• Journal of East-West Nursing Research
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.11-26
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• 2004

The purpose of this study is to investigate the present conditions of nursing investment contents, its conversion process, and output in Oriental University Medical Center, Korea to get good qualified Oriental nursing result which is the ultimate purpose of the Oriental nursing management, and to develope a matrix of Oriental nursing management system on the basis of that project. The subjects for nursing investment and output contents were eighteen nursing directors in eleven Oriental University Medical Center and two hundred thirty-nine nurses with three years and over experience in Oriental medical center. The subjects for Oriental nursing organization, human affair management, and control function were nineteen Oriental medical center in Oriental University Medical Center, Korea. Data were collected from November, 2002 to February, 2003 with questionnaire. Data analysis was done by SPSS PC+ 12 program. Frequency, percentage, and minimum/maximum values were used for investment contents, and frequency and percentage were used for conversion process and output contents. 1. The input factors of oriental nursing management system The objective's western hospital career was over five years of one hundred and seventy-five(73.2%) persons. Nursing in-service education was performed in fourteen hospitals(77.8%). Two hundreds(83.7%) were pro to oriental nurse system. Only four hospitals(22.2%) had independent budget in nursing division. Nursing staff allocation to the bed was from 2.8:1 to 9.06:1 respectively, with a big gap of the rate following the hospitals. 2. The conversion factors of oriental nursing system 1) Oriental nursing system Oriental hospital nursing system was organized independently in ten hospitals among eighteen hospitals. The recruitment of nurses which was a vital role of the nursing division of the hospital was mostly(79%) opened. The education to develope nursing personnels was through in-service one in 97.4%. Education for oriental nursing and management was performed in 42.1%(eight hospitals) and that for reserves was done in 36.8%(seven hospitals). Administration for nursing education by nursing division was 68.5%(thirteen hospitals). The post education evaluation was performed by report submission in 36.8%(seven hospitals), by written examination in 26.3%, by questionnaires in 21.1%, and by lecture presentation in 15.8% subsequently. The directorial meeting for the nursing directors was attended by 84.2%(sixteen hospitals), and the meeting type was the medical executive and support division executive meeting in 55.6%(ten hospitals) and the personnel management in 39.6%(seven hospitals). 2) The actual conditions of oriental nursing personnel management The reason of working in oriental hospital was by voluntary in 67.1%(a hundred and sixty persons), by nursing department order in 28.0%(sixty-seven persons), and by others in 5.0%(twelve persons) respectively. The shift form was a three-shifts one in 94.7%(eighteen hospitals), a two-shift one in only one hospital. Duty assignment was functional in 52.6%(ten hospitals), team and functional in 26.3%(five hospitals) and no team alone. Promotion manual was present at 68.4%(thirteen hospitals) and the competency essentials comprised of performance evaluation in 79%, interview, written examination, training result, study result subsequently. No labor union existed in 79%(fifteen hospitals) 3) Oriental nursing preceptor system There were five oriental hospitals(27.7%) administering the preceptor utilization model, which showed lower rate than the twenty-two medical university hospitals in Seoul in which fifteen hospitals (72.7%) were having the system. To the question of necessity of oriental nurse system asked to the objectives of two hundred and thirty-nine with more than three year-experience in oriental hospital, two hundred persons(83.7%) answered positively. 4) The control of oriental nursing The evaluation results from the target hospitals were mostly not opened in 89.4% of oriental hospitals. Thirteen hospitals(68.3%) had evaluation system of direct managers and the next were three hospitals(15.8%) of direct managers and selves. There was one hospital(5.3% each) where fellows and superiors, fellows, and inferiors' evaluation was performed and no hospital where superiors, fellows, inferiors and selves, and superiors, fellows and selves' evaluation was performed. The QI activity of nursing was 42.1%(eight hospitals) for nursing service evaluation, 36.8% for survey of ECSI, 26.3% for survey of ICSI, 15.8% for medical visit rate, 10% for hospital standardization inspection in sequence. 3. The output factors of oriental nursing management system The job satisfaction appeared good in general, indicating very good in thirty-seven persons (15.7%), good in one hundred and fourteen persons (48.3%) and fair in eighty-five persons(36.0%).

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.31-68
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• 1990

The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.