• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.254-261
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• 2022

Every vessel shall proceed at a safe speed to avoid collision. Additionally, every vessel shall comply with the speed limit rules in the territorial water and internal waters of Korea. The VTS operator shall properly control the compliance of the vessel with the safe speed and speed limit rules. Safe speed under the COLREG 1972 is not explicitly stipulated in knots. However, under the Domestic law for traffic safety-specific sea areas, etc., the speed limit is specified in knots and complied with. This speed limit rule is mainly based on the 'speed made good over the ground'; however, in some places, it is based on the 'speed making way through the water'. In this paper, I analyzed marine accidents that occurred in the past 5 years and the rate of violation of speed limits. Furthermore, I reviewed safe speed under the COLREG 1972, speed limit rules under domestic and foreign laws, and cases of non-compliance with safe speed in the judgment of the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal. Resultantly, I suggested in this paper that the speed limit rules in the domestic law must be observed by vessels to prevent marine accidents, and the rules which are stipulated in terms of 'speed making way through the water' must be revised as 'speed made good over the ground' such that the vessels can easily comply with them and the VTS operator can control the vessel properly.

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Automotive Engineers
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• v.3 no.3
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• pp.97-108
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• 1995

A 3-dimensional double track vehicle model, that has 12-degress-of-freedom, was proposed to analyze handling and riding behaviours of an automotive car. Nonlinear characteristics of the suspension and steering systems of the vehicle model were considered in its equations of motion, which were solved by using the 4th-order Runge-Kutta integration method. Computer simulations for lane change, steady-state handling, and running-over-bump manoeuvres were made and verified by vehicle tests on proving ground. The computed results of the proposed model showed better agreement with test results than those of the conventional 2-dimensional single track model did. Especially they showed good accuracy near the characteristic speed and in high lateral accelerated manoeuvres.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.1
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• pp.71-111
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• 2003

The key lessons of the very complex modern war can be dangerously misleading to the outsiders. The efforts trying to draw lessons learned from the Iraq War (OIF : Operation Iraqi Freedom) may be biased by the view of point by Americans, because most of war episodes have been come from the Western media coverage. More serious bias can be committed thanks to the differences of warfighting doctrines and military technology between US forces and ROK forces. However, OIF-fought allied commanders and outside military experts said this campaign exemplified 21st-century warfare: swift, agile and decisive, employing overpowering technology to bring relentless violence to bear in many places at once. Even though the campaign evolved differently than anticipated, allied forces regrouped and regained the initiative remarkably quickly, thanks in large part to a new command flexibility, tied to new technology that made possible the more rapid sharing of data. These factors permitted "new air-land dynamic". The things that compel that are good sensors networked with good intelligence disseminated through a robust networking system, which then yields speed. Speed turns out to be a very important factor for conducting "Rapid Decisive Operations" relied on joint "Mass of Effects". ROK forces facing the heaviest ground threat in the world may learn more from Cold War era-typed US Army 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), which operating considerably beyond existing doctrine. 3ID flew its personnel into Kuwait to meet up with equipment already located in the region as pre-positioned stock. During OIF, the division conducted continuous offensive operations over 230km deep battlespace for 21 days. The lessons learned for ROK army to prepare tomorrow's war may be found from 3ID in its training, command and control, task organization, firepower and battlespace management, and logistics.