• 제목/요약/키워드: Surface-to-Surface Missile

검색결과 108건 처리시간 0.027초

유도탄 조우 시나리오를 고려한 W-대역 밀리미터파 탐색기의 지상 표적 식별을 위한 1차원 산란점 추출에 관한 연구 (One-Dimensional Radar Scattering Center for Target Recognition of Ground Target in W-Band Millimeter Wave Seeker Considering Missile Flight-Path Scenario)

  • 박성호;김지현;우선걸;권준범;김홍락
    • 한국전자파학회논문지
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    • 제28권12호
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    • pp.982-992
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    • 2017
  • 본 논문에서는 유도탄 조우 시나리오를 고려한 W-대역 밀리미터파 탐색기의 지상 표적 식별을 위한 1차원 산란점 추출 기법을 소개하고, 편파 방향 및 조우 각도에 따른 산란점 추출 결과를 비교 분석하고자 한다. CST A-Solver를 이용해서 SBR(Shotting Bounce Racing)기법을 통해서 전차 표적의 표면과 모서리에 의한 산란을 각각 계산하였다. 편파에 따라 4-채널 RCS 데이터에 대해서 스펙트럼 추정 기법(spectral estimation technique)인 1차원 RELAX 알고리즘을 사용해서 각각의 산란점(scattering center)을 추출했고, 편파 방향과 관측 각도의 변화에 따른 산란점 추출 결과를 비교 분석하였다. 시뮬레이션 분석을 통해서 지상 표적에 대한 산란점 추출 결과를 W-대역 밀리미터파 탐색기의 표적 식별을 위한 특성 벡터로 활용 가능함을 확인하였다.

무인항공기의 노즐 형상 변화가 Lock-on Range에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구 (Investigation of the Effects of UAV Nozzle Configurations on Aircraft Lock-on Range)

  • 김민준;강동우;명노신;김원철
    • 한국항공우주학회지
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    • 제43권3호
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    • pp.204-212
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    • 2015
  • 표적 대상 항공기의 적외선 lock-on range는 항공기의 생존성을 결정하는데 있어 중요한 요소이다. 본 연구에서는 무인항공기의 엔진 노즐 형상이 lock-on range에 미치는 영향에 관한 이론적 연구를 수행하였다. 이를 위해 가상 아음속 항공기의 임무 요구조건과 엔진 성능분석을 통한 형상 변형노즐을 고려하였다. 먼저 열유동장과 노즐 표면 온도분포를 해석한 다음, 적외선 신호 해석을 수행하였다. 또한 대기전파 모델인 LOWTRAN 코드를 이용하여 고도와 계절변화에 따른 대기투과율을 계산하였다. IR 유도 미사일의 센서 특성값을 가정하여 여러 노즐형상에 대한 lock-on 및 lethal envelope 계산을 수행하였다. 높은 세장비를 갖는 변형노즐의 경우 최대 55.3%의 lock-on range 감소가 가능한 것으로 나타났다.

핵위협하 국지도발 대비 대응전략 발전방향 (South Korea's strategy to cope with local provocations by nuclear armed North Korea)

  • 김태우
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권31호
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    • pp.57-84
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    • 2013
  • North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

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HLA 기반 실시간 분산 M-SAM 시뮬레이션에서 RTI성능 측정 및 분석 (Performance Measurement and Analysis of RTI in the HLA-based Real-time Distributed M-SAM Simulation)

  • 최상영;조병규;이길섭
    • 한국정보과학회논문지:컴퓨팅의 실제 및 레터
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    • 제11권2호
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    • pp.149-156
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    • 2005
  • HLA는 시뮬레이션 표준 아키텍처로서 민수 및 국방 시뮬레이션 분야에서 관심이 높아가고 있다. 국내외에서 워게임과 같은 구조적 시뮬레이션에서는 HLA를 적용한 성공적인 개발사례를 찾아 볼 수 있다. 그러나 네트워크 시율레이터나 인터넷 게임과 같은 실시간 분산 시뮬레이션에서는 그 적용 사례가 아직까지 관찰되고 있지 않다. 그 이유는 실시간 분산 HLA 시뮬레이션에서는 네트워크 수준에서 RTI를 통한 메시지 전송시간이 컴퓨팅 능력, 시뮬레이션 노드 개수, 전송방식, 전송패킷의 크기에 영향을 받고, 응용 수준에서 메시지의 사건처리시간이 메시지 처리방식에 의존하여 실시간 제약조건을 설정하기가 어렵기 때문이다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 차후 M-SAM 시뮬레이터의 개발을 위하여 RTI의 실시간 제약 조건의 수준을 고찰하고자 한다. 이를 위하여 1.Af 환경에서 6대의 PC상에 HLA 기반의 실험용 시뮬레이터를 개발하고 RTI의 성능을 측정하고 분석하였다. 본 연구의 결과로서 이전의 연구에서 제시되지 않았던 다수 노드 환경에서 실제 운용 시나리오와 부하에 따른 메시지 지연시간, RTI 부하 및 RTI 패킷전송 비율에 대한 정량적인 특성 값을 얻을 수 있었고, 이 결과는 향후 M-SAM 시뮬레이터 또는 유사 응용체 계의 개발에서 표적 수, 전송주기 및 메시지 처리방식에 대한 설정지침으로 활용이 기대된다.

방사능으로 오염된 토양에 대한 Pu 및 Am 방사능 농도 및 동위원소비 측정에 대한 연구 (A Study on the Measurement of Activity Concentrations of Pu and Am and Their Isotopic Ratios in the Radioactively Contaminated Soil)

  • 이명호;송병철;박영재;김원호
    • 분석과학
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    • 제17권6호
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    • pp.514-519
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    • 2004
  • BOMARC 미사일 발사대 주변에서 채취한 토양에 대하여 입자크기에 따른 Pu 및 Am 방사능 분석 및 동위원소를 측정하였다. BOMARC 토양에서의 Pu와 Am 방사능 농도는 핵실험에 의해 생성된 방사능 낙진 준위보다 매우 높았으며, 입자크기가 증가함에 따라 감소하는 경향을 보여주었다. BOMARC 토양에서 측정한 Pu-238 / Pu-239, 240, Pu-241 / Pu-239, 240 및 Am-241 / Pu-239, 240 방사능비는 핵실험에 의해 생성된 방사능 낙진에 대한 방사능 농도비 보다 약간 낮은값을 나타내었다. ICP-MS로 측정한 Pu-240 / Pu-239 질량비는 북반구 대기권 핵실험 및 체르노빌 원전사고에 의한 질량비보다 매우 낮은 값을 나타내었고, Greenland Thule 지역에서 핵무기를 탑재한 B52 비행기 사고로 방출된 핵무기에 대한 질량비와 비슷한 값을 나타내었다. BOMARC 토양에서 측정된 Pu 및 Am 동위원소들의 방사능비 및 질량비로부터 BOMARC 토양에 오염된 Pu는 핵무기용 Pu로부터 생성되었다고 판단된다.

우주상 군비경쟁과 군비통제 (Military Competition and Arms Control in Space)

  • 신동춘;조홍제
    • 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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    • 제26권2호
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    • pp.203-237
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    • 2011
  • 1957년 소련의 스푸트닉 위성 발사 성공에 이은 미 소간 그리고 이후 다수 국가에의한 우주의 군사적 이용 및 우주공간에서의 군비경쟁은 인류의 공동자산으로서의 우주의 평화적 이용을 규정한 우주조약(OST)을 비롯한 다수 국제 조약의 이념에 배치되고 있다. 동서냉전의 격화와 더불어 이 같은 우주에서의 군사적 이용 및 경쟁은 더욱 가열되어져 왔으며, 우주의 평화적 이용 이념은 침략적 목적이 아닌 한 사실상 군사적 이용이 가능하다고 해석되고 있다. 군사적 이용은 주로 우주공간의 위성을 공격하거나 위성으로부터 공격을 하기위해 지상-우주, 우주-우주, 우주-지상의 세 방향으로 핵무기, 운동/초고속 무기, 레이저, 분자 빔, 근접 폭발, 교란 무기 등 현재 및 미래에 이용 가능한 기술을 사용하고 있다. 우주에서의 군비 통제는 주로 UNCOPUOS를 중심으로 국제조약의 제정과 관련 국가의 많은 노력으로 이루어지고 있으며, 대량살상무기의 우주 공간에서의 배치가 금지되고 있다. 대표적인 국제사회의 군비 통제 노력을 열거하면 신뢰구축조치(CBM), 기존 조약 내용의 강화, 부분적 조치, 국가 및 지역적 접근, 종합적 접근, 법적 구속력 있는 대안 등을 통하여 추구되어지고 있다. 미국은 우주 선진국으로서 우주의 군사적 이용 면에서도 관련국가를 훨씬 앞지르고 있어 2000년대 초 우주조약에서 탈퇴함으로써 우주의 평화적 이용을 위한 국제사회의 노력과 엇 박자를 내고 있다. 우주에서의 군비 통제를 통하여 인류의 평화가 확보되고 환경보전이 이루어질 수 있도록 국제사회 및 관련 국가간 협력과 이행이 절실히 필요하다. 한반도에서도 북한의 핵실험 및 미사일 발사에 따른 핵무기 보유, 남한의 우주 로켓트 발사 등 제반 상황으로 볼 때 국제사회의 군비통제 노력에 적극 동참할 것이 요구되고 있다.

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천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망 (Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an)

  • 김성만
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권34호
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

전쟁 패러다임의 전환에 따른 잠수함의 역할 변화에 대한 고찰 (A Review on the Change in Submarine Roles in Naval Warfare: Based on Warfare Paradigm)

  • 장준섭
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권46호
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    • pp.89-122
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    • 2020
  • The longing for submarine manufacture and the fear of her power had exited for a long time, but submarine that could submerge and attack was built from 20th century by science technology development. The question, 'Submarine can exercise her power in naval warfare?' had exited before World War I, but the effective value of submarine was shown in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare during World War I and World War II. Germany and the United States made the best use of submarines at that time. The submarines of these nations mounted fierce attack on the enemy's battleships and merchant ships and blocked the sea lanes for war material. These fierce attack on ships became impossible After World War II, and the major powers reduced and coordinated the defence budget, so they considered the role of submarine. However, submarine is still powerful weapon system because she can secretly navigate under the water, and one of the most important force in the navy. The aim of this thesis is analyzing submarine roles in each naval warfare and integrating maritime strategy and weapon system technology into her roles. First, the research about represent submarine roles like anti-surfaceship warfare, anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, land attack, supporting special operation and mine landing warfare will be presented, then the major naval warfare where submarine participated(during ex-World War I, World War I, World War II, The Cold War Era and post Cold War) and the analyzing of submarine roles by time will be presented. Submarine was developed for anti-surfaceship warfare during ex-World War I but could not make remarkable military gain in naval warfare because her performance and weapon was inadequate. However, the effective value of submarine in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare was shown during World War I and World War II. The major powers put battleships into naval warfare undiscriminatingly to command the sea power and submarines did massive damage to enemy navy power, so put a restraint the maritime power of enemy, and blocked the sea lanes for war material. After World War II, the battlefield situation changed rapidly and the concept of preemption became difficult to apply in naval warfare. Therefore, the submarine was unable to concentrate on anti-surfaceship mission. Especially during the Cold War era, nuclear submarine came to appear and her weapon system developed rapidly. These development gave submarines special missions: anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering. At that time, United States and Soviet submarines tracked other nation's submarines loaded with nuclear weapons and departing from naval their base. The submarines also collected information on the volume of ships and a coastal missile launching site in company with this mission. After Cold War, the major powers despatched forces to major troubled regions to maintain world peace, their submarines approached the shores of these regions and attacked key enemy installations with cruise missiles. At that time, the United States eased the concept of preemption and made the concept of Bush doctrine because of possible 911 terrorism. The missiles fired from submarines and surface battleships accurately attacked key enemy installations. Many nations be strategically successful depending on what kind of mission a submarine is assigned. The patterns of future naval warfare that my country will provide against will be military power projection and coalition/joint operations. These suggest much more about what future missions we should assign to submarines.