• 한국IT서비스학회지
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• 제19권3호
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• pp.101-115
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• 2020

Electronic voting is one of information technology service to handle a wide range of functions, including registration, certification, input and results of voting, using electronic technology, depending on the degree of automation. It helps voters exercise their voting rights not only for individual suffrage but also for major corporate decisions as shareholders by expressing their opinions regardless of geographical and time constraints. Such electronic voting helps open and expand voting participation, but on the contrary, it is possible to identify who voted and what kind of vote, such voting cannot guarantee confidentiality. Therefore, if blockchain technology is applied to electronic voting, it can increase the speed of processing and confidentiality by encrypting voting information. In this regard, the study aims to identify institutional issues on how electronic voting can be activated at a company's shareholders' meeting, and to find ways to overcome the limitations of existing electronic voting by utilizing the technical characteristics of blockchain. This study proposes a consortium-type blockchain-based electronic voting system to enhance the convenience and reliability of electronic voting for shareholders' meetings. In addition, this paper suggests how to enhance shareholders' profits through electronic voting at shareholders' meetings, as well as its policy measures and future improvements.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제3권3호
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• pp.67-77
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• 2016

Shareholders solely depend on annual reports to make investment, credit and other decisions. Investors expect that information should be reliable, relevant, comparable, consistent and thus easy to use for decision making. But whether the importance of annual reports to all shareholders is equally significant is a question of research. Thus, this research study tries to find out the importance of reading annual reports to the investors. A questionnaire survey is conducted on investors considering thirty one general shareholders and six brokers. This research based survey finds that most of the shareholders have no knowledge about accounting or finance and they have little knowledge about capital markets due to lack of training. This study also finds that general shareholders read an annual report at least moderately except value added statement, chairman's review, director's report and rumor. This study recommends human resource should be developed through adequate training, and annual reports should provide transparent and quality information which will ultimately increase the confidence of investors.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제8권3호
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• pp.383-390
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• 2021

This study investigates the effect of shareholders' rights, disclosure, and transparency on firm value. This study also investigates whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) is pure moderation or quasi moderation in the effect of shareholders' rights, disclosure, and transparency on firm value. This study's novelty is building a model framework to increase firm value and the role of CSR in increasing firm value. This study used secondary data provided by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand Stock Exchanges. The sample of this study is 142 companies with four years of observations from 2012-2015. Firm value is measured by Tobin's Q. While shareholder's rights, disclosure, and transparency are measured using the ASEAN scorecard. The analysis method used in this study is a fixed effect model using a panel data approach. The result of this study shows that shareholders' rights have a significant positive effect on firm value. However, disclosure and transparency do not affect firm value significantly. In comparison, the CSR disclosure has a moderation effect on the relationship between shareholders' rights and firm value. The CSR disclosure does not have a moderation effect on the relationship between disclosure and transparency and firm value.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• 제8권2호
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• pp.375-388
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• 2012

PVSS stands for publicly verifiable secret sharing. In PVSS, a dealer shares a secret among multiple share holders. He encrypts the shares using the shareholders' encryption algorithms and publicly proves that the encrypted shares are valid. Most of the existing PVSS schemes do not employ an ElGamal encryption to encrypt the shares. Instead, they usually employ other encryption algorithms like a RSA encryption and Paillier encryption. Those encryption algorithms do not support the shareholders' encryption algorithms to employ the same decryption modulus. As a result, PVSS based on those encryption algorithms must employ additional range proofs to guarantee the validity of the shares obtained by the shareholders. Although the shareholders can employ ElGamal encryptions with the same decryption modulus in PVSS such that the range proof can be avoided, there are only two PVSS schemes based on ElGamal encryption. Moreover, the two schemes have their drawbacks. One of them employs a costly repeating-proof mechanism, which needs to repeat the dealer's proof at least scores of times to achieve satisfactory soundness. The other requires that the dealer must know the discrete logarithm of the secret to share and thus weakens the generality and it cannot be employed in many applications. A new PVSS scheme based on an ElGamal encryption is proposed in this paper. It employs the same decryption modulus for all the shareholders' ElGamal encryption algorithms, so it does not need any range proof. Moreover, it is a general PVSS technique without any special limitation. Finally, an encryption-improving technique is proposed to achieve very high efficiency in the new PVSS scheme. It only needs a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the number of the shareholders, while all the existing PVSS schemes need at least a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the square of the number of the shareholders.

• 아태비즈니스연구
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• 제9권4호
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• pp.137-155
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• 2018

It has been reported that there is a significant positive relationship between the unexpected earnings on the earnings announcement date and the cumulative abnormal returns following the earnings announcement date. This study investigates whether the results of prior studies are because the public announcement of shareholders' meeting date was selected as the event date instead of either the preliminary earnings disclosure date or the profit/loss change announcement date. The results of this study are as follows. First, post-earnings-announcement drift(PEAD) occurs when unexpected earnings were computed based on the prior period earnings and the public announcement of the shareholders' meeting date as the profit disclosure date. Second, when analyzing the PEAD with the unexpected earnings calculated using the financial analysts' forecasts, no PEAD has been found both on the date of the shareholders' meeting and the earlier date of the preliminary earnings disclosure, profit/loss change announcement, or the public announcement of the shareholders' meeting. Foster et al. (1984) analyze the PEAD using time series model and earnings forecasting model and suggest that the PEAD appears only in the time series model. In this study, too, in the case of using analysts' profit forecasts, the lack of the PEAD shows that the PEAD can be changed according to the method of measuring the unexpected earnings.

• 대한안전경영과학회지
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• 제3권4호
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• pp.113-122
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• 2001

This study is to examine the effect of layoff on shareholders' wealth. Firms make layoff decisions by reason of cost cutting, lower performance, demand decline, restructuring. Therefore, I think that stock market responds to layoff positively, since the firm's labor productivity and profitability is improved after execution of layoff, I find that layoff variables effect on abnormal return positively in regression analysis. This means that layoff sends positive signal to the stock market for the firm's future performance. Therefore, layoff has a good effect on shareholders' wealth.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• 제39권3호
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• pp.63-98
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• 2017

This paper investigates the sales process of treasury stocks, while most previous research studies treasury stock repurchases. The sales of treasury stocks are an important measure to protect management rights only in Korea, as Korea's laws and systems allow treasury stock sales according to the board's resolution and not by the decisions made at the general shareholders' meetings. The board's resolution, which considers the owner-manager's interest on management rights, can cause damages to small shareholders. Considering (i) the economic characteristics of treasury stocks, (ii) other countries' institutions and experiences, (iii) a theoretical assessment of the possibility of small shareholder losses, and (iv) lessons from Korea's actual instances, Korea's present system should be corrected at least in the mid and long term. Even in the short-term, rules pertaining to sales enacted by the board's resolution inducing small shareholder losses should be overhauled. The autonomous discipline by various stakeholders could be an ideal measure by which to monitor ownermanager's decisions. In addition, temporary intervention measures, such as government examinations, could be implemented to protect small shareholders.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제11권1호
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• pp.75-93
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• 2001

The advantages of arbitration such as promptness, economy and flexibility apply to the disputes arising from corporate governance between shareholders and a corporation. The confidentiality of arbitration can be particularly highlighted in the disputes among the members inside corporation. But it appears that the shareholders believe litigation the best way to pursue liabilities of managers of corporation and improve the system of corporate governance. And it is claimed that the current litigation system lacks the implementation of shareholders rights due to structural deficiency and therefore need bring class actions into the system of Korean jurisprudence. The OECD, which afforded the rescue finances to Korea, also recommended shareholder class actions as a way to improve corporate governance. Class actions have merits but even advanced countries consider the changes of existing system or only stay class actions in the stage of discussion. Rather, legal experts urge arbitration to be used more frequently and the Courts also approved the dispute resolutions of the disputes as to corporate governance through arbitration. There is no report in Korea that arbitration was used to resolve the disputes between shareholders and the managers, or between shareholders and corporation, which is listed in the Stock Market. There only are the debates for bring class actions into the judicial system between NGOs and the organizations of corporate managers. But arbitration has greater advantages in resolving the disputes among the members of corporation that any other methods for dispute resolution. Arbitration can interpret flexibly the mandatory provisions of the Statutes of Security and the Code of Commerce to meet the needs of parties involved, which is not possible to the Courts. Arbitration can issue the award to meet the equity of the parties. And arbitration can avoid a resolution of All or Nothing by fully considering the specific situations of Korean corporations(such as family-dominated management) and can issue the award beneficial to all parties of shareholders, managers and corporation. Thus it should be sought to resolve the disputes as to corporate governance through arbitration.

• 재무관리연구
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• 제21권2호
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• pp.1-25
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• 2004

본 연구는 외환위기 전후의 기간을 포함하는 1992년-2002년의 기간 동안 행해진 한국기업의 인수합병결정의 성과를 측정하고 그 성과에 대한 횡단면분석을 통해 기업지배구조가 합병성과를 설명할 수 있는지를 검토하였다. 실증분석을 통해 밝혀진 주요결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 지분변수 중에서 대주주 1인 지분 및 임원 지분 등 내부 투자자 지분변수 보다는 지분 5% 이상 대량보유자의 지분과 기관투자자의 지분 등 외부 투자자의 지분이 상대적으로 강하게 합병성과에 긍정적으로 영향을 미친다. 둘째, 대량보유자 지분과 기관투자자 지분 이외에 중요한 외부 투자자로 인식되는 외국인 지분의 경우 그 자체로서는 기업합병의 성과에 큰 영향을 미치지 못하고 있지만, 외국인 주식투자가 본격화 된 1999년 이후에는 그 이전에 비해 외국인 지분이 기업합병의 성과에 미치는 영향력 이 증가되었다. 셋째, 대주주 1인 지분이나 임원 지분 등 내부 투자자들의 지분율은 합병의 성과를 설명하는 유의한 변수가 되지 못하였다. 이러한 실증분석 결과는 전체적으로 기업합병의 성과에 기업지배구조가 상당한 영향을 미치고 있음을 시사하고 있다. 특히 경영권 보호를 중시하는 한국경영환경을 고려할 때 내부 투자자의 지분보다는 외부 투자자의 지분이 기업합병의 성과를 잘 설명하고 있다는 분석결과는 대량보유자나 기관투자자 등 외부 투자자들이 기업지배구조 개선에 일정한 역할을 하고 있음을 의미한다고 할 수 있다.

• 재무관리연구
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• 제27권1호
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

본 연구는 1997년 1월 1일부터 2008년 12월 31일까지 한국거래소의 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 소유구조와 현금보유간의 관계를 실증분석 하였으며, 주요한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 대주주 지분율이 클수록 대주주들이 이사회 참여를 통한 경영권 통제 등을 통하여 수익성이 낮은 현금보유를 증가시키는 방향으로 소액주주의 이익을 침해할 수 있다. 1대주주와 2대주주 간의 지분율 차이가 증가할수록, 그리고 대주주들 간의 소유집중도가 증가할수록 현금보유가 증가한다. 그리고 경영자지분율은 현금보유에 비선형적으로 영향을 미친다. 다시 말해, 경영자지분율이 낮은 단계에서는 이익침해가설에 따라 현금보유에 양(+)의 영향을 미치지만, 경영자지분율이 일정 수준 이상으로 증가하면 이해일치가설에 따라 음(-)의 영향을 미치며, 경영자지분율이 매우 높은 수준으로 증가하면 다시 이익침해가설에 따라 양(+)의 영향을 미친다. 그리고 소유자지배기업은 경영자지배기업보다 대주주들이 현금보유에 미치는 영향력이 상대적으로 증가하여 현금보유를 증가시킬 수 있다. 이러한 결과는 한국기업의 현금보유는 주로 상충이론과 자금조달순서 이론으로 설명할 수 있으나, 대리인 이론으로도 부분적으로 설명할 수 있으며, 이는 대주주들이 소액주주와 균등한 혜택이 분배되는 재무정책을 기피하고 소액주주의 희생 하에 사적 이익을 취할 가능성이 있음을 시사한다. 따라서 우리나라에서도 대주주가 소액주주의 이익을 침해하는 행위를 예방하고, 소액주주의 이익을 보호할 수 있는 제도적 장치와 소유집중도를 완화시킬 수 있는 소유구조 정책이 필요하다고 생각한다.