• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.14 no.4
• /
• pp.107-121
• /
• 1992

Moonlighting or second-jobs will increase shirking of the primary job. This paper analyzes the motives for moonlighting so that the means of reducing these motives could be explored. The traditional theory claims that a worker who cannot fully realize his work potential will look to moonlighting. In a two-period model, however, the following motives are more important. The precautionary savings motive : A worker has an incentive to save for fear of losing his job and his income in the second period. The worker could save more by working more during the first period, and this additional motive for working is the precautionary savings motive. The insurance motive : When a worker is unemployed, he cannot expand his moonlighting hours according to his needs since the moonlighting hour is upward rigid. Therefore, a worker has an incentive to secure additional moonlighting hours in the first period so that quick adjustment can be made during the unemployment in the second period. Two policy measures to remove those motives for moonlighting are recommended, for these measures will enhance the productivity in the primary job. First, a firm should guarantee that there will be no layoffs in a downturn in the economy and that the employment level is adjusted to the economic states by work sharing among workers. Second, as unemployment insurance benefits compensate a portion of the income in case of unemployment, it substitutes the motives for moonlighting. A generalization of this argument can be found in Ehrlich and Becker(1972) where self-insurance(moonlighting) and market insurance(in this case, unemployment insurance) serves as substitutes. The two policy measures in the above have a spill-over effect : A decrease of labor supply in the moonlighting market will ease job search, and therefore will help those who have their primary job in the moonlighting sector.

• Journal of Information Technology and Architecture
• /
• v.10 no.3
• /
• pp.379-386
• /
• 2013

This study is about the suggestion of reduction method for social insurance cost of startup SMEs based on the study abroad. We suggest several methods (direct and indirect support, exemption, deferment or loan) based on the pros and cons, government's financial situation, the ease of implementation and effectiveness of mitigation methods, creating conditions for the implementation of social insurance mitigation.

• Journal of Families and Better Life
• /
• v.21 no.6
• /
• pp.43-51
• /
• 2003

The purpose of this research was to investigate the perception of financial risks and expenditures for insurance by household characteristics. Data were collected from 598 housewives by online survey on Dec., 2001. Results indicated that respondents had perceived the risk of unemployment most among three types of risks. Household characteristics reflecting financial needs in emergency case had positive effects on the perception of risks, and hence the expenditures for insurance, in general. On the other hand, the level of emergency preparation had negative effects on the perception of risks and the expenditures for insurance. However, only credit-related risk had a positive relationship with the expenditures for insurance.

• The Journal of Bigdata
• /
• v.2 no.2
• /
• pp.17-31
• /
• 2017

With the development of the big data environment, public institutions also have been providing big data infrastructures. Public data is one of the typical examples, and numerous applications using public data have been provided. One of the cases is related to the employment insurance. All employers have to make contracts for the employment insurance for all employees to protect the rights. However, there are abundant cases where employers avoid to buy insurances. To overcome these challenges, a data-driven approach is needed; however, there are lacks of methodologies to integrate, manage, and analyze the public data. In this paper, we propose a methodology to build a predictive model for identifying whether employers have made the contracts of employment insurance based on public data. The methodology includes collection, integration, pre-processing, analysis of data and generating prediction models based on process mining and data mining techniques. Also, we verify the methodology with case studies.

• Journal of Labour Economics
• /
• v.33 no.2
• /
• pp.91-134
• /
• 2010

This study examines job transition process and its lahor market performance by reasons of job separation, using the Employment Insurance DB(2000~07). The findings show that involuntary job changers lend to suffer greater loss in job spell and real wage than voluntary job changers, which seems to reflect their characteristics such as lower quality of job matching due to unsystematic job search, negative signaling effect in the labor market and decreasing availability of human capital in previous job. In addition, unemployment benefit eligible for involuntary job changers tends to prolong the period of unemployment, while increasing job spell in the following employment.

• Journal of Labour Economics
• /
• v.39 no.4
• /
• pp.1-29
• /
• 2016

This study examines the effects of the "youth unemployment bonus" program implemented in 2004. We view this program through the lenz of search-matching models and apply a quasi-experimental approach to an administrative unemployment insurance database of Korea. This episode is particularly useful because the program aims at long-term unemployed youths and the size of public assistance is large enough to subsidize employers for a year with a monthly subsidy of about $600. The main effects are found to be as follows: (i) the search period gets shortened by 18 days, (ii) the subsequent wage has increased by about three percents, and (iii) a conservative benefit-cost analysis reveals the validity of this program. We interpret these results in the context of general equilibrium models.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.17 no.5
• /
• pp.77-88
• /
• 2019

This study is empirically intended to look into the effects of basic income security on poverty elimination and life independence in income security policies. To achieve this, poverty elimination and life independence through the national pension and basic pension as old-age pension for basic income security and the unemployment benefit and livelihood benefit as employment insurance were determined as dependent variables. The 10th data from Korea Welfare Panel Study were used in the statistical package program to analyze these variables. The overall findings showed that the national pension and basic pension as part of the old-age pension had a positive effect on poverty elimination and life independence. The unemployment benefit and livelihood benefit of employment insurance were not significant and they were rejected. And poverty elimination had a significant effect on life independence and it was adopted. Consequently, the old-age pension is a pensionable income security policy given to all the elderly with lower income, which it is very useful for guaranteeing a basic income. Poverty elimination leads to life independence through the guarantee of a certain basic income, suggesting that they are closely related to each other.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.16 no.5
• /
• pp.440-448
• /
• 2016

This study analyzed the issue and limit of artists's Welfare Law. The issue is about artists' labor, their status, and the process for buying social insurance. In this study, we used the literature method the existing data collection clean up, analysis, and evaluating. The solution plan for the vitalization of the guarantee of social insurance for stage actors is as follows. First, based on social insurance law, is to grant an exceptional status to stage artists. Second, the process for buying social insurance has to be changed to posterior judgement by Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism after buying social insurance through Ministry of Employment and Labor. And when a theater company as a leaseholder rent a theater, it should be mandatory for it to get existing industrial accident compensation law. As a new numerical formula, there are an unemployment insurance numerical formula considering distinct characteristics of artists' labor and a formula of calculating insurance fee for industrial accident compensation. Last, there needs to be an introduction of exceptional method allowing a preparatory period for the production of a play and stage actors' side job.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.32 no.1
• /
• pp.131-169
• /
• 2010

I develop a matching model in which risk-averse workers face borrowing constraints and make a labor force participation decision as well as a job search decision. A sharp distinction between unemployment and out of the labor force is made: those who look for work for a certain period but find no job are classified as the unemployed and those who do not look for work are classified as those out of the labor force. In the model, the job search decision consists of two steps. First, each individual who is not working obtains information about employment opportunities. Second, each individual who decides to search has to take costly actions to find a job. Since individuals differ with respect to asset holdings, they have different reservation job-finding probabilities at which an individual is indifferent between searching and not searching. Individuals, who have large asset holdings and thereby are less likely to participate in the labor market, have high reservation job-finding probability, and they are less likely to search if they have less quality of information. In other words, if individuals with large asset holdings search for job, they must have very high quality of information and face very high actual job-finding probability. On the other hand, individuals with small asset holdings have low reservation job-finding probability and they are likely to search for less quality of information. They face very low actual job-finding probability and seem to remain unemployed for a long time. Therefore, differences in the quality of information explain heterogeneous job search decisions among individuals as well as higher job finding probability for those who reenter the labor market than for those who remain in the labor force. The effect of the extended maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits on the aggregate labor market and the labor market flows is investigated. The benchmark benefit duration is set to three months. As maximum benefit duration is extended up to six months, the employment-population ratio decreases while the unemployment rate increases because individuals who are eligible for benefits have strong incentives to remain unemployed and decide to search even if they obtain less quality of information, which leads to low job-finding probability and then high unemployment rate. Then, the vacancy-unemployment ratio decreases and, in turn, the job-finding probability for both the unemployed and those out of the labor force decrease. Finally, the outflow from nonparticipation decreases with benefit duration because the equilibrium job-finding probability decreases. As the job-finding probability decreases, those who are out of the labor force are less likely to search for the same quality of information. I also consider the matching model with two states of employment and unemployment. Compared to the results of the two-state model, the simulated effects of changes in benefit duration on the aggregate labor market and the labor market flows are quite large and significant.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
• /
• v.17 no.29
• /
• pp.47-61
• /
• 1994

Today, we can see the more serious industrial accidents than in the past according to the high growth rate of industrial society. Therefore, from the corporate as well as the human viewpoint it pays to have workers adequately trained and safety - oriented. The cost of accidents is high in terms of medical insurance costs lost time on the job, legal fees for court cases, workers' compensation, disability insurance, and unemployment compensation. The cost of preventing occupational accidents or illnesses is much less then the cost of treatment or workers' compensation. In this study, we investigate the situations of industrial accidents and safety control of 277 coporates in Busan, analyze the causes of accidents and propose the countermeasures to each of causes.