• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.18 no.3
• /
• pp.337-358
• /
• 2015

Vann Mcgee produced "counterexamples" to Modus Ponens in "A Counterexample to Modus Ponens". Discussions about the examples tended to focus on a probabilistic reading of conditional statements. This article attempts to establish both (1) Modus Ponens is a deductively valid rule of inference, and (2) the counterexample-like appearance of Mcgee's example can be (and should be) explained without making a reference to the notion of conditional probability. The reason why his examples seem to counter Modus Ponens is found rather within the ambiguity a conditional statement exhibits. That is, Mcgee's examples are cases of equivocation on the conditional statements involved.