• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.47-75
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• 2023

Compared to the EU, which legislates the Carbon Border Adjustment System (CBAM), the United States' carbon border adjustment policy movement is still relatively slow. Recently, however, a related bill has been proposed in the United States, and research institutes have been presenting research results on how to introduce an upstream carbon tax rather than an emission trading system and carry out carbon border adjustment based on it. Therefore, in this study, we looked at the economic and environmental effects of introducing this type of upstream carbon tax and carbon border adjustment in Korea. If an upstream carbon tax of KRW 30,000 per ton of CO₂ is applied to the net supply of domestic fossil energy, the expected carbon tax revenue is approximately KRW 22.9961 trillion, equivalent to about 5.7% of the total revenue of the Korean government of KRW 402 trillion in 2019. In addition, the carbon dioxide content of the steel sector, calculated based on the energy supply and demand status of the steel sector, which emits the most greenhouse gas emissions in Korea and has a considerable amount of overseas exports, was 106.22 million tons of CO₂. On the other hand, assuming that the upstream carbon tax of 30,000 won per ton of CO₂ embodied is directly passed on to the production cost of the steel sector, the carbon tax burden in the steel sector is estimated to reach approximately KRW 3.1865 trillion. Even after deducting KRW 1.1599 trillion in export refunds estimated by using the share of exports of steel products, the net carbon tax burden on steel products for domestic demand amounts to KRW 2.0266 trillion, which is analyzed to act as a factor in increasing the price of steel products.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.