• ETRI Journal
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• 제37권6호
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• pp.1108-1119
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• 2015

Multicast communication of mobile ad hoc networks is vulnerable to internal attacks due to its routing structure and high scalability of its participants. Though existing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) act smartly to defend against attack strategies, adversaries also accordingly update their attacking plans intelligently so as to intervene in successful defending schemes. In our work, we present a novel indirect internal stealthy attack on a tree-based multicast routing protocol. Such an indirect stealthy attack intelligently makes neighbor nodes drop their routing-layer unicast control packets instead of processing or forwarding them. The adversary targets the collision avoidance mechanism of the Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol to indirectly affect the routing layer process. Simulation results show the success of this attacking strategy over the existing "stealthy attack in wireless ad hoc networks: detection and countermeasure (SADEC)" detection system. We design a cross-layer automata-based stealthy attack on multicast routing protocols (SAMRP) attacker detection system to identify and isolate the proposed attacker. NS-2 simulation and analytical results show the efficient performance, against an indirect internal stealthy attack, of SAMRP over the existing SADEC and BLM attacker detection systems.

• 한국시뮬레이션학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국시뮬레이션학회 2000년도 추계학술대회 논문집
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• pp.113-117
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• 2000

침입 탐지 시스템은 네트워크나 호스트에 대한 오용, 남용, 또는 허가되지 않은 접근을 탐지하는 기능을 갖는 시스템이다. 최근 침입들은 그 종류가 매우 다양화되고, 탐지하기가 매우 어려운 형태로 나타나고 있다. 이러한 침입으로 대표적인 것이 분산 공격과 스텔시 공격(Stealthy Attack)이 있다. 분산 공격은 침입자가 공간적으로 분산되어 이를 탐지하기 어렵게 하는 공격을 말하며, 스텔시 공격은 시간적으로 분산되어 이를 탐지하기 어려운 경우를 말한다. 침입 탐지 시스템의 모델링 및 시뮬레이션을 위해서는 침입 탐지 시스템 모델에 필요한 침입을 제공하고, 침입에 대한 탐지 능력을 평가하기 위한 experimental frame을 디자인 해야한다. 본 연구에서는 분산 공격과 스텔시 공격 기능을 갖는 침입 생성 모델링 방법을 소개하며, 침입 생성을 위해 요구되는 침입 정보 베이스의 역할 및 저장 정보를 소개한다. 또한, 침입에 대한 탐지 능력 평가를 위한 Transducer 모델의 디자인을 소개한다.

• 정보보호학회논문지
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• 제28권1호
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• pp.123-133
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• 2018

사이버 물리 시스템(CPS: Cyber-Physical System)은 물리시스템과 사이버시스템이 통합되어 운영되는 시스템을 말한다. CPS는 대상 물리시스템을 안정적으로 운영하기 위해 다수의 센서를 이용하여 끊임없이 물리 대상을 모니터링하고 현재 상태에 따라 액추에이터 제어를 수행한다. 만약 악의적인 공격자가 자신들의 공격을 은닉하기 위해서 센서들의 측정값을 대상으로 위변조 공격을 수행한다면, 수집된 데이터에 기반하여 운영되는 사이버시스템은 현재 물리시스템의 운영 현황을 확인할 수 없게 된다. 이는 자동화 시스템 및 운전원의 대응을 지연시켜 더욱 큰 피해가 발생하게 된다. 점차 정교해지는 타겟형 공격들로부터 CPS를 안전하게 보호하기 위해서는 센서 및 측정값을 대상으로 수행되는 은닉형 공격을 탐지할 수 있는 대응기술을 개발해야 한다. 그러나 다양한 이기종 장치들이 존재하는 CPS에서 실제 현장장치들을 대상으로 취약점을 분석하고 실증하는 과정은 많은 시간을 필요로 한다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 CPS 은닉형 공격 탐지 기술의 성능 검증에 활용 가능한 중간자 PLC 실험환경 구축 방안을 제안하고 그 실험결과를 제시한다.

• 한국재난정보학회 논문집
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.3-26
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• 2005

In recent years, there is growing concern about the potential use of biological agents in war or acts of terrorism accompanied an increased realization that rapid preparedness and response are needed to prevent or treat the human damage that can be caused by these agents. The threat is indeed serious, and the potential for devastating numbers of casualties is high. The use of agents as weapons, even on a small scale, has the potential for huge social and economic disruption and massive diversion of regional and national resources to combat the threat, to treat primary disease, and to clean up environmental contamination. Biological weapons are one of weapons of mass destruction (or mass casualty weapons, to be precise. since they do not damage non-living entities) that are based on bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, fungi or toxins produced by these organisms. Biological weapons are known to be easy and cheap to produce and can be used to selectively target humans, animals, or plants. Theses agents can cause large numbers of casualties with minimal logistical requirements (in wide area). The spread of disease cannot be controlled until there is awareness of the signs of infection followed by identification of agents; and if the organism is easily spread from person to person, as in the case of smallpox, the number of casualties could run into the tens of thousands. Biological weapons could be used covertly, there can be a lot of different deployment scenarios. A lot of different agents could be used in biological weapons. And, there are a lot of different techniques to manufacture biological weapons. Terrorist acts that make use of Biological Agents differ in a number of ways from those involving chemicals. The distinction between terrorist and military use of Biological Weapon is increasingly problematic. The stealthy qualities of biological weapons further complicate the distinction between terrorism and war. In reality, all biological attacks are likely to require an integrated response involving both military and civilian communities. The basic considerations when public health agencies establish national defence plan against bioterrorism must be 1) arraying various laws and regulations to meet the realistic needs, 2)education for public health personnels and support of concerned academic society, 3)information collection and cooperative project with other countries, 4)Detection and surveillance(Early detection is essential for ensuring a prompt response to biological or chemical attack, including the provision of prophylactic medicines, chemical antidotes, or vaccines) and 5) Response(A comprehensive public health response to a biological or chemical terrorist event involves epidemiologic investigation, medical treatment and prophylaxis for affacted persons, and the initiation of disease prevention or environmental decontamination measures). The purpose of this paper is providing basic material of preparedness and response for biological terrorism in modern society.