• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.50 no.6
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• pp.890-898
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• 2018

Nondestructive inspection (NDI) is an integral part of structural integrity analyses of dry storage casks that house spent nuclear fuel. One significant concern for the structural integrity is stress corrosion cracking in the heat-affected zone of welds in the stainless steel canister that confines the spent fuel. In situ NDI methodology for detection of stress corrosion cracking is investigated, where the inspection uses a delivery robot because of the presence of the harsh environment and geometric constrains inside the cask protecting the canister. Shear horizontal (SH) guided waves that are sensitive to cracks oriented either perpendicular or parallel to the wave vector are used to locate welds and to detect cracks. SH waves are excited and received by electromagnetic acoustic transducers (EMATs) using noncontact ultrasonic transduction and pulse-echo mode. A laboratory-scale canister mock-up is fabricated and inspected using the proposed methodology to evaluate the ability of EMATs to excite and receive SH waves and to locate welds. The EMAT's capability to detect notches from various distances is evaluated on a plate containing 25%-through-thickness surface-breaking notches. Based on the results of the distances at which notch reflections are detectable, NDI coverage for spent nuclear fuel storage canisters is determined.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.435-446
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• 2021

This article examines the consequences of a significant spent fuel management decision or event in the United States, South Korea and Taiwan. For the United States, it is the financial impact of the Department of Energy's inability to take possession of spent fuel from commercial nuclear power companies beginning in 1998 as directed by Congress. For South Korea, it is the potential financial and socioeconomic impact of the successful construction, licensing and operation of a low and intermediate level waste disposal facility on the siting of a spent fuel/high level waste repository. For Taiwan, it is the operational impact of the Kuosheng 1 reactor running out of space in its spent fuel pool. From these, it draws six broad lessons other countries new to, or preparing for, nuclear energy production might take from these experiences. These include conservative planning, treating the back-end of the fuel cycle holistically and building trust through a step-by-step approach to waste disposal.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2001.05a
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• pp.420.2-420
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• 2001

• Proceedings of the Korean Radioactive Waste Society Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.601-608
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• 2003

Thermal analyses have been carried out for a spent fuel dry storage cask under normal and off-normal conditions. Environmental temperature is assumed to be $15^{\circ}C$ under the normal condition. The off-normal condition has an environmental temperature of $38^{\circ}C$. An additional off-normal condition is considered as a partial blockage of the air inlet ducts. Two of the four air inlet ducts are assumed to be completely blocked. The maximum temperatures of the fuel rod and concrete overpack were lower than the allowable values under the normal condition. Temperature distributions for the off-normal conditions were slightly higher than the normal conditions.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.97-102
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• 1984

Criticality analyses of the KSC-1(Korean Shipping Cask-1) spent fuel shipping cask have been performed with the help of KENO-IV Monte Carlo computer code and 19-group CSLIB 19 cross section set which was generated from AMPX modular system. The analyses followed a benchmark calculation which has been made regard to the B & W CX-10 criticality facility in order to validate the Monte Carlo code cross section set described above. The KSC-1 shipping cask seems to be safe in the criticality point of view for the transport of one PWR spent fuel assembly under the normal conditions as well as the hypothetical accident conditions.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.139-152
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• 2006

A spent fuel storage cask is required to prove the safety of a canister under a hypothetical accidental drop condition. A hypothetical accidental drop condition means that a canister is assumed to be a lee drop on to a pad of the storage cask during loading it into a storage cask. A pad of the storage cask absorbs shock to maintain the structural integrities of a canister under a hypothetical accidental drop condition. In this paper a finite element analysis for various pad structures was carried out to improve the structural integrity of a canister under a hypothetical accidental drop condition. A pad of a storage cask was designed a steel structure with concrete. The 1/4 height of a pad was modified with a structure composed of a steel and a polyurethane foam as a impact limiter. The effect of a shape of a steel structure was studied. The effects of the thickness of a steel structure and the density of a polyurethane foam was also studied.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.193-204
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• 2023

To ensure radiological safety margin in the transport and storage of spent nuclear fuel, it is crucial to perform source term and shielding analyses in advance from the perspective of conservation. When performing source term analysis on UO₂ fuel, which is mostly used in commercial nuclear power plants, uranium and oxygen are basically considered to be the initial materials of the new fuel. However, the presence of impurities in the fuel and structural materials of the fuel assembly may influence the source term and shielding analyses. The impurities could be radioactive materials or the stable materials that are activated by irradiation during reactor power operation. As measuring the impurity concentration levels in the fuel and structural materials can be challenging, publicly available information on impurity concentration levels is used as a reference in this evaluation. To assess the effect of impurities, the results of the source term and shielding analyses were compared depending on whether the assumed impurity concentration is considered. For the shielding analysis, generic cask design data developed by KEPCO-E&C was utilized.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.51-58
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• 2006

Since 2002, more than 400 PWR spent nuclear fuel assemblies have been transported and stored on-site using transport casks in order to secure the storage capacity of PWR spent nuclear fuel of Kori nuclear power plant. The complete on-site transport system, which includes KN-12 transport casks, the related equipment and transport vehicles, had been developed and provided. KN-12 transport casks were designed, fabricated and licensed in accordance with Korean and IAEA's transport regulations, and the related equipment was also provided in accordance with the related regulations. The on-site transport and storage operation using two KN-12 casks and the related equipment has been conducted, and the strict Quality Control and Radiation Safety Management through the whole process has been carried out so as to achieve the required safety and reliability of the on-site transport of spent nuclear fuel.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.47-59
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• 1993

The criticality of the shipping cask(KSC-7) for transportion of 7PWR spent fuel assemblies has been calculated and analysised on the basis of neutron transport theory. For criticality analysis, effects of the rod pitches, the fixed neutron absorbers(borated sus+boral) were considered. The effective multiplication factor has been calculated by KENO-Va, Mote Carlo method computer code, with the HANSEN-ROACH 16 group cross section set, which was made for personal computer system. The criticality for the KSC-7 cask was calculated in terms of the fresh fuel which was conservative for the aspects of nuclear critility. From the results of criticality analysis, the calculated Keff is proved to be lower than subcritical limit during normal transportation and under hypothetical accident condition. The maximum calculated criticalities of the KSC-7 were lower the safety criticality limit 1.0 recommended by US 10CFR71 both under normal and hypothetical accident condition. Also, to verify the KSC-7 criticality calculation results by using KENO-Va, it was carried out benchmark calculation with experimental data of B & W(Bobcock and Wilcox) company. From the 3s series of calculation of the KSC-7 cask and benchmark calculation, the cask was safely designed in nuclear criticality, respectively.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.141-154
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• 2015

In general, conventional criticality analysis for spent fuel transport/storage systems have been performed based on the assumption of fresh fuel concerning the potential uncertainties from number density calculations of actinide nuclides and fission products in spent fuel. However, these evaluation methods cause financial losses due to an excessive criticality margin. In order to overcome this disadvantage, many studies have recently been conducted to design and commercialize a transportation and storage cask applied to the Burnup Credit (BUC). This study conducted an assessment to ensure criticality safety for reactor operating parameters, axial burn-up profiles and misload accident conditions, which are the factors that are likely to affect criticality safety when the BUC is applied to the dual-purpose cask under development at the KOrea RADioactive waste agency (KORAD). As a result, it was found that criticality resulting from specific power, changed substantially and relied on conditions of low enrichment and high burn-up. Considering the end effect in the case of high burn-up produced a positive-definite result. In particular, the increment of maximum effective multiplication factors due to misloading was 0.18467, confirming that misload is a factor that must be taken into account when applying the BUC. The results of this study may therefore be utilized as references in developing technologies to apply the BUC to domestic models and operational procedures or preventing any misload accidents during the process of spent fuel loading.