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http://dx.doi.org/10.13089/JKIISC.2018.28.1.123

An Experimental Environment for Simulation of Stealthy Deception Attack in CPS Using PLCitM (PLC in the Middle)  

Chang, Yeop (The Attached Institute of ETRI)
Lee, Woomyo (The Attached Institute of ETRI)
shin, Hyeok-Ki (The Attached Institute of ETRI)
Kim, Sinkyu (The Attached Institute of ETRI)
Publication Information
Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology / v.28, no.1, 2018 , pp. 123-133 More about this Journal
Abstract
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is a system in which a physical system and a cyber system are strongly integrated. In order to operate the target physical system stably, the CPS constantly monitors the physical system through the sensor and performs control using the actuator according to the current state. If a malicious attacker performs a forgery attack on the measured values of the sensors in order to conceal their attacks, the cyber system operated based on the collected data can not recognize the current operation status of the physical system. This causes the delay of the response of the automation system and the operator, and then more damage will occur. To protect the CPS from increasingly sophisticated and targeted attacks, countermeasures must be developed that can detect stealthy deception attacks. However, in the CPS environment composed of various heterogeneous devices, the process of analyzing and demonstrating the vulnerability to actual field devices requires a lot of time. Therefore, in this study, we propose a method of constructing the experiment environment of the PLCitM (PLC in the middle) which can verify the performance of the techniques to detect the CPS stealthy deception attack and present the experimental results.
Keywords
Cyber Physical System; Stealthy Deception Attack; PLCitM (PLC in the Middle);
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