• Title/Summary/Keyword: Shareholders' Meeting

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Timing of Earnings Announcement and Post-Earnings-Announcement-Drift(PEAD) (이익 공시시점과 주가지연반응)

  • Kim, Hyung-Soon
    • Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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    • v.9 no.4
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    • pp.137-155
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    • 2018
  • It has been reported that there is a significant positive relationship between the unexpected earnings on the earnings announcement date and the cumulative abnormal returns following the earnings announcement date. This study investigates whether the results of prior studies are because the public announcement of shareholders' meeting date was selected as the event date instead of either the preliminary earnings disclosure date or the profit/loss change announcement date. The results of this study are as follows. First, post-earnings-announcement drift(PEAD) occurs when unexpected earnings were computed based on the prior period earnings and the public announcement of the shareholders' meeting date as the profit disclosure date. Second, when analyzing the PEAD with the unexpected earnings calculated using the financial analysts' forecasts, no PEAD has been found both on the date of the shareholders' meeting and the earlier date of the preliminary earnings disclosure, profit/loss change announcement, or the public announcement of the shareholders' meeting. Foster et al. (1984) analyze the PEAD using time series model and earnings forecasting model and suggest that the PEAD appears only in the time series model. In this study, too, in the case of using analysts' profit forecasts, the lack of the PEAD shows that the PEAD can be changed according to the method of measuring the unexpected earnings.

A Study of Blockchain Technology-based Electronic Voting in Shareholders' Meeting (블록체인 기술 기반의 주주총회 전자투표에 관한 연구)

  • Kim, Seog;Jeen, Sungkwang;Kim, Hyekyung;Choi, Jeongil
    • Journal of Information Technology Services
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    • v.19 no.3
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    • pp.101-115
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    • 2020
  • Electronic voting is one of information technology service to handle a wide range of functions, including registration, certification, input and results of voting, using electronic technology, depending on the degree of automation. It helps voters exercise their voting rights not only for individual suffrage but also for major corporate decisions as shareholders by expressing their opinions regardless of geographical and time constraints. Such electronic voting helps open and expand voting participation, but on the contrary, it is possible to identify who voted and what kind of vote, such voting cannot guarantee confidentiality. Therefore, if blockchain technology is applied to electronic voting, it can increase the speed of processing and confidentiality by encrypting voting information. In this regard, the study aims to identify institutional issues on how electronic voting can be activated at a company's shareholders' meeting, and to find ways to overcome the limitations of existing electronic voting by utilizing the technical characteristics of blockchain. This study proposes a consortium-type blockchain-based electronic voting system to enhance the convenience and reliability of electronic voting for shareholders' meetings. In addition, this paper suggests how to enhance shareholders' profits through electronic voting at shareholders' meetings, as well as its policy measures and future improvements.

Family Ownership and Firm Value : Perspective to Related-party Transaction and Wealth Transfer

  • Kim, Dong-Wook;Kim, Byoung-Gon;Youn, Myoung-Kil
    • Journal of Distribution Science
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    • v.15 no.4
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    • pp.5-13
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    • 2017
  • Purpose - This research analyzes the effects of Korean family ownership characteristics on firm value. The positive and negative effects of family ownership on Korean firm value were analyzed. If negative effects are evident, this research explores the factors that cause a decrease in firm value. Research design, data, and methodology - The study examined a total of 5,743 companies listed on the Korea Exchange from the period 2002 to 2012 using a panel data regression analysis. Result - An empirical analysis suggests that Korean family ownership diminishes firm value. Korean family firm value has been reduced when controlling shareholders are participated in management and pursue excessive wages, or make the management entrenchment effects associated with ownership-control disparity. When the controlling shareholders of family firms have increasing control rights over the shareholders' general meeting and the directors' board, the agency costs associated with seeking increasing executive wages or private benefits reduce firm value. Conclusions - This study has significance because it reveals the negative effect of family ownership in Korea on firm value. These negative effects can be the result of agency problems from controlling family shareholders seeking excessive wages or ownership-control disparity.

파산절차에 관한 경제학적 분석

  • Ryu, Geun-Gwan
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.23 no.1_2
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    • pp.149-191
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    • 2001
  • In this paper, we propose a new bankruptcy algorithm. The proposed algorithm is comprised of four tasks. Task A is the procedure of soliciting bids, Task B is the procedure of allocating claims, Task C is the procedure of trading claims, and Task D is the procedure of exercising options and holding shareholders' meeting. Tasks A, B, and D are based on Bebchuk(1988) and Aghion, Hart, ad Moore(1992). This paper adds Task C, the procedure of trading claims. Claims are in the form of options which are written on the new shares of the bankrupt firm. Trading options expedites the process of finding the value of the bankrupt firm, and also it mitigates the problem of incomplete capital market by expanding the pool of new investors.

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A Case of Determining Control when Holding Voting Rights of Less Than a Majority: A Step-by-step Review to Determine whether the Power is Retained (과반수 미만 의결권 보유시 지배력 판단 사례: 힘의 보유 여부 판단을 위한 단계별 검토)

  • Ji-Young Kim;Myeong-Jeon Oh
    • Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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    • v.14 no.1
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    • pp.313-325
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    • 2023
  • Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the process of determining control in a situation where investors hold less than a majority of the voting rights of the investee through case. Design/methodology/approach - In this study, the various and complex considerations presented in K-IFRS 1110 'Consolidated Financial Statements' were systematically classified and stratified. Findings - First, the agreement to delegate voting rights does not necessarily have to be documented, but it can be said to be substantive rights right only if it is not of the nature that one party can discontinue at any time. Second, if it is clear that investors do not have power due to the relative size of voting rights and the degree of stock dispersion, there is no need to review the past shareholders' meeting resolutions and additional facts and circumstances. Research implications or Originality - This study expects to minimize errors in applying the standards by classifying and stratifying the various considerations presented in K-IFRS 1110 into first and subsequent considerations. In addition, it is expected to contribute to reducing practical confusion in determining control by presenting a step-by-step review through case on whether or not to have power to judge control when holding voting rights of less than a majority.