• 항공우주시스템공학회지
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.127-132
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• 2016

Recently, China & Japan have expanded their responding ADIZ(Air Defence Identification Zone) to implement each Government's maritime policy and to project their Air Power in preparation for maritime provocation & contingency, especially over the piled area where East Asia countries have claimed to have maritime jurisdiction one another. So this is to guide the Development Option for Korea Air Defence Identification Zone to cope with the maritime intentions of the neighboring countries, considering the international law for ADIZ, the maritime policy and the maritime sovereign & jurisdiction area of the Republic of Korea, etc.

• 대한지리학회지
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• 제44권5호
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• pp.661-674
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• 2009

최근 유엔지명전문가회의에서는 두 개 이상의 국가에 걸치거나 국경을 초월하여 존재하는 지리적 실체가 갖는 이름이 어떤 지위를 가질 것인가에 대하여 활발한 토론이 진행되었다. 두 개의 상반된 견해가 제시되었는데, 하나는 어떤 실체가 위치한 곳에서 사용되는 언어로 표기된 지명은 그 경계 내에서만 토착지명이라는 관점이며, 다른 하나는 어떤 언어로 표기된 지명은 전체에 대하여 토착지명이라는 관점이다. 전자는 지리적 실체가 나뉠 수 있음을 전제로 한다는 점에서 부분적 관점, 후자는 지리적 실체를 나뉘지 않는 전체로 인식한다는 점에서 전체적 관점이라고 부를 수 있다. 부분적 관점에서는 적어도 한국의 영해에서는 '동해'라고 불러야 한다는 점, 전체적 관점에서는 바다 전체에 대해 '동해'는 토착지명이 된다는 점 등에서 볼 때, 어떤 관점에서도 '동해'지명은 존중되어야 한다. 이 논문은 지리적 실체를 나눌 수 있고 각 부분은 다른 형태의 지명을 가질 수 있다는 부분적 관점을 지지한다. 지리적 실체의 분리에 대해서는 지역 주민들이 자신의 것으로 인식하는 바다의 경계를 사용해야 한다. 영어로 표기된 East Sea는 토착지명 '동해'의 번역된 형태로 분류하는 방안이 제안된다.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• 한국해양학회지:바다
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• 제18권2호
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• pp.104-109
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• 2013

이번 연구에서는 서해와 남해에 서식하는 노래미(Hexagrammos agrammus)와 쥐노래미(Hexagrammos otakii)의 산란특성 연구를 위해 2012년 11월부터 12월까지 스쿠버다이빙을 통한 잠수조사를 실시하였다. 서해에서는 수심 6-7 m의 크고 작은 암반지역 위에 있는 홍조류에 노래미 난괴가 간격을 두고 부착되어 있었으며, 난괴 주변에도 홍조류가 많이 분포하고 있었다. 산란기의 노래미 수컷은 붉은색의 혼인색을 띄며 난괴를 보호하고 있었고, 수정란과 함께 은폐되어 눈에 잘 띄지 않았다. 남해의 경우 수심은 서해와 같은 6-7 m이지만, 사질 및 암반에 놓인 폐그물 위, 바위 틈, 해조가 무성한 암반지역 등 비교적 다양한 곳에 노출되어 있는 4-8개의 쥐노래미 난괴를 확인할 수 있었으며, 서해와는 다르게 외부에 노출되고 조류소통이 좋은 지역에서 난괴가 확인되었으며, 쥐노래미 수컷의 혼인색은 황금빛을 띄고 있어 쉽게 발견할 수 있었다.

• 대한원격탐사학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한원격탐사학회 2002년도 Proceedings of International Symposium on Remote Sensing
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• pp.663-663
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• 2002

The National Oceanographic Research Institute of KOREA started to survey for the basic data necessary to territorial sea and EEZ identification and marine development with Multi-Beam Echo Sounder(L3 SeaBeam 2112) since 1996. The Multi-Beam surveys has provided a very new and precise way of describing the morphology and nature of the underwater seabed. Multi-Beam Echo Sounder systems employ sound waves propagating at angles which vary from vertical to nearly horizontal. The locations on the bottom where echoes are generated cover a swath whose port to starboard width may be equal to many times the water depth. Newer Multi-beam bathymetric sonars provide both a beam by beam depth and backscatter amplitude of the bottom. But The backscattered amplitude didn't use for identification of bottom properties because backscatter amplitude effects by the many environmental variables of underwater and seabed. We investigates the utilization of geo-referenced backscatter amplitude and analysis of relationship between The Backscattered Amplitude and Sidescan Sonar imagery from Sea Beam 2112. For the backscattered amplitude imagery mainly represents the properties of sediment, we computed the beam geometry, time-varied amplifier gain, and mainly incidence angle to the topography using bathymetric model at each ping. In this paper, those issues are illustrated, and the angular independent imagery based on swath topographic model is described.

• 대한원격탐사학회지
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• 제28권1호
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• pp.95-100
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• 2012

큰 너울은 먼 해역에서 발생한 후 우리나라 해안에 전파하여 피해를 입히는 경우가 많다. 이를 방지하기 위해서는 우리나라 인근 해역에서 뿐만 아니라 외해역에서도 파랑 관측이 이루어져야 하지만 현장 관측의 경우 많은 비용 및 장비 망실 위험 때문에 어려움이 따른다. 위성의 고도계를 활용할 경우 우리나라 동해 중앙 해역이나 외해 그리고 타 국가의 해역과 같이 접근이 어려운 해양에서 파랑을 관측하는 일이 가능하다. 그러나 이에 앞서서 고도계 파랑 자료의 정확도를 검증하는 것이 필요하다. 본 연구에서는 ENVISAT 위성의 고도계 파고 자료와 이어도 기지에서 관측한 파랑 자료를 비교 분석 한 후 그 활용성을 검토한다.

• 항공우주시스템공학회지
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.44-51
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• 2014

This thesis analyzes the latest operating concept and status for Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) researching overseas ADIZ CONOPS, international legal basis for ADIZ, the intention & background of proclamation for China Air Defense Identification Zone(CADIZ). Firstly, ADIZ is lawful concerning international connivance for ADIZ where around 20 countries have operated, Article 56 "Rights, jurisdiction & duties of the coastal State" and Article 301 "Peaceful uses of the seas" on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLS). Secondly, ADIZ has been regarded as a support means for national interest & policy as well as military air defense one. Thirdly, Based on legal re-interpretation for UNCLS relating to ADIZ, China proclaimed CADIZ where can ensure national maritime policy and strategy including A2/AD(Anti-Access & Area Defence), inroad into the ocean, claim for Senkaku Islands possession, etc..

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.

• 해양안보
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• 제2권1호
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• pp.125-149
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• 2021

후쿠시마 원전 사고가 일어난 지 10년이 지난 지금까지도 일본은 매일 생성되는 원전 오염수 문제를 해결하지 못하고 있다. 그들은 오염수 저장탱크가 한계에 다다를 것으로 예상되자, 안전성에 관한 한국의 우려에도 일방적으로 원전 오염수를 해양에 방출하기로 했다. 문제는 한국의 대응에도 불구하고, 여전히 일본이 『유엔해양법협약』상 의무를 성실히 이행하지 않은 채 해양 방출을 준비하고 있다는 데 있다. 원전 오염수의 방사성물질로 인한 해양오염은 물론, 한국의 해양주권 침탈까지도 우려되는 상황이다. 특히 한번 환경이 오염되기 시작하면 본래의 상태로 되돌리기 어렵기에, 당장 안전성이 보장되지 않는 한 원전 오염수의 해양 방출은 반드시 막아야 한다. 본 논문은 일본과 한국이 원전 오염수 해양 방출 사안으로 빚은 갈등을 해결하기 위한 한국의 대응 전략을 제안한다. 한국은 일본과의 협력, 잠정조치, 주변국과의 공조를 통해 다양한 측면에서 일본의 원전 오염수 해양 방출에 대응해야 할 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권43호
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• pp.29-55
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• 2018

Arctic sea ice has been retreating as a result of the global warming. Arctic sea ice extent for April 2018 averaged 13.71 million square kilometers. This figure shows far less sea ice compared to the average extent from 1981 to 2010. Meanwhile, 287 times of maritime transits through the Northwest Passage have been made during the 2017 and the first ship traversed the Northern Sea Route without the assistant of ice-breaker in August 2017. Commercialization of the Arctic Passage means significant economic and strategic advantages by shortening the distance. In this article, 'Arctic Passage' means Northern Sea Route along the Arctic coast of Russia and Northwest Passage crossing Canadian Arctic Ocean. As climate changes, the potential feasibility of the Arctic Passage has been drawing international attention. Since navigation in this area remains hazardous in some aspects, IMO adopted Polar Code to promote safe, secure and sustainable shipping through the Arctic Passage. Futhermore, Russia and Canada regulate foreign vessels over the maritime zones with the authority to unilaterally exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the Article 234 of UNCLOS. The dispute over the navigation regime of the arctic passage materialized with Russia proclaimed Dmitrii Laptev and Sannikov Straits as historically belong to U.S.S.R. in the mid 1960s and Canada declared that the waters of the passage are historic internal waters in 1973 for the first time. So as to support their claims, In 1985, Russia and Canada established straight baseline including Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage. The United States has consistently protested that the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage are straits used for international navigation which are subject to the regime of transit passage. Firstly, it seems that Russia and Canada do not meet the basic requirements for acquiring a historic title. Secondly, since the Law of the Sea had adopted before the establishment of straight baseline over the Russian Arctic Archipelago and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, Ships can exercise at least the right of innocent passage. Lastly, Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage have fulfilled the both geographical and functional criteria pertaining to the strait used for international navigation under the international law. Especially, should the arctic passage become commercially viable, it can be expected to accumulate the functional criterion. Russia and Canada regulate the ships navigate in their maritime zones by adopting the higher degree of an environmental standard than generally accepted international rules and standard mainly under the Article 234 of UNCLOS. However, the Article 234 must be interpreted restrictively as this contains constraint on the freedom of navigation. Thus, it is reasonable to consider that the Article 234 is limited only to the EEZ of coastal states. Therefore, ships navigating in the Arctic Passage with the legal status of the territorial sea and the international straits under the law of the sea have the right of innocent passage and transit passage as usual.