• 해양환경안전학회지
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• 제28권2호
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• pp.254-261
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• 2022

모든 선박은 충돌을 피하기 위해 안전속력을 준수하여야 하고, 우리나라 영해 및 내수에서 속력의 제한규칙을 준수하여야 한다. 그리고 선박교통관제사는 선박이 안전속력과 속력의 제한규칙을 준수하도록 적절히 관제하여야 한다. 국제해상충돌예방규칙에서 안전속력은 선박이 명시적으로 몇 노트의 속력으로 항행하여야 하는지 규정하고 있지 않다. 반면에 국내법에서는 교통안전특정해역 등에서 제한속력을 지정하여 이를 준수하도록 하고 있다. 이 속력의 제한규칙은 주로 대지속력을 기준으로 하고 있으나, 대수속력을 기준으로 하는 곳도 있다. 이 논문은 최근 5년간 발생한 해양사고와 제한속력 위반율에 대해 분석하였고, 국제해상충돌예방규칙상 안전속력, 국내외법상 속력의 제한규칙 및 해양안전심판원 재결 중 안전속력을 준수하지 아니한 사례에 대해 살펴보았다. 그 결과, 이 논문에서는 국내법상 속력의 제한규칙이 선박에서 해양사고 예방을 위해 반드시 준수되어야 한다는 것과 선박이 이 규칙을 준수하기 쉽고, 선박교통관제사가 선박을 적절히 관제할 수 있도록 대수속력으로 규정된 속력의 제한규칙을 대지속력으로 개정할 필요가 있다는 것을 제시하였다.

• 한국자동차공학회논문집
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• 제3권3호
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• pp.97-108
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• 1995

A 3-dimensional double track vehicle model, that has 12-degress-of-freedom, was proposed to analyze handling and riding behaviours of an automotive car. Nonlinear characteristics of the suspension and steering systems of the vehicle model were considered in its equations of motion, which were solved by using the 4th-order Runge-Kutta integration method. Computer simulations for lane change, steady-state handling, and running-over-bump manoeuvres were made and verified by vehicle tests on proving ground. The computed results of the proposed model showed better agreement with test results than those of the conventional 2-dimensional single track model did. Especially they showed good accuracy near the characteristic speed and in high lateral accelerated manoeuvres.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권1호
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• pp.71-111
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• 2003

The key lessons of the very complex modern war can be dangerously misleading to the outsiders. The efforts trying to draw lessons learned from the Iraq War (OIF : Operation Iraqi Freedom) may be biased by the view of point by Americans, because most of war episodes have been come from the Western media coverage. More serious bias can be committed thanks to the differences of warfighting doctrines and military technology between US forces and ROK forces. However, OIF-fought allied commanders and outside military experts said this campaign exemplified 21st-century warfare: swift, agile and decisive, employing overpowering technology to bring relentless violence to bear in many places at once. Even though the campaign evolved differently than anticipated, allied forces regrouped and regained the initiative remarkably quickly, thanks in large part to a new command flexibility, tied to new technology that made possible the more rapid sharing of data. These factors permitted "new air-land dynamic". The things that compel that are good sensors networked with good intelligence disseminated through a robust networking system, which then yields speed. Speed turns out to be a very important factor for conducting "Rapid Decisive Operations" relied on joint "Mass of Effects". ROK forces facing the heaviest ground threat in the world may learn more from Cold War era-typed US Army 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), which operating considerably beyond existing doctrine. 3ID flew its personnel into Kuwait to meet up with equipment already located in the region as pre-positioned stock. During OIF, the division conducted continuous offensive operations over 230km deep battlespace for 21 days. The lessons learned for ROK army to prepare tomorrow's war may be found from 3ID in its training, command and control, task organization, firepower and battlespace management, and logistics.