• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.22 no.3
• /
• pp.691-705
• /
• 2012

Buffer overflow vulnerability is the most representative one that an attack method and its countermeasure is frequently developed and changed. This vulnerability is still one of the most critical threat since it was firstly introduced in middle of 1990s. Shellcode is a machine code which can be used in buffer overflow attack. Attackers make the shellcode for their own purposes and insert it into target host's memory space, then manipulate EIP(Extended Instruction Pointer) to intercept control flow of the target host system. Therefore, a lot of research to defend have been studied, and attackers also have done many research to bypass security measures designed for the shellcode defense. In this paper, we investigate shellcode defense and attack techniques briefly and we propose our new methodology which can hide shellcode in the 24bit BMP image. With this proposed technique, we can easily hide any shellcode executable and we can bypass the current detection and prevention techniques.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
• /
• v.19 no.3
• /
• pp.289-301
• /
• 2023

Due to the development and dissemination of modern technology, anyone can easily communicate using services such as social network service (SNS) through a personal computer (PC) or smartphone. The development of these technologies has caused many beneficial effects. At the same time, bad effects also occurred, one of which was the spam problem. Spam refers to unwanted or rejected information received by unspecified users. The continuous exposure of such information to service users creates inconvenience in the user's use of the service, and if filtering is not performed correctly, the quality of service deteriorates. Recently, spammers are creating more malicious spam by distorting the image of spam text so that optical character recognition (OCR)-based spam filters cannot easily detect it. Fortunately, the level of transformation of image spam circulated on social media is not serious yet. However, in the mail system, spammers (the person who sends spam) showed various modifications to the spam image for neutralizing OCR, and therefore, the same situation can happen with spam images on social media. Spammers have been shown to interfere with OCR reading through geometric transformations such as image distortion, noise addition, and blurring. Various techniques have been studied to filter image spam, but at the same time, methods of interfering with image spam identification using obfuscated images are also continuously developing. In this paper, we propose a deep learning-based spam image detection model to improve the existing OCR-based spam image detection performance and compensate for vulnerabilities. The proposed model extracts text features and image features from the image using four sub-models. First, the OCR-based text model extracts the text-related features, whether the image contains spam words, and the word embedding vector from the input image. Then, the convolution neural network-based image model extracts image obfuscation and image feature vectors from the input image. The extracted feature is determined whether it is a spam image by the final spam image classifier. As a result of evaluating the F1-score of the proposed model, the performance was about 14 points higher than the OCR-based spam image detection performance.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.21 no.4
• /
• pp.61-75
• /
• 2011

Recently, there is significant increasing of massive attacks, which try to infect PCs that visit websites containing pre-implanted malicious code. When visiting the websites, these hidden malicious codes can gain monetary profit or can send various cyber attacks such as BOTNET for DDoS attacks, personal information theft and, etc. Also, this kind of malicious activities is continuously increasing, and their evasion techniques become professional and intellectual. So far, the current signature-based detection to detect websites, which contain malicious codes has a limitation to prevent internet users from being exposed to malicious codes. Since, it is impossible to detect with only blacklist when an attacker changes the string in the malicious codes proactively. In this paper, we propose a novel approach that can detect unknown malicious code, which is not well detected by a signature-based detection. Our method can detect new malicious codes even though the codes' signatures are not in the pattern database of Anti-Virus program. Moreover, our method can overcome various obfuscation techniques such as the frequent change of the included redirection URL in the malicious codes. Finally, we confirm that our proposed system shows better detection performance rather than MC-Finder, which adopts pattern matching, Google's crawling based malware site detection, and McAfee.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
• /
• v.7 no.6
• /
• pp.155-164
• /
• 2018

Many malicious programs have been compressed or encrypted using various commercial packers to prevent reverse engineering, So malicious code analysts must decompress or decrypt them first. The OEP (Original Entry Point) is the address of the first instruction executed after returning the encrypted or compressed executable file back to the original binary state. Several unpackers, including PinDemonium, execute the packed file and keep tracks of the addresses until the OEP appears and find the OEP among the addresses. However, instead of finding exact one OEP, unpackers provide a relatively large set of OEP candidates and sometimes OEP is missing among candidates. In other words, existing unpackers have difficulty in finding the correct OEP. We have developed new tool which provides fewer OEP candidate sets by adding two methods based on the property of the OEP. In this paper, we propose two methods to provide fewer OEP candidate sets by using the property that the function call sequence and parameters are same between packed program and original program. First way is based on a function call. Programs written in the C/C++ language are compiled to translate languages into binary code. Compiler-specific system functions are added to the compiled program. After examining these functions, we have added a method that we suggest to PinDemonium to detect the unpacking work by matching the patterns of system functions that are called in packed programs and unpacked programs. Second way is based on parameters. The parameters include not only the user-entered inputs, but also the system inputs. We have added a method that we suggest to PinDemonium to find the OEP using the system parameters of a particular function in stack memory. OEP detection experiments were performed on sample programs packed by 16 commercial packers. We can reduce the OEP candidate by more than 40% on average compared to PinDemonium except 2 commercial packers which are can not be executed due to the anti-debugging technique.