• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제25권8호
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• pp.1-24
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• 2021

Purpose - This study categorizes factors that influence the utilization of preferential tariffs based on the characteristics of rules of origin (RoO) and identifies and analyzes the influence of these characteristics on the utilization of preferential tariffs and the trade performance of companies. Design/methodology - In this study, we categorized factors that have an influence on the utilization of preferential tariffs based on the characteristics of RoO and investigated and tested the influence of these characteristics on the utilization of preferential tariffs and the trade performance of companies. For empirical analysis, we categorized the characteristics of RoO into restrictiveness, complexity, and uncertainty. We then developed a research model and formulated hypotheses based on previous studies, and tested the hypotheses using statistical software-(SPSS 25.0 and AMOS 18.0.) Findings - Previous studies suggested that each characteristic of RoO is determined by unique features of a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA). This study conducted an empirical analysis on the influence of the characteristics of RoO on the utilization of preferential tariffs and trade performance. The results confirmed that, overall, the characteristics of preferential rules of origin (PRoO) are related to and influence Korean companies' utilization of preferential tariffs and trade performance. As for the degree of the influence, the characteristics were in the order of uncertainty> restrictiveness> complexity. Nevertheless, complexity turned out not to have an influence large enough to change a company's decision on the utilization of preferential tariffs. Based on these results, this study identified unique features of PRoO and related problems for Korean companies that want to utilize preferential tariffs and suggested countermeasures for their effective utilization of preferential tariffs in the future. Originality/value - Companies that want to use preferential tariffs in international trade have to satisfy PRoO. The issue of origin can be regarded as an essential part of an RTA and RoO, are a crucial criterion in using preferential tariffs. The rules are requirements to claim benefits of preferential trade agreements and are the primary reasons companies have trouble in utilizing preferential tariffs. In this sense, this study categorized the characteristics of RoO, which are a key part of an RTA, and surveyed working-level professionals in charge of international trade at Korean companies to investigate the relationship between these characteristics and the utilizations of preferential tariffs and trade performance of the companies.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제20권3호
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• pp.55-63
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• 1994

Optional two-part tariffs are in growing use in telecommunication services markets. This paper considers the problem of designing profit-maximizing optional two-part tariffs for heterogeneous user groups. It is shown that, at an optimum, one of usage charges among a set of optional two-part tariffs should be made equal to marginal cost. It is also shown that, if demand curves cross, then one of usage charges at the optimum can be below marginal cost. An example with linear demand functions is given to illustrate the important features of optimal two-part tariffs.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.49-68
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• 2012

When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제22권1호
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• pp.105-114
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• 1996

Telecommunication services are typically offered with two-part tariffs which consist of the access charges and the usage charges. In the previous analyses of optimal two-part tariffs, consumers have been assumed to be final users. In this paper, we take the telecommunication service as an input factor which is purchased by business consumers. We proposed a two-stage market model in which the good in queston is produced by an upstream monopolist and purchased as an input by firms and they sell their final outputs in a downstream market. We derive the optimal two-part tariffs of inputs in the case of oligopolistic downstream market with heterogeneous downstream firms. It is shown that two-part tariffs are more desirable than uniform prices from a welfare standpoint. It is also shown that if an upstream monopolist earns positive profits, usage charge is less than marginal cost in the optimal two-part tariffs.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제34권
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• pp.189-223
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• 2007

In Korea-U.S.A. FTA Negotiation, U.S.A. request to eliminate barriers of tariffs and non-tariff in trade of cosmetics. Korea applies tariffs of 8% on most cosmetics and personal care products. There are some non-tariffs barriers in cosmetics trade between Korea and U.S.A., for example, transparency on restriction and regulatory, cosmeceuticals, import clearance review, quality control testing, ingredient labelling. Tariffs of 8% on most cosmetics should be eliminated, a proviso of complementary measures on sanitation of Korean people about imported cosmetics. This is a meaning of reformation of prior management(tariffs) by strong ex post management in cosmetics trade. It is important that Korea should construct system of ex post management, for instance, construction of data base on manufacturer, importer, bland name of cosmetics and all ingredients of cosmetics. This is concerned with labelling of cosmetics and cosmeceutical and publication of Korean edition of INCI(International Nomenclature of Cosmetic Ingredient).

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권10호
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• pp.500-506
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• 2005

With the advent of electric power systems moving to a deregulated retail electricity market environment, calculating distribution service tariffs has become a challenging theme for distribution industries and tariff regulators. As distribution business remains as a monopoly, it is necessary to be regulated. And as multiple distribution companies compete with each other, it would be efficient to adopt competition to the determination of distribution service tariffs. This paper proposes a method to calculate distribution service tariffs using yardstick regulation, which can lead to competition among multiple distribution companies. The proposed method takes into account not only recovering revenue requirements but also the advantages of the yardstick regulation based on long-term marginal costs of distribution network expansion algorithms. A computer simulation is carried out to illustrate effectiveness of the proposed method and it is estimated that the algorithm can be applied to compute the distribution service tariffs under retail electricity markets.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.145-166
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• 2017

FTA 협정관세는 수입물품이 협정에 따른 협정관세의 적용대상이며, 협정상의 원산지결정기준에 따라 물품의 원산지가 해당 체약상대국일 경우에 적용된다. 협정관세를 적용받고자 하는 수입자는 수입신고 수리 전까지 세관장에게 협정관세의 적용을 신청하여야 한다. 본 연구는 FTA 체약상대국에서 수입한 물품에 대해 FTA 협정관세 혜택이 배제되어 수입자가 관세당국의 결정에 대한 심판청구를 한 사례를 중심으로 검토하여 FTA를 활용하는 기업의 협정관세 적용상 유의점을 살펴보았으며, 이를 바탕으로 다음과 같은 시사점을 제시하고자 한다. 먼저 한 EU FTA와 FTA 관세특례법상의 비당사국을 경유하는 물품의 직접운송원칙과 관련된 유효요건을 확인하고, 한 미 FTA와 FTA 관세특례법상의 원산지증명서의 인정기준과 협정관세 사후적용을 위한 신청기준 등과 같은 협정관세의 적용기준을 확인하여야한다. 그리고 한 EU FTA와 FTA 관세특례법상의 원산지신고서의 발행자 기준과 선하증권의 원산지신고서 인정 여부를 확인하여야 하며, 무역기업은 관세당국의 FTA 협정관세 배제 결정시 조세심판원의 조세심판청구제도를 적극적으로 활용하여 FTA 협정관세 혜택을 향유하여야 한다. 마지막으로 FTA 협정관세 적용과정에서 특정사안에 대해 무역기업과 관세당국 간에 FTA 협정과 관세특례법상 법적용 기준의 해석상 불일치에 대비하여야 한다.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제13권4호
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• pp.399-410
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• 2011

전통적으로 자국 산업의 이익보호를 위해 관세는 널리 사용되어 왔다. 개발도상의 단계에 있는 나라들은 자국의 유치산업을 보호할 목적으로 관세를 사용하는 반면, 선진국들은 자국의 상품이 타국의 시장에 진출할 수 있도록 타국을 압박하는 수단으로 사용되는 경우가 많다. 본 논문에서는 선진국이 자국의 특정 수출품을 개발도상국 시장에 일정한 비율 이상 진출시키기 위해 개발도상국의 제3의 생산품에 관세를 부과하겠다는 위협을 하는 경우 그 경제적 효과를 간단한 게임이론 모형을 통해 살펴본다. 만약 관세가 부과된 제3의 생산품이 주력 수출품인 경우 개발도상국 정부는-주력 수출품 생산자들의 로비 등을 통해-문제가 된 상품에 일정한 제재를 부과함으로써 선진국과의 마찰을 자발적으로 해소하려는 유인을 갖게 됨을 보인다. 이러한 결과는 최근 FTA로 대변되는 양자 간 무역협정의 체결에서 나타나는 산업 간 이해득실의 차이를 개별 산업의 협상력 차이로 설명할 수 있다는 의미를 지닌다.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제23권3호
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• pp.84-104
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• 2019

Purpose - This paper explains why free trade agreements (FTAs) are more popular than customs unions (CUs) in respect of tariff coordination. Design/methodology - This paper employs an equilibrium theory of trade agreements with tariff coordination. I set up three-country partial equilibrium model with competing exporters. Domestic and exporting firms decide their optimal production under given tariffs and each country levies its tariff under the trade agreements. I found stability of implicit tariff coordination and preference of each country between an FTA and a CU. Findings - I demonstrate that two FTA members can keep their external tariffs higher than separately decided external tariffs by keeping the status-quo. This implicit tariff coordination can benefit each member through trade diversion. In a CU, each member country must have a common optimal external tariff and it must incur costs because each country may seek different external tariffs for their own national welfare. The benefit of implicit coordination in an FTA and the cost of explicit coordination in a CU account for the popularity of the FTA. Originality/value - This paper uses the idea of implicit tariff coordination in trade agreements. In a CU, tariff coordination is explicit and mandatory. All member countries must have a single common external tariff for each good. On the other hand, in an FTA, each country establishes its external tariff with the goal of maximizing its own welfare. However, each country can also coordinate "implicitly" by keeping the status-quo after establishing an FTA.

• 무역학회지
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• 제45권1호
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• pp.173-201
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• 2020

As the US's trade deficit with China and China's manufacturing industry has risen rapidly, the US has begun to regulate trade items as part of China's checks. Four rounds of reprisal measures have greatly altered the trade structures of both countries. In particular, Korea, which is highly dependent on the US and China, has been directly affected by US-China trade disputes. The purpose of this study was to analyze the effects of US-China trade disputes on the stock price of Korean export firms by performing an event study. This study analyzed stock price fluctuations for 7 days before and after entry into forced [Please check] retaliatory tariffs on Korean exporters' export items subject to retaliatory tariffs. According to the analysis results, among companies that produce goods with major tariffs imposed on China by the US, such as electronic appliances, semiconductors, machinery, and automobiles, those producing electronics and semiconductor products were positively affected by the tariff incident. Secondly, among the companies producing steel, chemicals, and machinery, which the main tariffs imposed by the United States, companies producing steel and chemicals were negatively affected by the incident due to the stagnation of trade between China and the US. The results of this study suggest future trade policy directions for Korea and help to establish an export strategy for major industries.