role in the Chinese ''Belt and Road'' initiative as a recipient of Chinese investments and a site for the deployment of China's naval facilities to protect the trade routes. On the regional level, China will strive to become a leader of the trade and economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region, the South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear program issues. The American factor in modern international relations, namely so-called "Trump factor", which means the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement, will cause demand for Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as well. However, in this case a number of questions arise: is China prepared for this? Is Beijing able to bear greater responsibility? Does China have the potential for this? The article concludes that China will not become global leaders in the next 20-30 years, because of internal (political reforms) and foreign policy reasons (doctrinal formulation of foreign policy initiatives, military-political and economic power, international posture and relations with other states). The authors believe that the implementation of Chinese leadership is possible not on the condition of confrontation between China and the United States, but on the establishing of constructive relations between these countries. The last meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping showed a trend for creating channels for dialogue between Beijing and Washington, which can become the basis for interaction. An important place in the work is given to the analysis of development and forecasting the evolution of Russian-Chinese and U.S.-China relations. As for Russia, Moscow should conduct a policy that will not allow it to become a ''junior partner'' of China.