• Title/Summary/Keyword: Work Motivation

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The Abuse and Invention of Tradition from Maintenance Process of Historic Site No.135 Buyeo Gungnamji Pond (사적 제135호 부여 궁남지의 정비과정으로 살펴본 전통의 남용과 발명)

  • Jung, Woo-Jin
    • Journal of the Korean Institute of Traditional Landscape Architecture
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    • v.35 no.2
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    • pp.26-44
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    • 2017
  • Regarded as Korea's traditional pond, Gungnamj Pond was surmised to be "Gungnamji" due to its geological positioning in the south of Hwajisan (花枝山) and relics of the Gwanbuk-ri (官北里) suspected of being components to the historical records of Muwang (武王)'s pond of The Chronicles of the Three States [三國史記] and Sabi Palace, respectively, yet was subjected to a restoration following a designation to national historic site. This study is focused on the distortion of authenticity identified in the course of the "Gungnamji Pond" restoration and the invention of tradition, whose summarized conclusions are as follows. 1. Once called Maraebangjuk (마래방죽), or Macheonji (馬川池) Pond, Gungnamji Pond was existent in the form of a low-level swamp of vast area encompassing 30,000 pyeong during the Japanese colonial period. Hong, Sa-jun, who played a leading role in the restoration of "Gungnamji Pond," said that even during the 1940s, the remains of the island and stone facilities suspected of being the relics of Gungnamji Pond of the Baekje period were found, and that the traces of forming a royal palace and garden were discovered on top of them. Hong, Sa-jun also expressed an opinion of establishing a parallel between "Gungnamji Pond" and "Maraebangjuk" in connection with a 'tale of Seodong [薯童說話]' in the aftermath of the detached palace of Hwajisan, which ultimately operated as a theoretical ground for the restoration of Gungnamj Pond. Assessing through Hong, Sa-jun's sketch, the form and scale of Maraebangjuk were visible, of which the form was in close proximity to that photographed during the Japanese colonial period. 2. The minimized restoration of Gungnamji Pond faced deterrence for the land redevelopment project implemented in the 1960s, and the remainder of the land size is an attestment. The fundamental problem manifest in the restoration of Gungnamji Pond numerously attempted from 1964 through 1967 was the failure of basing the restorative work in the archaeological facts yet in the perspective of the latest generations, ultimately yielding a replication of Hyangwonji Pond of Gyeongbok Palace. More specifically, the methodologies employed in setting an island and a pavilion within a pond, or bridging an island with a land evidenced as to how Gungnamji Pond was modeled after Hyangwonji Pond of Gyeongbok Palace. Furthermore, Chihyanggyo (醉香橋) Bridge referenced in the designing of the bridge was hardly conceived as a form indigenous to the Joseon Dynasty, whose motivation and idea of the misguided restoration design at the time all the more devaluated Gungnamji Pond. Such an utterly pure replication of the design widely known as an ingredient for the traditional landscape was purposive towards the aesthetic symbolism and preference retained by Gyeongbok Palace, which was intended to entitle Gungnamji Pond to a physical status of the value in par with that of Gyeongbok Palace. 3. For its detachment to the authenticity as a historical site since its origin, Gungnamji Pond represented distortions of the landscape beauty and tradition even through the restorative process. The restorative process for such a historical monument, devoid of constructive use and certain of distortion, maintains extreme intimacy with the nationalistic cultural policy promoted by the Park, Jeong-hee regime through the 1960s and 1970s. In the context of the "manipulated discussions of tradition," the Park's cultural policy transformed the citizens' recollection into an idealized form of the past, further magnifying it at best. Consequently, many of the historical sites emerged as fancy and grand as they possibly could beyond their status quo across the nation, and "Gungnamji Pond" was a victim to this monopolistic government-led cultural policy incrementally sweeping away with new buildings and structures instituted regardless of their original space, and hence, their value.

Performance of Korean State-owned Enterprises Following Executive Turnover and Executive Resignation During the Term of Office (공기업의 임원교체와 중도퇴임이 경영성과에 미치는 영향)

  • Yu, Seungwon;Kim, Suhee
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.34 no.3
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    • pp.95-131
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    • 2012
  • This study examines whether the executive turnover and the executive resignation during the term of office affect the performance of Korean state-owned enterprises. The executive turnover in the paper means the comprehensive change of the executives which includes the change after the term of office, the change after consecutive terms and the change during the term of office. The 'resignation' was named for the executive change during the term of office to distinguish from the executive turnover. The study scope of the paper is restrained to the comprehensive executive change itself irrespective of the term of office and the resignation during the term of office. Therefore the natural change of the executive after the term of office or the change after consecutive terms is not included in the study. Spontaneous resignation and forced resignation are not distinguished in the paper as the distinction between the two is not easy. The paper uses both the margin of return on asset and the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry as proxies of the performance of state-owned enterprises. The business nature of state-owned enterprise is considered in the study, the public nature not in it. The paper uses the five year (2004 to 2008) samples of 24 firms designated as public enterprises by Korean government. The analysis results are as follows. First, 45.1% of CEOs were changed a year during the sample period on the average. The average tenure period of CEOs was 2 years and 3 months and 49.9% among the changed CEOs resigned during the term of office. 41.6% of internal auditors were changed a year on the average. The average tenure period of internal auditors was 2 years and 2 months and 51.0% among the changed internal auditors resigned during the term of office. In case of outside directors, on average, 38.2% were changed a year. The average tenure period was 2 years and 7 months and 25.4% among the changed internal directors resigned during the term of office. These statistics show that numerous CEOs resigned before the finish of the three year term in office. Also, considering the tenure of an internal auditor and an outside director which diminished from 3 years to 2 years by an Act on the Management of Public Institutions (applied to the executives appointed since April 2007), it seems most internal auditors resigned during the term of office but most outside directors resigned after the end of the term. Secondly, There was no evidence that the executives were changed during the term of office because of the bad performance of prior year. On the other hand, contrary to the normal expectation, the performance of prior year of the state-owned enterprise where an outside director resigned during the term of office was significantly higher than that of other state-owned enterprises. It means that the clauses in related laws on the executive dismissal on grounds of bad performance did not work normally. Instead it can be said that the executive change was made by non-economic reasons such as a political motivation. Thirdly, the results from a fixed effect model show there were evidences that performance turned negatively when CEOs or outside directors resigned during the term of office. CEO's resignation during the term of office gave a significantly negative effect on the margin of return on asset. Outside director's resignation during the term of office lowered significantly the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry. These results suggest that the executive's change in Korean state-owned enterprises was not made by objective or economic standards such as management performance assessment and the negative effect on performance of the enterprises was had by the unfaithful obeyance of the legal executive term.

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