• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 1997.05b
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• pp.177-182
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• 1997

금속연료가 연소할 때 발생하는 Fission Gas는 주로 직경방향으로의 Swelling을 일으켜 낮은 연소도의 원인이 되어 왔다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 높은 연소도를 갖는 금속연료의 개발을 목적으로 Fission Gas가 Plenum으로 쉽게 방출하는 조직인 Laminar Structure를 갖는 합금의 설계를 연구하였다. 또한 조사 후의 조직안정성을 예측하기 위해 열처리 후의 미세조직의 변화를 관찰하여 조직안정성을 시험하였다. U-10wt.%Zr 합금 중 Zr 원소 대신에 2wt.% 및 3wt.%의 W 또는 Mo을 첨가한 합금을 제조하여 합금원소 첨가의 영향에 따른 미세조직의 변화를 조사하였다. 그 결과 모든 조성의 합금은 Matrix에 있어서 Laminar Structure를 나타내었다. 또한 U-10wt.%Zr에 비해 2wt.% 및 3wt.%W의 W 또는 Mo를 첨가한 합금의 lamina Thickness가 철면 미세해짐을 확인하였다. 특히 U-7wt.%Zr-3wt.%W의 경우는 U-10wt.Zr에 비해 Laminar Thickness가 1/2배까지 감소되었다. 합금원소(W, Mo) 첨가에 의한 Laminar Thickness의 감소는 Fission Gas의 Inter-connected Path가 보다 잘 형성되게 하여 Gas의 방출속도를 증가시켜 Swelling을 감소시킬 것으로 생각된다. 열처리한 금속연료의 미세조직을 비교한 결과를 보면 합금원소(W, Mo)를 첨가한 합금을 50$0^{\circ}C$에서 1000시간동안 열처리한 것을 U-Zr 2원계 합금을 열처리한 것과 비교했을 때 약 1/3배 정도의 Laminar Thickness를 유지하는 것으로 보아 합금원소를 첨가하면 조사 후의 조직안정성에도 크게 기여할 것으로 기대된다.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Precision Engineering Conference
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• 2012.05a
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• pp.787-788
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• 2012

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.99-114
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• 1987

U. S. commercial landings of wild salmon have remained relatively stable for the past 5 years, averaging 300,000 MT. While the same period, U. S. imports of fresh salmon have increased over ten fold from 1.8 to over 19 million pounds. Over 70 percent of the new supplies of fresh salmon come from Norway. Norway exports to the United States were negligible in 1980 and 1981. However, U. S. imported 1,768 M. T. in 1983, 3,896 M. T. in 1984, and 6,272 M. T. in 1985. Over the past 5 years, import price of fresh wild salmon from Canada has declined steadily from ＄2.58 per pound to ＄1.25 per pound in 1985, while those from Norway had remained unchanged, ranging from ＄3.28 to ＄3.45 over the same period. Norway's cultured salmon entered the United States in 1985 at about ＄3.35/1b., roughly triple the price of Canadian fresh wild salmon imports. U. S. apparent consumption of fresh and frozen salmon has sharply increased from 50,000 MT in 1981 to 92,000 MT in 1985, up 86 percent over the five years. Annual per capita consumption has increased steadily from 0.47 pounds in 1981 to 0.85 pounds in 1985. The estimated demand models show that the annual wholesale price of fresh salmon in the U. S. market would be declined by increase in supplies and would be raised by increase in the U. S. GNP. The empirical results in this study show that wholesale price of fresh salmon in 1990 would remain unchanged at the 1985 level, under the following condition: 1) Norwegian production of Atlantic fresh salmon would reach 80,000 MT (176 million pounds by 1990) 2) Imports of Norwegian Atlantic fresh salmon would keep the same percentage (21%) of Norwegian productions in 1990 3) Imports from other countries and U. S. domestic production would increase and maintain the same level of 25% of U. S. total supplies in 1990 4) U. S. GNP would increase by ＄200 billion annually, slightly less than in the past years.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.47-82
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• 2015

To control the sphere, it required a strategic understanding to sphere and a power for overcome to it. In the early 20th century, the Pacific-War is a confrontation between the U.S. and the Japan for holding supremacy a pacific ocean sphere, building on maritime geopolitical perception. The Pacific ocean is a large of sphere, so if a country pursues a Pacific region supremacy, it needs a strategic perception and capability to control the sphere. After the U.S. has unified the continental, it has formed geopolitical perception in the Pacific ocean and by the way to control the Pacific ocean selected a naval power. The U.S. must have overcome a Pacific sphere for getting through to the Pacific region, this concept has developed the War Plan Orange(war plan relations with the Japan). Meanwhile, at this point of time, the Japan has recognized to a geopolitical point of view about security environment in the Pacific ocean. like as the U.S. has the War Plan Orange in mind for building on geopolitical perception of the Pacific ocean, the Japan also has learned geopolitical perception from the U.S. Because of this, the Japan has established the Interception-Attrition strategy(war plan relations with the U.S.). If we don't have overcome a sphere of the Pacific ocean, we don't hold hegemony of the Asia-Pacific region. So the analysis of perspective maritime geopolitics about the Pacific war is a meaningful study.

• Communications of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.201-205
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• 2012

A space X is cs-starcompact if for every open cover $\mathcal{U}$ of X, there exists a convergent sequence S of X such that St(S, $\mathcal{U}$) = X, where $St(S,\mathcal{U})\;=\; \cup\{U{\in}\mathcal{U}:U{\cap}S{\neq}\phi\}$. In this paper, we prove the following statements: (1) There exists a Tychonoff cs-starcompact space having a regular-closed subset which is not cs-starcompact; (2) There exists a Hausdorff cs-starcompact space with arbitrary large extent; (3) Every Hausdorff centered-Lindel$\ddot{o}$f space can be embedded in a Hausdorff cs-starcompact space as a closed subspace.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.195-221
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• 1994

This study investigates the wealth effect of foreign acquisition of U.S. based firms. Contrary to previous studies, this analysis demonstrates that after appropriate control of domestic-acquired targets, the wealth gains to the shareholders of targets in foreign takeovers are similar to those in domestic takeovers. This paper investigates the validity of the competitive acquisition market in cross-border takeovers and concludes that : 1) in cases of inward foreign direct investment into the U.S., foreign firms do not realize significant net benefits from acquisitions; and 2) the foreign acquirer is as well informed as its U.S, counterparts about the target's market. The results of this study are consistent with the view that each country has different motivations for investing in the U.S. market. Consider, for example, Japan. The evidence suggests that Japanese companies pay a considerable price for U.S. targets which have performed poorly before the takeover. While there is no specific rationale to explain why Japanese firms buy the most volatile and worst performing firms, international barriers may provide a possible reason for these anomalies. Overall, the evidence of this paper supports the view that foreign takeovers occur in a competitive acquisition market.

• Journal of Fashion Business
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• v.6 no.6
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• pp.34-42
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• 2002

Anthropometric studies and multicultural research on body changes are fundamental and important data for domestic apparel industry and for globalization of women's clothing marketing. The objective of this study is to compare the general body measurements and shoulder angles of Korean and U. S. elderly women to supply basic data for the apparel design. The anthropometric data was collected including both direct and indirect measurements of 272 women over the age of 55 in Korean (subject = 123) and the U.S (subject = 149). The statistical methods used for the analysis of measurement data are the factor and cluster analysis respectively. The results of the factor analysis indicated that 5 factors can be extracted in Korean and 4 factors can be extracted in the U. S. from 15 body measurements to explain the variance. The results of cluster analysis by shoulder slope angle and forward displacement of the shoulder of Korean and the U. S. women classified them in three groups, cluster 1, cluster 2 and cluster 3 respectively.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2014.05a
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• pp.377-379
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• 2014

U.S. Navy had constructed 27 aegis cruisers from USS Ticonderoga(CG-47) and has been constructing aegis destroyers from USS Arleigh Burke(DDG-51). The aegis warships are the core anti-air forces of U.S. navy since 1983, the year of first aegis cruiser launching. U.S. Navy has been modernizing aegis warships to cope with advanced air threats. In this paper, it is reported that current status and analyzed report of U.S. Navy's aegis warships and aegis modernization plan.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.59-90
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• 2015

Since 1855, the federal courts of the United States have been empowered to assist in the gathering of evidence for use before foreign tribunals. Today, the source of that authority is 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$ which permits the courts to order a person "to give [ ] testimony... or to produce a document ... for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal${\cdots}$ ." It was generally assumed, until the United States Supreme Court's decision of Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. in 2004, that arbitration tribunals were not "foreign tribunals" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$. While the issue in Intel did not involve an arbitration tribunal, a statement by the Supreme Court in dicta has called into question the exact parameters of the words "foreign tribunal," resulting in a split of opinion among the federal courts of the United States. This article explores the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$, examines the United States Supreme Court decision in Intel, and discusses the split among the courts of the United States regarding the interpretation of "foreign tribunal." The article further surveys emerging issues: is an arbitration tribunal in a case involving foreign parties and seated in the United States a "foreign tribunal"; does agreeing to the use of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration circumscribe the use of 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$; can a party be ordered to produce documents located outside the United States; and is there a role for judicial estoppel in determining whether an application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$ should be granted?