• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.117-134
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• 2004

This study suggests a data driven optimization approach, which simulates the models of human learning processes from cognitive sciences. It shows how the human learning processes can be simulated and applied to solving combinatorial optimization problems. The main advantage of using this method is in applying it into problems, which are very difficult to simulate. 'Undecidable' problems are considered as best possible application areas for this suggested approach. The concept of an 'undecidable' problem is redefined. The learning models in human learning and decision-making related to combinatorial optimization in cognitive and neural sciences are designed, simulated, and implemented to solve an optimization problem. We call this approach 'SLO : simulated learning for optimization.' Two different versions of SLO have been designed: SLO with position & link matrix, and SLO with decomposition algorithm. The methods are tested for traveling salespersons problems to show how these approaches derive new solution empirically. The tests show that simulated learning for optimization produces new solutions with better performance empirically. Its performance, compared to other hill-climbing type methods, is relatively good.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.307-335
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• 2015

An important component in Prawitz's and Dummett's proof-theoretic accounts of validity is the condition for validity of open arguments. According to their accounts, roughly, an open argument is valid if there is an effective method for transforming valid arguments for its premises into a valid argument for its conclusion. Although their conditions look similar to the proof condition for implication in the BHK explanation, their conditions differ from the BHK account in an important respect. If the premises of an open argument are undecidable in an appropriate sense, then that argument is trivially valid according to Prawitz's and Dummett's definitions. I call this 'the triviality problem'. After a brief exposition of their accounts of proof-theoretic validity, I discuss triviality problems raised by undecidable atomic sentences and by Godel sentence. On this basis, I suggest an emendation of Prawitz's definition of validity of argument.