• Title/Summary/Keyword: Surface-to-Surface Missile

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One-Dimensional Radar Scattering Center for Target Recognition of Ground Target in W-Band Millimeter Wave Seeker Considering Missile Flight-Path Scenario (유도탄 조우 시나리오를 고려한 W-대역 밀리미터파 탐색기의 지상 표적 식별을 위한 1차원 산란점 추출에 관한 연구)

  • Park, Sungho;Kim, Jihyun;Woo, Seon-Keol;Kwon, Jun-Beom;Kim, Hong-Rak
    • The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
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    • v.28 no.12
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    • pp.982-992
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    • 2017
  • In this paper, we introduce a method of selection for the optimal transmission polarization of a W-band seeker through the extraction of the one-dimensional scattering center of a ground tank target. We calculated the surface scattering and edge scattering using the shooting and bouncing ray tracing method of the CST A-solver. Based on 4-channel RCS data, using the one-dimensional RELAX algorithm, which is a kind of spectral estimation technique, scattering centers of ground targets were extracted. According to the changes in the polarization state and look angle, we compared and analyzed the scattering center results. Through simulation, we verified that the scattering center results can be applied when feature vectors are used for target recognition.

Investigation of the Effects of UAV Nozzle Configurations on Aircraft Lock-on Range (무인항공기의 노즐 형상 변화가 Lock-on Range에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구)

  • Kim, Min-Jun;Kang, Dong-Woo;Myong, Rho-Shin;Kim, Won-Cheol
    • Journal of the Korean Society for Aeronautical & Space Sciences
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    • v.43 no.3
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    • pp.204-212
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    • 2015
  • The infrared lock-on range of target aircraft plays a critical role in determining the aircraft survivability. In this investigation, the effects of various UAV engine nozzle configurations on the aircraft lock-on range were theoretically analyzed. A virtual subsonic aircraft was proposed first, based on the mission requirement and the engine performance analysis, and convergent-type nozzles were then designed. After determining thermal flow field and nozzle surface temperature distribution with the CFD code, an additional analysis was conducted to predict the IR signature. Also, atmospheric transmissivity for various latitude and seasons was calculated, using the LOWTRAN code. Finally, the lock-on and lethal envelopes were calculated for different nozzle configurations, assuming the sensor threshold of the given IR guided missile. It was shown that the maximum 55.3% reduction in lock-on range is possible for deformed nozzles with the high aspect ratio.

South Korea's strategy to cope with local provocations by nuclear armed North Korea (핵위협하 국지도발 대비 대응전략 발전방향)

  • Kim, Tae-Woo
    • Strategy21
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    • s.31
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    • pp.57-84
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    • 2013
  • North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

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Performance Measurement and Analysis of RTI in the HLA-based Real-time Distributed M-SAM Simulation (HLA 기반 실시간 분산 M-SAM 시뮬레이션에서 RTI성능 측정 및 분석)

  • Choi Sang-Yeong;Cho Byung-Kyu;Lee Kil-Sup
    • Journal of KIISE:Computing Practices and Letters
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    • v.11 no.2
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    • pp.149-156
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    • 2005
  • The HLA is the simulation architecture standard that the civilian and military simulation communities are deeply interested in. We can find various successful practices applying HLA to constructive simulations such as war games in domestics and overseas. However, any case of real-time distributed simulations has not been reported. The reason is that a message transmission period via RTI in a network layer varies according to computing power, simulation nodes, transmission types, and packet size; further a message processing time in an application layer depends on its processing methods, thus too difficult to set up real-time constraints for the enhancement of a real-time resolution. Hence, in this paper we have studied the real-time constraints of RTI for the development of the M-SAM simulator. Thus we have developed a HLA based pilot simulator using 6 PC's in LAN and then measured and analysed the performance of the RTI. As the results of our work, we could obtain the quantitative values for message delay, RTI overhead and RTI packet transmission ratio by a real operation scenario and loads, which are not shown in the previous works. We also expect that the results can be used as a guideline to set up the number of targets, transmission frequency and message processing method in the development of the M-SAM simulator and similar applications.

A Study on the Measurement of Activity Concentrations of Pu and Am and Their Isotopic Ratios in the Radioactively Contaminated Soil (방사능으로 오염된 토양에 대한 Pu 및 Am 방사능 농도 및 동위원소비 측정에 대한 연구)

  • Lee, Myung Ho;Song, Byoung Chul;Park, Young Jai;Kim, Won Ho
    • Analytical Science and Technology
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    • v.17 no.6
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    • pp.514-519
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    • 2004
  • Soil samples collected from around the BOMARC Missile Site were measured for their activity concentrations and isotopic ratios of Pu and Am isotopes with particle sizes. The activity concentrations of Pu and Am in the BOMARC soil were remarkably higher than the fallout levels, and the activities decreased nearly exponentially with an increasing particle size of the soil due to a decreasing surface area. The activity ratios of Pu-238 / Pu-239, 240, Pu-241 / Pu-239, 240 and Am-241 / Pu-239, 240 observed in the BOMARC soil were much lower than those attributed to the nuclear reprocess plants and the Chernobyl fallout. Also, the atomic ratio of Pu-240 / Pu-239 in the BOMARC soil was remarkably lower than the fallout value influenced by the nuclear weapons testing and the Chernobyl accident. The atomic ratio of Pu-240 / Pu-239 was so close to the value of the weapons grade Pu released from the crash of a B52 plane in the Thule of the Greenland, such that the Pu isotopes detected in the BOMARC soil could have originated from the weapons grade plutonium.

Military Competition and Arms Control in Space (우주상 군비경쟁과 군비통제)

  • Shin, Dong-Chun;Cho, Hong-Je
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.26 no.2
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    • pp.203-237
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    • 2011
  • Since USSR successfully launched its satellite "Sputnik"in 1957, many countries including US and USSR began military use of space, and engaged in arms race in space, which is against spirit and ideals of peaceful use of space as common heritage of mankind stipulated in many treaties such as Outer Space Treaty. With worsening Cold War between East and Western Bloc, this military use of space and arms race in space has been intensifying. Regarding the ideals of peaceful use of space, it is interpreted that military use of space is possible unless it does not have the purpose of aggression. The military use of space may have diverse forms such as attacking satellites in space, or attacking from satellites, making use of present and future technologies available which should include the use of nuclear and kinetic/hyper-speed weapons, laser, particle beams, near explosion, disturbance weapons in different directions (i.e., surface to space, space to space, and space to surface). Arms control is being implemented by the efforts of many countries in different formalities including legislature of international treaties under the auspices of UNCOPUOS and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. Taking outstanding examples aiming at arms control by international community, there are confidence building measures (CBM), strengthening implementation of existing treaties, partial ban of nuclear tests, countryand regional approach, comprehensive approach and measures having legally binding force. While U.S. has surpassed other countries concerned in the area of military useof space, it withdrew from OST in early 2000s, thereby raising concern of international community. It requires concerted efforts of cooperationand implementation by international society to make sure peace of mankind and environmental conservation through arms control in space. Observing de facto possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea following series of nuclear tests and launching satellites, and efforts of launching rockets by South Korea, it is strongly needed for both countries to take part in arms control efforts by international community.

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Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an (천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망)

  • Kim, Sung-Man
    • Strategy21
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    • s.34
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

A Review on the Change in Submarine Roles in Naval Warfare: Based on Warfare Paradigm (전쟁 패러다임의 전환에 따른 잠수함의 역할 변화에 대한 고찰)

  • Jang, Jun-Seop
    • Strategy21
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    • s.46
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    • pp.89-122
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    • 2020
  • The longing for submarine manufacture and the fear of her power had exited for a long time, but submarine that could submerge and attack was built from 20th century by science technology development. The question, 'Submarine can exercise her power in naval warfare?' had exited before World War I, but the effective value of submarine was shown in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare during World War I and World War II. Germany and the United States made the best use of submarines at that time. The submarines of these nations mounted fierce attack on the enemy's battleships and merchant ships and blocked the sea lanes for war material. These fierce attack on ships became impossible After World War II, and the major powers reduced and coordinated the defence budget, so they considered the role of submarine. However, submarine is still powerful weapon system because she can secretly navigate under the water, and one of the most important force in the navy. The aim of this thesis is analyzing submarine roles in each naval warfare and integrating maritime strategy and weapon system technology into her roles. First, the research about represent submarine roles like anti-surfaceship warfare, anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, land attack, supporting special operation and mine landing warfare will be presented, then the major naval warfare where submarine participated(during ex-World War I, World War I, World War II, The Cold War Era and post Cold War) and the analyzing of submarine roles by time will be presented. Submarine was developed for anti-surfaceship warfare during ex-World War I but could not make remarkable military gain in naval warfare because her performance and weapon was inadequate. However, the effective value of submarine in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare was shown during World War I and World War II. The major powers put battleships into naval warfare undiscriminatingly to command the sea power and submarines did massive damage to enemy navy power, so put a restraint the maritime power of enemy, and blocked the sea lanes for war material. After World War II, the battlefield situation changed rapidly and the concept of preemption became difficult to apply in naval warfare. Therefore, the submarine was unable to concentrate on anti-surfaceship mission. Especially during the Cold War era, nuclear submarine came to appear and her weapon system developed rapidly. These development gave submarines special missions: anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering. At that time, United States and Soviet submarines tracked other nation's submarines loaded with nuclear weapons and departing from naval their base. The submarines also collected information on the volume of ships and a coastal missile launching site in company with this mission. After Cold War, the major powers despatched forces to major troubled regions to maintain world peace, their submarines approached the shores of these regions and attacked key enemy installations with cruise missiles. At that time, the United States eased the concept of preemption and made the concept of Bush doctrine because of possible 911 terrorism. The missiles fired from submarines and surface battleships accurately attacked key enemy installations. Many nations be strategically successful depending on what kind of mission a submarine is assigned. The patterns of future naval warfare that my country will provide against will be military power projection and coalition/joint operations. These suggest much more about what future missions we should assign to submarines.