• Journal of the Korean Society of Costume
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• v.66 no.6
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• pp.122-134
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• 2016

With the advent of the new political regime of Jong Un Kim, North Korea is undergoing many changes, with its main motivation being economic growth. This study aims to identify the changes in clothing in North Korea under the new political climate. The research conducted a review on literature and empirical study. For literature review, books and papers from studies related to North Korea have been reviewed. For the empirical part, interviews with diverse class of North Korean refugees including Hanawon, videos on TV, 1,100 pictures and related articles from newspapers and Internet have been collected. Through this analysis, the study found that subtle changes in North Korean fashion started prior to the Jong Un Kim's regime, but has become full-blown since Kim's assumption of power. This proves that the country is not yet independent from its political situation. The results are as follows: First, the appearance of Ri Sol-ju has liberalized the fashion concept of North Korean women, and the popularity of her trademark style has actually contributed to a more amicable image for Kim. Second, the "Hallyu" style has spread to North Korea through various channels, and has started new trends. Third, the diversification of fashion styles has been greatly accelerated in accordance with the expansion of market, resulting from the economic revitalization policy. Last of all, Jong Un Kim's direct orders concerning fashion have resulted in some significant changes. The sophisticated uniforms of flight attendants and the development of luxury cosmetics being prime examples. As studies on this subject are extremely rare, this research is significant to identify the changes on the clothing culture under Jong Un Kim's regime, and to present an expanded view, as the two countries work towards an united Korea.

• Korean Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences
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• v.41 no.6
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• pp.493-504
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• 2008

In the seas around the Korean Peninsula, the seasonal cycle of zooplankton related to North Pacific regime shifts was investigated to understand the reaction of the ecosystem to climate change using long-term data on zooplankton biomass (1965-2000) and the abundance of four major zooplankton groups: copepods, amphipods, chaetognaths, and euphausiids (1978-2000). In general, the zooplankton biomass showed a large peak in spring and a small peak in autumnin Korean waters, but there was a slight difference in the peak time depending on the location and the period before and after the North Pacific regime shift. The zooplankton biomass showed conspicuous seasonal peaks in R-III (1990-2000) compared to R-I (1965-1976) and R-II (1977-1988), and the seasonal peak shifted from the autumn in R-II to the spring in R-III. The peak of copepods and euphausiids in abundance was from April to June, while chaetognaths peaked from August to October. We postulate that the time lag between the peaks for copepods and chaetognaths results from the predator-prey relationship. The regime shift in 1989 did not alter the seasonal cycle of the four major zooplankton groups, although it enhanced their production. The seasonal peaks of the four major zooplankton groups did not shift, while the seasonal peaks of the zooplankton biomass did shift. This was not only becausethe zooplankton biomass included other mesozooplankton groups but also because the abundance of the four major zooplankton groups increased significantly in spring.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.69-92
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• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.113-122
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• 2018

The issue of security on the Korean peninsula is facing the greatest upheaval in 2018 with the inter-Korean summit and the US-North Korea summit. North Korea has pursued the parallel policy developing military and economic at the same time. However, North Korea is changing its route to give up nuclear weapons and focus on the economy through summit talks. Since the change in North Korea is similar to that of Libya in the past, it is necessary to analyze why North Korea is trying to abandon its nuclear program and how the process is flowing compared to the case of Libya. The Libya model was constructed and analyzed in terms of international and domestic perpectives and recognition of the situation by leadership. North Korea's nuclear policy was evaluated based on the Libya model. The nuclear development of Libya and North Korea has caused diplomatic and economic pressures from the international community and ultimately led to instability of the regime. Two countries have tried to abandon nuclear program in order to solve the instability of the regime, also gain the economic reward insead. Libya took economic benefits and secured some of the stability of the regime, but the regime collapsed under the wave of democracy due to the influx of foreign capital and ideas. North Korea will seek diplomatic and economic gains with the example of Libya, but will try to limit as much as possible the culture of democracy and the full opening that can be incidental.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.3_1
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• pp.107-114
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• 2016

The North Korean regime, Kim Jungun's foreign policy is changed frequently. And their military policy has no gravity. North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and long range missile. Now they have Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. These activities redound a great threat in Korean peninsula. There are a no possibilities to give up its nuclear weapons and missile development. For the peace in Korean peninsula, we should make North Korea to abandon its nuclear himself through effective sanctions. Now China should effort to control North Korea. To reduce the threat we should coordinate the strategic interests of China and US. This study is to predict the North Korea military activities to analyze "military policies."

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.5
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.169-238
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• 2010

The year 2010 is the 60th anniversary commemorating the Korean War. China intervened in the Korean War with the logics such as "To Resist the U.S.'s Aggression and Aid North Korea," "Save Endangered Home & defend Nation," and "If the Lips Are Gone, the Teeth Will Be Exposed to the Cold or If One of Them Falls, the Other is in Danger." However, China had a deep and long connection with North Korea through 1st Chinese Civil War, war against Japan imperialism, and 2nd Chinese Civil War. China has consulted with Kim Il-sung on his invasion of South Korea at the initial stage of development and played a casting vote role in the execution of the invasion plan. During the Korean War, the PLA supported the North Korea's regime by its action, and made the Korea Peninsula divide into two semi-permanently. Even after the war, China continues to maintain relations with North Korea by helping North Korea build the Kim Il-sung's Kingdom. Currently, whenever any issue related to North Korea rises in the international society, China definitely gets involved in those issues and exercises its power. Conditionally 'either armed aggression or, and wartime' in North Korea, China would follow the "Clause of Military Auto Intervention." In addition, China is very likely to establish refugee camps for North Koreans in the Northeastern-Three-Province and to provide rear bases or guerrilla camps for pro-Chinese sects. Furthermore, voluntarily playing a role as spokesman of North Korean Regime in the international society, China will exercise enormous influence on the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

• Economic Analysis
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.34-83
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• 2020

This paper examines two different reunification regimes and investigates the decision making problems on tax and income transfers in a political economy model. The first reunification regime is the South-Driven regime under which the majority of South Korea choose the tax rate, the amount of transfers and the size of migration. The second is the North-Participation regime under which there is no limit on migration and the majority of Unified Korea choose the tax rate and the amount of transfers. In both regimes, Northern residents' migration decisions are endogenous and those who decide not to migrate to the Southern region have an alternative to declare fiscal independence of income redistribution taking place within the North independently. This paper shows that there is no income redistribution in a politico-economic equilibrium under the South-Driven regime. Given that, those remaining in the Northern region decide to declare fiscal independence. On the other hand, the North-Participation regime delivers an equilibrium supporting income redistribution and no fiscal independence.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.55-83
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• 2018

This paper is written to identify the opportunities and risks of the declaration of the end of the Korean War with North Korea. The declaration has been seriously discussed in the course of negotiation for the denuclearization of North Korea especially in 2018. For this purpose, this paper revisits the concepts of related terms such as peace, peace regime, peace agreement and declaration of the end of war. It assesses the background and intention of North Korean request for the declaration. Then, it analyzes opportunities and risks regarding South Korea, if it agrees on the declaration. As a result, this paper found that declaration of the end of the Korean War could provide South Korea with opportunities such as a progress on the North Korean denuclearization, contribution to the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and improvement on South Korea and North Korea relations. At the same time, the declaration could bring risks such as the dismantlement of the United Nations Command, demands of the withdrawal of US forces in Korea, a possible stop of North Korean denuclearization process and the weakening of South Korean peoples' awareness on North Korean threats. South Korea need to heed more on the risks than the opportunities, because the national security should be handled with caution.