• 수완나부미
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• 제9권1호
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• pp.173-192
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• 2017

The Sasaq community in Lombok, Indonesia has been recognized as a peasant community with its unique and strong social capital. Sources of social capital recognition can be derived from common terms or expressions and institutions practiced in community daily life. However, there is a trend of neglecting and ignoring those values by the community, especially the youth. Through action research, we would like to revitalize social capital of the community in supporting social and economic development in the rural level. In this paper, we introduce a Strategic Leadership and Learning Organization (SLLO) approach to build community participation in solving social and economic problems. Through regular dialogue, communities come with common agreements and collective action that are perceived as emergence property. Several common agreements are intended to solve community problems actually in line with the objectives of government designated development.

• 한국과 국제사회
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• 제2권2호
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• pp.89-130
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• 2018

본 논문은 '미중관계의 전개와 현안문제 및 시사점을 분석하기 위한 것이다. 초기 및 적대적 대결기의 미중관계, 미중접근 관계정상화기 및 1980~90년대 미중관계, G2시대 개막후 2010년대 중반까지의 미중관계, 트럼프-시진핑시대의 미중관계와 주요현안과 시사점을 살펴본 후 결론을 도출해본 것이다. 지난 30여 년간의 중국의 급속한 성장은 기존의 미국중심의 단극적 국제질서를 변화시키며 양국간의 경쟁을 촉발시키고 있다. 미국과 중국은 전략 경제대화'를 정기적으로 개최하는 유일한 국가가 되었고, 주제 역시 양자간의 관계뿐만 아니라 글로벌 이슈까지 논의하는 나라로 발전해왔다. 미중협력 갈등의 현안문제는 양국관계는 물론 글로벌 이슈를 망라하고 있다. 예컨대 남중국해, 북핵과 사드, 통상 금융질서, 대만문제 등이 바로 그것이다. 미중갈등은 남의 일이 아니라 한국의 외교 안보 경제에도 직결되는 문제이다. 우리는 미중관계에 있어서 '코리아 패싱(Korea passing)'이 나오지 않도록 튼튼한 한 미 안보공조관계를 유지 강화해 나가는 한편, 한 중 경제협력관계도 조화롭게 추진해 나가는 헤징전략이 요구된다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.114-139
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• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제13권5호
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• pp.3-10
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• 2013

김정일시대 군사협상 분석 모델인 '항일유격대식 협상모델'을 활용하여 최근에 실시된 개성공단 실무회담 분석을 통하여 김정은시대에 개최될 군사협상의 지속과 변화를 제시하고자 한다. 특히, 개성공단 실무회담 분석을 통하여 김정은 시대의 경제분야 협상에서도 군사회담과 유사한 협상행태가 진행되고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다. 이와 같은 분석을 통하여 유추할 수 있는 사항은 김정은시대 군사협상에서도 김정일시대의 군사협상 범주에서 협상이 진행될 것이라는 사실이다. 근본적으로 북한은 변화의 길을 걷겠지만 현 시점에서는 기존의 전략문화를 변경하기 보다는 그 틀 속에서 군사협상 목적을 달성하려 할 것이다. 이러한 현상은 당분간 지속될 것이다. 향후 북한은 경제난 극복을 위하여 군사협상에 변화를 꾀할 것이다. 따라서 우리 정부의 군사협상에 대한 인식의 대전환이 있어야 할 것이다. 우리정부는. 대화와 협상을 유도하기 위해서 지속적으로 노력하여야 한다. 북한의 변화를 유도하기 위해서는 군사 협상에 적용할 수 있는 통일 전선논리를 활용한 경제 분야 협상 의제를 개발하여야 한다. 이를 이용하여 북한의 군사협상 정책결정자들에게 논리체계를 형성하여 준다면 새로운 군사협상의 틀을 만들 수 있을 것이다. 북한은 변화를 통한 경제적 교류협력을 보장하는 길이 생존하고 발전하는 길임을 인식하여야 한다.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.31-43
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• 2017

The article is devoted to the theoretical and practical analysis of Chinese global leadership. The concept of leadership is applied as a methodology, which involves identifying the main factors, such as strategic power, the attractiveness of political institutions, the ability to provide acceptable ideas and the presence of allies that contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the country's leadership potential. The authors also describe the relevance of Chinese global leadership and analyze its domestic, economic and international causes. Moreover, the ''Belt and Road'' initiative is defined as the main mechanism for providing the influence of China on the global level which is now being changed its quantitative component, namely the increasing attention to the security aspects of this initiative. In addition to that, it is important to note that China maintains its economic and political positions in Africa, Central Asia and South-East Asia. Africa has a special role in the Chinese ''Belt and Road'' initiative as a recipient of Chinese investments and a site for the deployment of China's naval facilities to protect the trade routes. On the regional level, China will strive to become a leader of the trade and economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region, the South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear program issues. The American factor in modern international relations, namely so-called "Trump factor", which means the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement, will cause demand for Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as well. However, in this case a number of questions arise: is China prepared for this? Is Beijing able to bear greater responsibility? Does China have the potential for this? The article concludes that China will not become global leaders in the next 20-30 years, because of internal (political reforms) and foreign policy reasons (doctrinal formulation of foreign policy initiatives, military-political and economic power, international posture and relations with other states). The authors believe that the implementation of Chinese leadership is possible not on the condition of confrontation between China and the United States, but on the establishing of constructive relations between these countries. The last meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping showed a trend for creating channels for dialogue between Beijing and Washington, which can become the basis for interaction. An important place in the work is given to the analysis of development and forecasting the evolution of Russian-Chinese and U.S.-China relations. As for Russia, Moscow should conduct a policy that will not allow it to become a ''junior partner'' of China.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제7권1호
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• pp.229-258
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• 2023

Для основных ведущих стран Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона США, Китая и России сложилась ситуация "новой нормальности". Причем для каждой из указанных стран эта "новая нормальность" имеет свои собственные особенности, характеристики и значение. Для США – это обострение военного противостояния с Китаем в Тайваньском проливе. Для Китая – обострение соперничества с Соединенными Штатами до нового уровня и, одновременно, замедление темпов экономического развития с очень высокой вероятностью их дальнейшего снижения. "Новая нормальность" для России – это почти полное свертывание отношений с США, ЕС и их партнёрами и союзниками на фоне специальной военной операции и введенных санкций. Эти нюансы, в дополнение к результатам 20-го съезда КПК, во многом и будут определять основные тенденции в китайско-американских и китайско-российских отношениях. С высокой вероятностью отношения Китая и России не претерпят серьезных изменений на фоне украинского кризиса. Пекин будет стараться сохранять позицию "доброжелательного нейтралитета" по отношению к Москве. В то же время баланс между "доброй волей" и "нейтралитетом" может варьироваться в зависимости от масштабов китайско-российского сотрудничества. Например, в экономической сфере китайские компании будут лимитировать сотрудничество с российскими партнерами, опасаясь западных вторичных санкций. Однако, в целом, Россия сохранит свое значение для Китая как сильнейший антиамериканский полюс. В отношениях с США Китай продолжит твердо отстаивать свои интересы, в то же время, не исключая нормализации отношений с Вашингтоном в определенных областях сотрудничества: стратегическая стабильность, нетрадиционные угрозы, экология и т.д. В целом решения 20-го съезда КПК не позволяют говорить ни за, ни против идеи о готовности Китая возобновить диалог с США в период после конгресса. Китайско-американские отношения, как отмечалось выше, имеют свою собственную логику и, вероятно, продолжат развиваться в ее рамках. Впрочем, как и китайско-российские отношения. В рамках этой логики Пекин, похоже, продолжает балансировать между двумя векторами своей внешней политики. С одной стороны – это развитие двустороннего сотрудничества с Россией с целью укрепления собственных переговорных позиций в противостоянии с Вашингтоном: военное сотрудничество с акцентом на совместные учения, политическое сотрудничество, основанное на антиамериканизме, экономическое сотрудничество с оглядкой на риски вторичных санкций. С другой стороны, для Китая неприемлемо, во-первых, нарушение территориальной целостности Украины, во-вторых, прямое военное столкновение с США и, в-третьих, дальнейшее обострение отношений с Вашингтоном по фактору китайской дружбы с Россией.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제13권
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• pp.869-895
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• 2000

The US supports the Information and Communication (IC) industry as a strategic one to wield a complete power over the World Market. However, several other countries are also eager to have the support for the IC industry because the industry produces a high added value and has a significant effect on other industries. Korea is not an exception. Korea recently succeeded in the commercialization of CDMA for the first time in the world, after the successful development of TDX. Hence, it is highly likely to get tracked by the US. Although the IC industry is a specific sector of IT, there is a concern that there might be a trade friction between the US and Korea due to a possible competition. It will be very important to prepare a solution in advance so that Korea could prevent the friction and at the same time increase its share domestically and globally. It will be our important task to solve the problem with the minimum cost if the conflict arises unfortunately in the IT area. The parties that have a strong influence on the US trade policy are the think tank group and the IT-related interest group. Therefore, it would be important to have a close relationship with them. We found some implications by analyzing the case of Japan, which has experienced trade frictions with the US over the long period of time in the high tech industry. In order to get rid of those conflicts with the US, the Japanese did the following things : (1) The Japanese government developed supporting theories and also resorted to international support so that the world could support the Japanese theories. (2) Through continual dialogue with the US business people, the Japanese business people sought after solutions to share profits among the Japanese and the US both in the domestic and in the worldwide markets. They focused on lobbying activities to influence the US public opinion to support the Japanese. The specific implementation plan was first to open culture lobby toward opinion leaders who were leaders about the US opinion. The institution, Japan Society, were formed to deliver a high quality lobbying activities. The second plan is economic lobby. They have established Japanese Economic Institute at Washington. They provide information about Japan regularly or irregularly to the US government, research institution, universities, etc., that are interested in Japan. The main objective behind these activities though is to advertise the validity of Japanese policy. Japanese top executives, practical interest groups on international trade, are trying to justify their position by direct contact with the US policy makers. The third one is political lobby. Japan is very careful about this political lobby. It is doing its best not to give impression that Japan is trying to shape the US policy making. It is collecting a vast amount of information to make a correct judgment on situation. It is not tilted toward one political party or the other, and is rather developing a long-term network of people who understand and support the Japanese policy. The following implications were drawn from the experience of Japan. First, the Korean government should develop a long-term plan and execute it to improve the Korean image perceived by American people. Second, the Korean government should begin public relation activities toward the US elite group. It is inevitable to make an effort to advertise Korea to this elite group because this group leads public opinion in the USA. Third, the Korean government needs the development of a relevant policy to elevate the positive atmosphere for advertising toward the US. For example, we need information about to whom and how to about lobbying activities, personnel network who immediately respond to wrong articles about Korea in the US press, and lastly the most recent data bank of Korean support group inside the USA. Fourth, the Korean government should create an atmosphere to facilitate the advertising toward the US. Examples include provision of incentives in tax on the expenses for the advertising toward the US and provision of rewards to those who significantly contribute to the advertising activities. Fifth, the Korean government should perform the role of a bridge between Korean and the US business people. Sixth, the government should promptly analyze the policy of IT industry, a strategic area, and timely distribute information to industries in Korea. Since the Korean government is the only institution that has formal contact with the US government, it is highly likely to provide information of a high quality. The followings are some implications for business institutions. First, Korean business organization should carefully analyze and observe the business policy and managerial conditions of US companies. It is very important to do so because all the trade frictions arise at the business level. Second, it is also very important that the top management of Korean firms contact the opinion leaders of the US. Third, it is critically needed that Korean business people sent to the USA do their part for PR activities. Fourth, it is very important to advertise to American employees in Korean companies. If we cannot convince our American employees, it would be a lot harder to convince regular American. Therefore, it is very important to make the American employees the support group for Korean ways. Fifth, it should try to get much information as early as possible about the US firms policy in the IT area. It should give an enormous effort on early collection of information because by doing so it has more time to respond. Sixth, it should research on the PR cases of foreign enterprise or non-American companies inside the USA. The research needs to identify the success factors and the failure factors. Finally, the business firm will get more valuable information if it analyzes and responds to, according to each medium.