• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.793-805
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• 2015

Due to the rise of automotive security problems following automotive safety and the progress of the internet technology leading to a hyper-connected society, guaranteeing the safety of automotive requires security plans in the supply chain assurance and automotive software, and risk management plans for identifying, evaluating, and controlling the risks that may occur from the supply chain since the modern automotive is a Safety Critical system. In this paper, we propose a study on Automotive Supply Chain Risk Management (A-SCRM) procedures by person interested within the automotive Life-Cycle.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.30 no.6
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• pp.1189-1206
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• 2020

Recently, ICT companies do not directly design, develop, produce, operate, maintain, and dispose of products and services, but are outsourced or outsourced companies are increasingly in charge. Attacks arising from this are also increasing due to difficulties in managing vulnerabilities for products and services in the process of consignment and re-consignment. In order to respond to this, standards and systems for security risk management of ICT supply chain are being established and operated overseas, and various case studies are being conducted. In addition, research is being conducted to solve supply chain security problems such as Software Bill of Materials (SBOM). International standardization organizations such as ISO have also established standards and frameworks for security of ICT supply chain. In this paper, we presents ICT supply chain security management items suitable for domestic situation by comparing and analyzing ICT supply chain security standards and systems developed as international standards with major countries such as the United States and EU, and explains the necessity of cyber security framework for establishing ICT supply chain security system.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.9-20
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• 2022

Supply chain attacks target critical infrastructure, causing large amounts of damage and evolving into a threat to public safety and national security. Accordingly, when establishing cybersecurity strategies and policies, supply chain risk management is specified to enhance security, and the US Biden administration recently issued the Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity, SBOM was mentioned as part of the guidelines for strengthening software supply chain security. If the government mandates SBOM and uses it as a security verification tool for supply chains, it can be affected by the domestic procurement system in the future and can be referenced when establishing a security system for domestic supply chains according to the progress of policy implementation. Accordingly, in this paper, countries that are promoting the SBOM policy as a way to strengthen the security of the software supply chain were selected and analyzed with a focus on related cases. In addition, through comparison and analysis of foreign SBOM policy trends, methods for using domestic SBOM in terms of technology, policy, and law were considered. As the value of using SBOM as a supply chain integrity/transparency verification tool is expected in the future, it is necessary to continuously identify trends in the establishment of international standardization and policy development for SBOM and study the standard format.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.29 no.5
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• pp.1089-1097
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• 2019

An era of smart manufacturing is coming through the rapid development of information and communication technology. As a result, many companies have begun to utilize a variety of hardware and software for the efficient business of the manufacturing process. At this time, the hardware and software used are supplied through manufacturing and distribution processes. These supply processes are exposed to a variety of security threats. As the recent cases of supply chain attacks have increased, foreign countries are establishing supply chain management systems and managing supply chain risks. In Korea, on the other hand, there was research on supply chain risk management in some fields. In this paper, we emphasizes the necessity of supply chain risk management through supply chain attack cases. In addition, we analyze trends of foreign supply chain management system and explains the necessity of domestic supply chain security strategy.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.53 no.3
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• pp.879-887
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• 2021

The nuclear supply chain attack surface is a large, complex network of interconnected stakeholders and activities. The global economy has widened and deepened the supply chain, resulting in larger numbers of geographically dispersed locations and increased difficulty ensuring the authenticity and security of critical digital assets. Although the nuclear industry has made significant strides in securing facilities from cyber-attacks, the supply chain remains vulnerable. This paper discusses supply chain threats and vulnerabilities that are often overlooked in nuclear cyber supply chain risk analysis. A novel supply chain cyber-attack surface diagram is provided to assist with enumeration of risks and to examine the complex issues surrounding the requirements for securing hardware, firmware, software, and system information throughout the entire supply chain lifecycle. This supply chain cyber-attack surface diagram provides a dashboard that security practitioners and researchers can use to identify gaps in current cyber supply chain practices and develop new risk-informed, cyber supply chain tools and processes.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.38 no.4
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• pp.81-94
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• 2023

The increased adoption of open source security management in supply chains is gaining worldwide attention. In particular, as security and threatening situations, such as solar winds, Kaseya ransomware, and Log4j vulnerability, are becoming more common in supply chains using software (SW)-defined networks, SW bills of materials (SBOMs) for SW products should be prepared to protect major countries like the United States. An SBOM provides SW component information and is expected to become required for SW supply chain management. We focus on SW supply chain management policies and SBOM trends in major countries and private organizations worldwide for safe SW use and determine the current status of Korea and ETRI's open source SW supply chain management trends.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.33 no.6
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• pp.989-1000
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• 2023

In order to respond to supply chain threats, active research and development efforts are underway for software tamper prevention technologies such as Secure Boot and management systems like Software Bill of Materials(SBOM). Particularly, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is introducing standards for Trusted Platform Module(TPM) to provide a secure and trustworthy computing boot environment. This paper emphasizes the need for introducing secure booting technology for cryptographic modules to ensure that they remain safe and provide reliable functionality even in the face of supply chain threats. Furthermore, it analyzes vulnerabilities in cryptographic modules verified by the ISO/IEC 19790 standard and proposes security requirements for secure booting of cryptographic modules to address these vulnerabilities.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.149-157
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• 2020

Security threats in supply-chains can be targeted at all the users who use products related to these supply-chains as well as at single equipment or individuals. This implies that these security threats can cause nationwide economic and social damages. In particular, it is true that hardware security threat analysis technology in supply-chains has significant technical barriers due to the lack of software knowledge as well as the need to study and understand undisclosed hardware designs. In this paper, we discuss the future direction of studies by introducing basic concepts and attack cases, along with domestic and foreign technology trends related to supply-chain security technology.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.229-244
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• 2024

Recently, supply chain attacks against nuclear facilities such as "Evil PLC" are increasing due to the application of digital technology in nuclear power plants such as the APR1400 reactor. Nuclear supply chain security requires a asset management system that can systematically manage a large number of providers due to the nature of the industry. However, due to the nature of the control system, there is a problem of inconsistent management of attribute information due to the long lifecycle of software assets. In addition, due to the availability of the operational technology, the introduction of automated configuration management is insufficient, and limitations such as input errors exist. This study proposes a systematic asset management system using SBOM(Software Bill Of Materials) and an improvement for input errors using natural language processing techniques.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.38 no.4
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• pp.58-69
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• 2023

Cyberspace is emerging as a critical domain requiring national-level governance and international cooperation owing to its potential financial and societal impacts. This research aims to investigate the cybersecurity policies from major countries for understanding with comprehensive perspectives. Global trends emphasize a comprehensive command-centered approach, with top leadership directing cybersecurity policies. Key policy areas include security across technology ecosystems, protection of critical infrastructure, and software supply chain security. Investment is being focused on zero-trust architectures, software bills, and new technologies like artificial intelligence. For countries like Korea, immediate response and adaptation to these trends are crucial to develop and enforce national cybersecurity policies.