• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.1-17
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• 2005

In this article we consider a supply chain consisting of a risk-sensitive manufacturer and a riskneutral retailer. The manufacturer maximizes her individual expected profit by designing a supply chain coordinating returns contract (SCRC) that consists of (i) a channel coordinating returns policy that maximizes the supply chain joint expected profit, and (ii) a profit sharing arrangement that gives the retailer an expected profit only slightly higher than that in the no returns case so that it is just enough to induce the retailer to accept the SCRC. Thus, the manufacturer captures as high a percentage as possible of the jointly maximum supply chain profit. However, this contract can sometimes lead to the manufacturer's resulting realized profit being lower than that in the no returns case when demand is lower than expected. In this context, even though profit is sufficiently attractive on average, will the risk-sensitive manufacturer ever consider applying a SCRC? Our research raises this question and focuses on designing a SCRC that can significantly increase the probability of the manufacturer's resulting realized profit being at least higher than that in the no returns case.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.38-51
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• 2004

Over the years, most or many companies have focused their attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of their business units. As a new way of doing business, these companies have begun to realize the strategic importance of planning, controlling, and designing their own supply chain system. This paper analyzes the coordination issues in supply chains that consist of one manufacturer and multiple retailers operating under uncertain end customer demand and delivery lead-time. We use the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to determine the appropriate ordering and inventory level at which the manufacturer and multiple retailers can maximize the profit of the chain. This is performed under three controlling policies: the traditionally centralized controlling policy under the manufacturer's perspective, the entire chain’s perspective, and lastly the coordinating controlling policy with an incentive scheme. The outcome from the study reveals that the coordinating controlling policy with an incentive scheme can outperform the traditional centralized controlling policies by creating a win-win situation in which all members of the chain benefit from higher profit, thus resulting in more willingness from all members to join the chain.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.81-91
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• 2001

In supply chain management, coordination between a manufacture and suppliers Is regarded as the most important issue when partnership of organizations of considered. This paper Introduces the current status of SCM in terms of physical systems, relation with other solution systems as well as the general history and definitions of SCM. Researches are categorized into deterministic, stochastic, and several future research areas are discussed in the paper.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.132-137
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• 2012

공급사슬상에서의 구성원간 협력이 보편화되어가는 현재의 추세에 따라 본 논문은 공급자-판매자로 구성된 공급 사슬에서의 옵션 계약을 통한 구성원간 협력 문제에 대해 연구하였다. 구체적으로, 본 논문은 가격이 공급자에 의해 결정되고 옵션 계약 물량이 판매자에 의해 결정될 경우에 대한 공급사슬 전체 관점 및 각 구성원 관점에서의 최적 옵션 가격, (옵션) 행사 가격, 현물 시장 가격, 옵션 계약 물량 결정 문제를 계량적으로 연구하였다. 본 논문의 연구결과를 통해 옵션 계약이 공급사슬에서의 구성원간 협력에 이용되는 경우에 대한 좀 더 나은 이해가 가능하며, 본 논문에서 제시한 예제는 실제 공급사슬상에서의 최종 소비자 수요가 정규분포나 연속균등분포등의 특정 분포를 따를 경우에 대한 최적 가격 및 옵션 계약 물량 계산 방법을 설명한다.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.129-147
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• 2014

This study proposes an optimal operational policy for a green supply chain (GSC) where a retailer pays an incentive for collection of used products from customers and determines the optimal order quantity of a single product under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer produces the optimal order quantity of product using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts. Here, two scenarios for the product demand are assumed as: the distribution of product demand is known, and only both mean and variance are known. This paper develops mathematical models to find how order quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recycling affect the expected profits of each member and the whole supply chain under both a decentralized GSC (DGSC) and an integrated GSC (IGSC). The analysis numerically compares the results under DGSC with those under IGSC for each scenario of product demand. Also, the effect of the quality of the recyclable parts on the optimal decisions is shown. Moreover, supply chain coordination to shift the optimal decisions of IGSC is discussed based on: I) profit ratio, II) Nash bargaining solution, and III) Combination of (I) and (II).

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.142-152
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• 2021

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) emphasize securing supply chain security through mutual cooperation between aviation security and customs by establishing a standardized security system by regulations, procedures and practices of international air cargo. Accordingly, in accordance with the Aviation Security Act, the known consignors system aims to secure cargo security before loading air cargo into the aircraft, while the customs AEO system is a public-private cooperation program that focuses on simplification of customs clearance procedures. These systems basically have the same purpose of effectively identifying high-risk cargo through a risk-based approach in international air cargo transportation and preventing risks in advance, and the content that a common basic standard for cargo security must be established is also similar. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a cooperation system by simplifying problems such as cumbersome and redundant authentication procedures and on-site verification through coordination of security requirements for mutual recognition between the two systems. As a result, it is necessary to establish a process for coordinating security and customs' supply chain security program and maximize the effect of harmonizing supply chain security by strengthening the linkage between known consignors and AEO.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.3-27
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• 2010

This paper covers a plan to build supply chain cooperation systems among stream of the textile industry to strengthen international competitiveness. To obtain the study objective, it has been reviewed the theoretical rationale relating to organizational cooperation model and discussion and performed the case study that analyzed stream group and participated firms to the textile stream policy project. The analyzed stream cooperative types that measured configuration of cooperative degree and productive type are new market creation, technology improvement, relation maintenance, and relation cease. Two types - new market creation and technology improvement - have significant effect of the textile stream cooperation. Key successful factors of these two effective types are the external intervention of specialized consulting organization and build internal coordination and integrated mechanism to the cooperative stream group and participated firms.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.104-107
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• 2007

In this paper, we propose the coordination scheme in a single-manufacturer-multiple-retailer supply chain system. Traditionally, the bargaining power of the single manufacturer is superior to those of retailers. The business environment supported by the e-business scheme may give rise to new business behavior. The multitude of retailer requests the manufacturer to relax the his unilateral lot-sizing policy while they are willing to compensate more than the manufacturer's expected loss caused by abandon his superior bargaining power. The side payment aggregated by the multiple retailers is transferred to the manufacturer according to the degree of the manufacturer's relaxation from the current unilateral lot-sizing policy.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.303-311
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• 2010

In the last few years growing interest has been dedicated to supply chain management. Modeling complexity is added to supply chain coordination problem by accounting for reverse logistics activities. The objective of this paper is to extend inventory model of manufacturing factory with respect to the production of raw material of forward logistics and recycling material of reverse logistics. The proposed model is applied to a plastic recycling process plant located in Taiwan. The case study improvement scheme shows when the recycling rate of recycling material increases from 15% to 50%, the total inventory cost of manufacturing factory decreases by 12.82%, safety stock volume decreases by 41.19% and the reorder quantity is down by 50.96%. This paper finds whether the results of the model can reach the economic profit through quantitative analysis and encourages companies integrate reverse logistics into the supply chain system.

• Information Systems Review
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.191-203
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• 2001

The purpose of this research is to investigate success factors for supply chain management. According to the statistical analysis of 98 survey data, we find that the success factors mentioned in this literature(Supplier-Buyer relations, Inter-organizational Coordination, Planning & Control, Information Technology) positively affect the corporate performance. This research also indicates that supply chain management should be implemented according to dependent industrial characteristics and external conditions. We used three key environmental factors: (1) The product exchanged and its technology, (2) the competitive condition in downstream market, (3) capabilities of the suppliers available.