• Journal of Surface Science and Engineering
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.165-171
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• 1999

The etching reaction of $UO_2$ in $CF_4/O_2$ gas plasma is examined as functions of $CF_4/O_2$ ratio, plasma power, and substrate temperature at up to $370^{\circ}C$ under the total pressure of 0.30 Torr. It is found that the highest etching rate is obtained at 20% $O_2$ mole fraction, regardless of r. f. power and substrate temperature. The existence of the optimum $CF_4/O_2$ ratio is confirmed by SEM, XPS and XRD analysis. The highest etching reaction rate at $370^{\circ}C$ under 150W exceeds 1000 monolayers/min., which is equivalent to 0.4$\mu\textrm{m}$/min. The mass spectrometry analysis results reveal that the major reaction product is uranium hexa-fluoride $UF_6$. Based on the experimental findings, dominant overall reaction of uranium dioxide in $CF_4/O_2$ plasma is determined : $8UO_2+12CF_4+3O_2=8UF_6+12CO_{2-x}$ where $CO_{2-x}$ represents the undetermined mix of $CO_2$ and CO.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.127-133
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• 2014

North Korea's uranium enrichment facility is a matter of international concern. It is of particular alarming to South Korea with regard to the security and safety of the country. This situation requires continuous monitoring of the DPRK and emergency preparedness on the part of the ROK. To assess the detectability of an undeclared uranium enrichment plant in North Korea, uranium concentrations in the air at both a short and a long distance from the enrichment facility were estimated. $UF_6$ source terms were determined by using existing information on North Korean facility and data from the operation experience of enrichment plants from other countries. Using the calculated source terms, two atmospheric dispersion models (Gaussian Plume Model and HYSPLIT models) and meteorological data were used to estimate the uranium particle concentrations from the Yongbyon enrichment facility. A maximum uranium concentration and its location are dependent upon the meteorological conditions and the height of the UF6 release point. This study showed that the maximum uranium concentration around the enrichment facility was about $1.0{\times}10^{-7}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$. The location of the maximum concentration was within about 0.4 km of the facility. It has been assumed that the uranium sample of about a few micrograms (${\mu}g$) could be obtained; and that few micrograms of uranium can be easily measured with current measurement instruments. On the contrary, a uranium concentration at a distance of more than 100 kilometers from the enrichment facility was estimated to be about $1.0{\times}10^{-13}{\sim}1.0{\times}10^{-15}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$, which is less than back-ground level. Therefore, based on the results of our paper, an air sample taken within the vicinity of the Yongbyon enrichment facility could be used to determine as to whether or not North Korea is carrying out an undeclared nuclear program. However, the air samples taken at a longer distance of a few hundred kilometers would prove difficult in detecting a clandestine nuclear activities.