• 분석과 대안
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.63-92
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• 2019

What motivates split-ticket voting in mixed electoral systems, where voters choose one party in district races and another party on the party list ballot? While much of the literature assumes strategic intent, three aspects commonly are overlooked: the competitiveness of district races, the presence of a district candidate from one's preferred party, and whether voters know the electoral threshold for party list seats. Furthermore, few studies disaggregate types of split-ticket voting (e.g. not voting for one's preferred party in a district vs. party list). Taiwan provides an intriguing case study for analysis, not only as a relatively new adopter of a mixed system, but also the presence of additional conditions that would encourage at least the consideration of a split ticket. Using survey data from the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) after the Taiwan's 2016 Legislative Yuan election, this analysis finds that knowing the threshold, the winner's margin, and the placement of a district candidate from one's preferred party all influence split-ticket voting among those with a partisan preference. However, closer inspection identifies a distinction between defecting from the district versus the party list. Evidence shows that district competitiveness and candidate placement influences defection from the district candidate, while the electoral threshold influences defection from the party list. The results add to our understanding of strategic and non-strategic incentives in mixed systems.

• Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research
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• 제2권3호
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• pp.196-227
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• 2015

The premise of the intentional model of split-ticket voting is that some voters split their tickets simply because they prefer divided government and believe in constant "checks and balances." This article examines whether this premise stands firm in an emerging democracy like Taiwan. That is, by using survey data in Taiwan, we explore whether one's attitude toward divided or unified government is "real." We hypothesize that a citizen's attitude toward "checks and balances" is subject to change, and conditional on whether her preferred party is in power. Specifically, we speculate that a citizen would tend to hold the balancing perspective or favor divided government, if her preferred party is in opposition. However, if her preferred party becomes the ruling party, she would be more likely to oppose (hold) the balancing (non-balancing) perspective or favor unified government. We then utilize panel survey data embedded in Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) to verify our hypothesis.

• 의정연구
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• 제26권2호
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• pp.35-71
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• 2020

2020년 4월 15일에 치러진 제21대 총선은 한국에서 준연동형 비례대표제가 적용되었던 최초의 선거였다. 선거제도 개혁의 본래 취지는 상대다수제로 치러지는 지역구 선거의 폐단을 줄이고 비례성을 높임으로써 유권자의 선호에 왜곡이 발생하지 않도록 하려는 것이었다. 그러나 연동형 방식을 도입해 제도를 힘들게 바꾸었음에도 지역구 후보 투표에서 유권자들의 선호에는 여전히 왜곡이 발생하고 있었다. 특히 후보 간 선거 경쟁이 심한 지역일수록 군소정당 지지자들은 자신의 선호대로 군소정당 후보에게 투표하기 보다는, 당선 가능성이 더 높은 거대정당의 후보에게 사표방지 심리에 따라 투표하는 경향이 강하게 나타났다. 이러한 군소정당 지지자의 전략적 분할투표 행태는 지역주의 균열이 강하게 작동하는 영호남 지역보다는 그렇지 않은 지역들에서 더 두드러지게 나타났다. 본 연구의 분석 결과는, 준연동형 비례대표제로 제도를 개혁했지만 거대정당에게 보다 유리한 결과로 이어지는 유권자들의 전략적 분할투표 행태가 여전히 지속되고 있음을 보여주며, 선거제도 개혁이 당초 목표로 했던 비례성 개선 효과에 한계가 있음을 시사한다.