• Title/Summary/Keyword: USFK

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Lessons learned from Multinational Parties Involved Program Management Consortiums in Korea

  • KO, Ok-Yeol
    • International conference on construction engineering and project management
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    • 2015.10a
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    • pp.32-36
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    • 2015
  • This study explores the issue of program management consortia involving multinational participants. The aim of this research was to leverage advantages in program management (PM) skills and PM model improvement in product line construction in mega scale construction programs, typically funded by public funds. Such ventures involve multinational parties using dedicated partnering based on a program management consortium (PMC) to reduce confrontation between parties in complex circumstances, allowing an open and non-adversarial approach to project management. This research also seeks to implement an ongoing feedback program of best practices and lessons learned to minimize the repetition of mistakes and to reduce costs in sequenced construction. Recently, the Korean government has planned to undertake three large new projects: the Korean Peninsula major river maintenance, the reclamation of Se-Mangum, and the Science/Business City. This paper starts by providing a framework for the cost-reduction strategy for the United States Forces Korea (USFK) Relocation Program, which will be funded with public funds and a private fund investment (PFI) that combines programs executed by two governments as owners and multinational stakeholders, joined in the PMC. The establishment of project-oriented consortia is an innovative and non-adversarial approach to massive international construction projects. Such projects have used various tools effectively and skillfully. This experience may offer an opportunity to practice new and advanced program management delivery methods, and it is expected that Korea will gain a competitive advantage in the international construction market.

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A Study on the Network Governance Model Using the Returned Area(Camp Market) ( 반환공여구역(캠프마켓) 활용을 위한 네트워크 거버넌스 모형 연구)

  • Yoon, mi
    • Journal of Urban Science
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    • v.12 no.1
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    • pp.21-34
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    • 2023
  • Based on the theory of network governance, this study aims to establish a n'work governance model and present strategic measures for the use of return donor zones. In a network society, it is difficult for the government to handle complex problems alone, so close cooperation between related agencies has become important. After the return of the USFK base, most of the policies established by the government have not been carried out smoothly, so it is necessary to introduce cooperative network governance.Accordingly, technical statistics were analyzed for camp market business institutions to examine the centrality and structure of network relations (information sharing relationship, idea exchange relationship, civil complaint sharing relationship). As a result of the analysis, the Camp Market Division of Incheon City had the most central role and great influence in the camp market, which was maintained even when the time changed. Currently, it is in the form of a vertical network centered on local governments, but in the future, a horizontal network is suitable to strengthen cooperative relations and must be systematically managed around managers.

The effect of using the CAMBRA mobile application on dental caries management in children and adolescents (CAMBRA 모바일 애플리케이션을 이용한 소아, 청소년의 치아우식 관리 효과)

  • An-Na Yeo;Yu-Min Kang;Seul-Gi Kim;Su-Young Lee
    • Journal of Korean society of Dental Hygiene
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    • v.24 no.4
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    • pp.281-289
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    • 2024
  • Objectives: This study aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the CAMBRA-students application by assessing the changes in dental caries risk factors and management effectiveness in elementary and middle school students. Methods: This study was conducted between July 2023 and May 2024 and included 113 participants (55 experimental and 58 control participants). Participants used the CAMBRA-students application to enter the protective and risk factors. Clinicians recorded the disease indicators and classified the participants into risk groups. Only the experimental group received the tailored dental caries management program, with feedback provided via the applicationat each intervention stage. Results: The pre- and post-intervention assessments revealed an increase in the high-risk group and a decrease in the extremehigh-risk group. Conversely, the control group exhibited a decrease in the high-risk group and an increase in the extreme high-risk group. The DMFT index and rateand salivary flow rate increased in both groups. The Simple Hygiene Score and ΔR decreased and increased in the experimental and control groups, respectively, with no statistically significant differences. Conclusions: The CAMBRA-students application effectively prevented dental caries in children and adolescents. The future development of personalized oral care programs tailored to different life stages is recommended.

Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an (천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망)

  • Kim, Sung-Man
    • Strategy21
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    • s.34
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

Exercising the Rights of Self-Defense and Using Force in Response to North Korean Provocations (북한의 군사도발에 대응한 군사력 사용과 자위권 행사)

  • Bai, Hyung-Soo
    • Strategy21
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    • s.40
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    • pp.216-234
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    • 2016
  • 본 논문은 자위권 사용과 군사력 사용 간의 관계를 분석하고 이를 한반도 서해에서의 한국과 북한 간 해상긴장 상황에 적용시킨 이슈를 다룬다. 국가가 행사하는 자위권(self-defense: 自衛權)은 기본적으로 전쟁 방지를 위한 기본적 원칙이다. 그러나 이는 군사력 사용(Use of Forces: 軍事力 使用) 또는 무력행사(武力行事)이라는 측면에서 칼의 양날과 같은 결과를 낳는다. 즉 자위권 행사로 전쟁의 확산을 방지하는 반면에 자위권 행사로 상대방에 대한 적성(敵性)을 인정해 주는 경우이다. 반면 북한의 군사도발은 전방향적이며, 1953년 한반도 정전협정 위반이다. 1953년 정전협정 체결 이후 양국은 서해 북방한계선(NLL)에서의 군사적 충돌을 거쳤으며, 이는 과연 한국이 자위권 차원에서의 방어태세와 군사력 사용 측면에서의 대응태세 간에 괴리가 존재하고 있다는 것으로 나타나고 있다. 당연히 피해를 받는 곳은 한국이며, 이는 서해 북방한계선에서의 남북한 해군 간 대결국면에서 나타나고 있다. 이에 본 논문은 자위권을 국가 차원 행사하는 수준과 작전에 투입된 현장 작전 지휘관 차원에서 행사하는 수준으로 구분하여 다룬다. 서해 북방한계선 부근 수역에서의 북한의 해상 군사도발에 대해 현장 작전 지휘관이 행사하는 자위권은 대한민국 정부 차원에서의 자위권 행사와는 다르면, 이 문제를 국제법을 중심으로 분석하기에는 너무나 많은 제한점이 있다. 현행 국제법상 국가 자위권 문제는 군사력을 동반하는 문제로서 그 행사요건이 매우 애매모호하고 까다롭다. 그러나 현장 작전지휘관의 자위권 행사는 단호해야 하며, 이는 군사력 운용으로 나타나야 한다. 실제 서해에서의 남북한 대결국면에서의 대한민국 해군의 자위권 행사는 정전협정에 의거 제한되고 있으며, 이는 2010년 북한의 천안함 침몰과 연평도 폭격도발 시 대한 민국 해군과 해병대의 대응에서 증명되었다. 현재 대한민국 국방부는 현장 작전 지휘관에서 소위 '선제적 자위권 행사' 부여 필요성에 대한 논의를 진행 중으로 알려져 있다. 이에 따라 선제적 자위권 행사를 위한 조치들을 제도화하는 움직임을 보이고 있다. 예를 들면 2013년 발표된 대한민국 합참과 유엔사령부/한미 연합사령부/주한미군사령부 북한 군사 도발에 대한 대응계획(ROK JCS and UNC/CFC/USFK Counter-Provocation Plan)이 이를 간접적으로 증명하고 있다. 선제적 자위권은 행사에 있어 몇 가지 원칙을 요구하고 있으며, 이에 대한 합법성 문제는 아직 해결되고 있지 않다. 따라서 이 문제와 북한 군사도발 시에 대한 대한민국의 선제적 자위권 행사 간 연관성 문제를 어떻게 해석할 수 있는가에 대한 연구가 필요한 실정이다. 평시 군사력 사용에 따른 무력행사의 적법성은 그 인정이 대단히 어려운 것이 현실이며, 이에 따라 북한의 군사도발에 대한 가장 효율적 방안이 선제적 자위권이라면, 이에 대한 법적 대응이 무엇인가에 대한 제도적 근거를 필요로 할 것이다.

A Study on the Statistical Evaluation of Apolipoprotein E Genotype and Alzheimer's Disease (Apolipoprotein E 유전자형과 알츠하이머형 치매의 통계적인 고찰)

  • Jung, An Na;Lee, Yoen Ju;Choi, Sam Kyu;Park, Jung Oh;Woo, Myoung Soo;Yu, Kyong Nae
    • Korean Journal of Clinical Laboratory Science
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    • v.36 no.2
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    • pp.110-114
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    • 2004
  • Apolipoprotein E is the major lipid-carrier protein in the brain, and several studies provided evidence that apolipoprotein E(ApoE) epsilon4 allele can be considered a genetic risk factor for Alzheimer's disease(AD). Inheritance of the APOE gene has three alleles: ${\varepsilon}2$, ${\varepsilon}3$ and ${\varepsilon}4$. There are six possible genotypes: ${\varepsilon}2/{\varepsilon}2$, ${\varepsilon}3/{\varepsilon}3$, ${\varepsilon}4/{\varepsilon}4$, ${\varepsilon}2/{\varepsilon}3$, ${\varepsilon}2/{\varepsilon}4$, ${\varepsilon}3/{\varepsilon}4$. AD is characterized by a progressive loss of function and death of nerve cells in several areas of the brain. The ${\varepsilon}4$ allele is associated with a risk for developing AD. People with the ${\varepsilon}4/{\varepsilon}4$ genotype have the highest risk, but people with the ${\varepsilon}2/{\varepsilon}4$ or ${\varepsilon}3/{\varepsilon}4$ genotypes are also likely to develop the disease. 64.3% of people carry the is ${\varepsilon}3/{\varepsilon}3$ genotype, 22.1% carry the second ${\varepsilon}3/{\varepsilon}4$ genotype but, ${\varepsilon}2/{\varepsilon}2$ genotype is not usually found of people carry the 3.6% is ${\varepsilon}4/{\varepsilon}4$ genotype in a total of a test group of 140 people. The ratio of ${\varepsilon}4/{\varepsilon}4$ genotype related directly with AD is less than the ${\varepsilon}3/{\varepsilon}3$ genotype, but the ${\varepsilon}2/{\varepsilon}4$ and ${\varepsilon}3/{\varepsilon}4$ genotype ratio of indirect AD risk is 25.7% in the group of people, regardless. Thus, we have referred to the benefit from the treatment of AD through apoE genotype diagnosis.

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Analysis of the Construction Process Managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Far East District Using IDEF0 (주한미군공사 수행을 위한 FED(Far East District) 프로세스 분석에 관한 연구)

  • Hwang, Jae-Hong;Ham, Nam-Hyuk;Kim, Je-Hyuck;Kim, Jae-Jun
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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    • v.10 no.1
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    • pp.163-173
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    • 2010
  • A significant number of projects have been managed by US Army Corps of Engineers FED. Today, more information must be provided to the parties involved in the projects by phase than ever before. Specifically, USFK`s construction projects have been managed by FED(Far East District). Recently, however, large US private construction companies have been filling the role previously taken by FED. However, there is few construction managers to implement FED project in Korea. Accordingly, this study analyzes FED projects practices with focus on the construction management actors in order to suggest guideline. This study suggests a model FED construction process(Bid, Contract, Construction, As-Built Phase) by analyzing the existing FED project process using a IDEF0 methodology.

Directions in Promoting Independence in Operational Control (전시작전통제권 단독 행사 추진의 방향)

  • Park, Seung-Sik
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.4
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    • pp.351-379
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    • 2006
  • Former ministers of national defense and foreign affairs, intellectuals such as former and incumbent professors, and various NGO groups are demanding the South Korean government to stop promoting independence in operational control which is currently held by the United States Armed Forces in Korea commander. Although the Korea should exercise operational control independently in the future, orientation on the direction which should be taken under consideration in promoting this transfer should be assumed. First of all, South Korea must sufficiently examine the criticisms and dissenting opinions, and reflect them in promoting independence in operational control. From now on, the South Korean government should reflect the opinions of experts in operational control, and must promote the transfer with national consensus. Unilateral enforcement of the transfer may cause serious errors and aggravate conflicts Second, ROKA's exercise of independence in operational control should take place only after gaining restraint on North Korea's attack against the South, and the issues on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction(WMD) has been resolved, and a peace regime has been reached. Furthermore, exercise of independence in wartime operational control should be promoted only if there is a guarantee that international trust and the military collaboration will be restored to a level beyond the present state. Third, the USFK and the Korean-US alliance is providing South Korea with national security, not to mention tremendous diplomatical, and economical benefits However, if the alliance between the two countries become weakened due to the exercise of the independence in operational control, we might suffer a great deal of loss. Even though reasonable justification and external independence may be gained through promoting independence in operational control, it should be promoted in a longitudinal manner because national security problems and conflicts may be intensified, and there is no actual profit in doing so. Fourth, if the Korean-US alliance becomes weakened and therefore the United States decides to discuss eastern-asia strategies, North Korea deterrence strategies, and Japanese rearmament issues with other neighboring countries, South Korea may become diplomatically isolated and a subordinate to surrounding countries, destroying the independence we have now instead of restoring it Therefore searching for means to reinforce international trust and collaboration between South Korea and the United States, and leaving ROKA’s independence in operational control as a long term objective would be a more realistic method.

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A Study of the Influencing Factors for Decision Making on Construction Contract Types : Focused on DoD Construction Acquisitions with Firm Fixed Price and Cost Reimbursable in FAR (건설공사 대가지급방식의 의사결정 영향요인에 관한 연구 - 미국 연방조달규정에 따른 미국 국방성의 정액계약과 실비정산계약을 중심으로 -)

  • Son, Young-Hoon;Kim, Kyung-Rai
    • Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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    • v.25 no.2
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    • pp.23-35
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    • 2024
  • This study analyzed the correlation between each of the 12 influencing factors in FAR 16.04 and the decision-making process for construction contract types, using data from a total of 2,406 DoD Construction Acquisitions spanning from 2008 to 2022. The study considered 12 independent variables, grouped into 4 Characteristics with 3 factors each. Meanwhile, all other contract types were categorized into two types: Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) and Cost-Reimbursement Contract (CRC), which served as the dependent variables. The findings revealed that FFP contracts significantly dominated in terms of acquisition volume. In line with prevailing beliefs, logistic data analysis and Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) analysis of Relative Weights from Experts' Survey demonstrated that independent variables like Uncertainty of the Scope of Work and Complexity found out to be increasing the likelihood of selecting CRC. The number of contractors in the market does indeed influence the possibilities of contract decision-making between CRC and FFP. Meanwhile, the p-values of the top 3 influencing factors on CRC from the AHP analysis-namely, Appropriateness of CAS, Project Urgency, and Cost Analysis-exceeded 0.05 in the binominal regression results, rendering it inconclusive whether they significantly influenced the construction contract type decision, particularly with respect to payment methods. This outcome partly results from the fact that a majority of respondents possessed specific experiences related to the USFK relocation project. Furthermore, influencing factors in construction projects behave differently than common beliefs suggest. As a result, it is imperative to consider the 12 influencing factors categorized into 4 Characteristics areas before establishing acquisition strategies for targeted construction projects.

The lesson From Korean War (한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로-)

  • Yoon, Il-Young
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.8
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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