• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.173-192
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• 2017

The Sasaq community in Lombok, Indonesia has been recognized as a peasant community with its unique and strong social capital. Sources of social capital recognition can be derived from common terms or expressions and institutions practiced in community daily life. However, there is a trend of neglecting and ignoring those values by the community, especially the youth. Through action research, we would like to revitalize social capital of the community in supporting social and economic development in the rural level. In this paper, we introduce a Strategic Leadership and Learning Organization (SLLO) approach to build community participation in solving social and economic problems. Through regular dialogue, communities come with common agreements and collective action that are perceived as emergence property. Several common agreements are intended to solve community problems actually in line with the objectives of government designated development.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.89-130
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• 2018

This paper is to analyse the development of the U.S.-China relationship and pending issues and implications. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the relationship between the US and China in the early and hostile confrontation period; the relationship of US-Chinese approach/normalization period and the relationship in the 1980s and 1990s; the relationship by mid-2010 since the opening of the G2 era; the US-China relations and major pending issues and implications in the era of Trump-Xi Jinping; and conclusion. The rapid growth of China over the past three decades has changed the existing US-centered international order and has triggered competition between the two countries. The United States and China have become the only countries that regularly hold strategic and economic dialogue, and the topic has also developed into a country that discusses not only bilateral relations but also global issues. The issues of US-China cooperation and conflicts encompass global issues as well as bilateral relations issues. For example, the South China Sea, the North Korean nuclear issue and the THAAD, the economic and financial order, and the Taiwan issue. It is not a matter of another country, but a problem that directly or indirectly leads to Korea's diplomacy, security and economy. In order to prevent 'Korea passing' in the US-China relationship, we need a hedging strategy that maintains and strengthens the strong ROK-US security cooperation and harmonious promotion of ROK-China economic cooperation.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.114-139
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• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.13 no.5
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• pp.3-10
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• 2013

This study is trying to suggest the continuity and changes that would be made in inter-Korean military negotiations in the future under the Kim Jeong-eun regime by analyzing the recent inter-Korean Working-Level Talks for Gaeseong Industrial Complex based on 'anti-Japanese guerilla style negotiation model, the military negotiation model under Kim Jeong-il era. Especially, through analysis of the inter-Korean Working-Level Talks for Gaeseong Industrial Complex, it is verified that behavior similar to that in the military talks in the past is found even in the economic negotiations. Such analysis leads to an assumption that negotiations under the Kim Jeong-eun regime would be made within the category of the military negotiations under the Kim Jeong-il era. Fundamentally North Korea will change but try to achieve its objectives in the military talks within the existing frame of strategic culture rather than changing it. Such phenomenon will continue for some time. In the future inter-Korean military talks, however, North Korea will try to change its behavior to cope with its financial difficulties. Accordingly, the South Korea's government will have to have paradigm shift toward inter-Korean military negotiations. Especially, Kim Jeong-eun's studying abroad in the past will make him change in the negotiations. At this moment, the South Korean government must make continuous efforts to induce dialogue and negotiation. In order to induce the North Korea to change, the development of economic norm logic with the united front applied in the strategic culture of military negotiation and the formation of a value system in the North Korea's military negotiation policy makers will lead to the creation of a new military negotiation framework.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.31-43
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• 2017

The article is devoted to the theoretical and practical analysis of Chinese global leadership. The concept of leadership is applied as a methodology, which involves identifying the main factors, such as strategic power, the attractiveness of political institutions, the ability to provide acceptable ideas and the presence of allies that contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the country's leadership potential. The authors also describe the relevance of Chinese global leadership and analyze its domestic, economic and international causes. Moreover, the ''Belt and Road'' initiative is defined as the main mechanism for providing the influence of China on the global level which is now being changed its quantitative component, namely the increasing attention to the security aspects of this initiative. In addition to that, it is important to note that China maintains its economic and political positions in Africa, Central Asia and South-East Asia. Africa has a special role in the Chinese ''Belt and Road'' initiative as a recipient of Chinese investments and a site for the deployment of China's naval facilities to protect the trade routes. On the regional level, China will strive to become a leader of the trade and economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region, the South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear program issues. The American factor in modern international relations, namely so-called "Trump factor", which means the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement, will cause demand for Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as well. However, in this case a number of questions arise: is China prepared for this? Is Beijing able to bear greater responsibility? Does China have the potential for this? The article concludes that China will not become global leaders in the next 20-30 years, because of internal (political reforms) and foreign policy reasons (doctrinal formulation of foreign policy initiatives, military-political and economic power, international posture and relations with other states). The authors believe that the implementation of Chinese leadership is possible not on the condition of confrontation between China and the United States, but on the establishing of constructive relations between these countries. The last meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping showed a trend for creating channels for dialogue between Beijing and Washington, which can become the basis for interaction. An important place in the work is given to the analysis of development and forecasting the evolution of Russian-Chinese and U.S.-China relations. As for Russia, Moscow should conduct a policy that will not allow it to become a ''junior partner'' of China.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.229-258
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• 2023

For the main countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States, China and Russia, a situation of "new normality" is emerging. Moreover, for each of the countries, this "new normality" has its own meaning. For the United States, this is an aggravation of the military confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait. For China, this is an increase in the degree of rivalry with the United States and a slowdown in the pace of economic development with a very high probability of their decline in the future. For Russia, this is an almost complete curtailment of relations with the United States against the background of a special military operation and imposed sanctions. These nuances, in addition to the results of the 20th CPC Congress, will determine the main trends in Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations. It seems that China's attitude towards Russia will not change against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Beijing will maintain a position of "benevolent neutrality" towards Moscow. At the same time, the balance between "goodwill" and "neutrality" may vary depending on the scope of Sino-Russian cooperation. For example, in the economic sphere, Chinese companies will be afraid to cooperate with Russian partners for fear of secondary sanctions. However, in general, Russia will retain its importance for China as the strongest anti-American pole. In relations with the United States, China will continue to firmly defend its interests, while at the same time not excluding the normalization of relations with Washington in certain areas of cooperation: strategic stability, non-traditional threats, ecology, etc. In general, the decisions of the 20th CPC Congress do not allow us to say either in favor or against the idea of China's readiness to resume dialogue with the United States in the post-congress period. Sino-American relations, as noted above, have their own logic and will probably continue to develop within its framework. However, so are Sino-Russian relations. Within the framework of these logics, Beijing seems to continue to balance between the two vectors of its foreign policy. On the one hand, this is the development of bilateral cooperation with Russia in order to strengthen its own negotiating positions in the confrontation with the United States: military cooperation with an emphasis on joint exercises, political cooperation based on anti-Americanism, economic cooperation with an eye to the risks of secondary sanctions. On the other hand, it is unacceptable for China to recognize the collapse of Ukraine, the inadmissibility of a direct military clash with the United States and the extreme undesirability of further aggravation of relations with the United States on the factor of Chinese friendship with Russia.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.13
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• pp.869-895
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• 2000

The US supports the Information and Communication (IC) industry as a strategic one to wield a complete power over the World Market. However, several other countries are also eager to have the support for the IC industry because the industry produces a high added value and has a significant effect on other industries. Korea is not an exception. Korea recently succeeded in the commercialization of CDMA for the first time in the world, after the successful development of TDX. Hence, it is highly likely to get tracked by the US. Although the IC industry is a specific sector of IT, there is a concern that there might be a trade friction between the US and Korea due to a possible competition. It will be very important to prepare a solution in advance so that Korea could prevent the friction and at the same time increase its share domestically and globally. It will be our important task to solve the problem with the minimum cost if the conflict arises unfortunately in the IT area. The parties that have a strong influence on the US trade policy are the think tank group and the IT-related interest group. Therefore, it would be important to have a close relationship with them. We found some implications by analyzing the case of Japan, which has experienced trade frictions with the US over the long period of time in the high tech industry. In order to get rid of those conflicts with the US, the Japanese did the following things : (1) The Japanese government developed supporting theories and also resorted to international support so that the world could support the Japanese theories. (2) Through continual dialogue with the US business people, the Japanese business people sought after solutions to share profits among the Japanese and the US both in the domestic and in the worldwide markets. They focused on lobbying activities to influence the US public opinion to support the Japanese. The specific implementation plan was first to open culture lobby toward opinion leaders who were leaders about the US opinion. The institution, Japan Society, were formed to deliver a high quality lobbying activities. The second plan is economic lobby. They have established Japanese Economic Institute at Washington. They provide information about Japan regularly or irregularly to the US government, research institution, universities, etc., that are interested in Japan. The main objective behind these activities though is to advertise the validity of Japanese policy. Japanese top executives, practical interest groups on international trade, are trying to justify their position by direct contact with the US policy makers. The third one is political lobby. Japan is very careful about this political lobby. It is doing its best not to give impression that Japan is trying to shape the US policy making. It is collecting a vast amount of information to make a correct judgment on situation. It is not tilted toward one political party or the other, and is rather developing a long-term network of people who understand and support the Japanese policy. The following implications were drawn from the experience of Japan. First, the Korean government should develop a long-term plan and execute it to improve the Korean image perceived by American people. Second, the Korean government should begin public relation activities toward the US elite group. It is inevitable to make an effort to advertise Korea to this elite group because this group leads public opinion in the USA. Third, the Korean government needs the development of a relevant policy to elevate the positive atmosphere for advertising toward the US. For example, we need information about to whom and how to about lobbying activities, personnel network who immediately respond to wrong articles about Korea in the US press, and lastly the most recent data bank of Korean support group inside the USA. Fourth, the Korean government should create an atmosphere to facilitate the advertising toward the US. Examples include provision of incentives in tax on the expenses for the advertising toward the US and provision of rewards to those who significantly contribute to the advertising activities. Fifth, the Korean government should perform the role of a bridge between Korean and the US business people. Sixth, the government should promptly analyze the policy of IT industry, a strategic area, and timely distribute information to industries in Korea. Since the Korean government is the only institution that has formal contact with the US government, it is highly likely to provide information of a high quality. The followings are some implications for business institutions. First, Korean business organization should carefully analyze and observe the business policy and managerial conditions of US companies. It is very important to do so because all the trade frictions arise at the business level. Second, it is also very important that the top management of Korean firms contact the opinion leaders of the US. Third, it is critically needed that Korean business people sent to the USA do their part for PR activities. Fourth, it is very important to advertise to American employees in Korean companies. If we cannot convince our American employees, it would be a lot harder to convince regular American. Therefore, it is very important to make the American employees the support group for Korean ways. Fifth, it should try to get much information as early as possible about the US firms policy in the IT area. It should give an enormous effort on early collection of information because by doing so it has more time to respond. Sixth, it should research on the PR cases of foreign enterprise or non-American companies inside the USA. The research needs to identify the success factors and the failure factors. Finally, the business firm will get more valuable information if it analyzes and responds to, according to each medium.