• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.101-115
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• 2020

Electronic voting is one of information technology service to handle a wide range of functions, including registration, certification, input and results of voting, using electronic technology, depending on the degree of automation. It helps voters exercise their voting rights not only for individual suffrage but also for major corporate decisions as shareholders by expressing their opinions regardless of geographical and time constraints. Such electronic voting helps open and expand voting participation, but on the contrary, it is possible to identify who voted and what kind of vote, such voting cannot guarantee confidentiality. Therefore, if blockchain technology is applied to electronic voting, it can increase the speed of processing and confidentiality by encrypting voting information. In this regard, the study aims to identify institutional issues on how electronic voting can be activated at a company's shareholders' meeting, and to find ways to overcome the limitations of existing electronic voting by utilizing the technical characteristics of blockchain. This study proposes a consortium-type blockchain-based electronic voting system to enhance the convenience and reliability of electronic voting for shareholders' meetings. In addition, this paper suggests how to enhance shareholders' profits through electronic voting at shareholders' meetings, as well as its policy measures and future improvements.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.3 no.3
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• pp.67-77
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• 2016

Shareholders solely depend on annual reports to make investment, credit and other decisions. Investors expect that information should be reliable, relevant, comparable, consistent and thus easy to use for decision making. But whether the importance of annual reports to all shareholders is equally significant is a question of research. Thus, this research study tries to find out the importance of reading annual reports to the investors. A questionnaire survey is conducted on investors considering thirty one general shareholders and six brokers. This research based survey finds that most of the shareholders have no knowledge about accounting or finance and they have little knowledge about capital markets due to lack of training. This study also finds that general shareholders read an annual report at least moderately except value added statement, chairman's review, director's report and rumor. This study recommends human resource should be developed through adequate training, and annual reports should provide transparent and quality information which will ultimately increase the confidence of investors.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.383-390
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• 2021

This study investigates the effect of shareholders' rights, disclosure, and transparency on firm value. This study also investigates whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) is pure moderation or quasi moderation in the effect of shareholders' rights, disclosure, and transparency on firm value. This study's novelty is building a model framework to increase firm value and the role of CSR in increasing firm value. This study used secondary data provided by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand Stock Exchanges. The sample of this study is 142 companies with four years of observations from 2012-2015. Firm value is measured by Tobin's Q. While shareholder's rights, disclosure, and transparency are measured using the ASEAN scorecard. The analysis method used in this study is a fixed effect model using a panel data approach. The result of this study shows that shareholders' rights have a significant positive effect on firm value. However, disclosure and transparency do not affect firm value significantly. In comparison, the CSR disclosure has a moderation effect on the relationship between shareholders' rights and firm value. The CSR disclosure does not have a moderation effect on the relationship between disclosure and transparency and firm value.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.375-388
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• 2012

PVSS stands for publicly verifiable secret sharing. In PVSS, a dealer shares a secret among multiple share holders. He encrypts the shares using the shareholders' encryption algorithms and publicly proves that the encrypted shares are valid. Most of the existing PVSS schemes do not employ an ElGamal encryption to encrypt the shares. Instead, they usually employ other encryption algorithms like a RSA encryption and Paillier encryption. Those encryption algorithms do not support the shareholders' encryption algorithms to employ the same decryption modulus. As a result, PVSS based on those encryption algorithms must employ additional range proofs to guarantee the validity of the shares obtained by the shareholders. Although the shareholders can employ ElGamal encryptions with the same decryption modulus in PVSS such that the range proof can be avoided, there are only two PVSS schemes based on ElGamal encryption. Moreover, the two schemes have their drawbacks. One of them employs a costly repeating-proof mechanism, which needs to repeat the dealer's proof at least scores of times to achieve satisfactory soundness. The other requires that the dealer must know the discrete logarithm of the secret to share and thus weakens the generality and it cannot be employed in many applications. A new PVSS scheme based on an ElGamal encryption is proposed in this paper. It employs the same decryption modulus for all the shareholders' ElGamal encryption algorithms, so it does not need any range proof. Moreover, it is a general PVSS technique without any special limitation. Finally, an encryption-improving technique is proposed to achieve very high efficiency in the new PVSS scheme. It only needs a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the number of the shareholders, while all the existing PVSS schemes need at least a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the square of the number of the shareholders.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.137-155
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• 2018

It has been reported that there is a significant positive relationship between the unexpected earnings on the earnings announcement date and the cumulative abnormal returns following the earnings announcement date. This study investigates whether the results of prior studies are because the public announcement of shareholders' meeting date was selected as the event date instead of either the preliminary earnings disclosure date or the profit/loss change announcement date. The results of this study are as follows. First, post-earnings-announcement drift(PEAD) occurs when unexpected earnings were computed based on the prior period earnings and the public announcement of the shareholders' meeting date as the profit disclosure date. Second, when analyzing the PEAD with the unexpected earnings calculated using the financial analysts' forecasts, no PEAD has been found both on the date of the shareholders' meeting and the earlier date of the preliminary earnings disclosure, profit/loss change announcement, or the public announcement of the shareholders' meeting. Foster et al. (1984) analyze the PEAD using time series model and earnings forecasting model and suggest that the PEAD appears only in the time series model. In this study, too, in the case of using analysts' profit forecasts, the lack of the PEAD shows that the PEAD can be changed according to the method of measuring the unexpected earnings.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.3 no.4
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• pp.113-122
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• 2001

This study is to examine the effect of layoff on shareholders' wealth. Firms make layoff decisions by reason of cost cutting, lower performance, demand decline, restructuring. Therefore, I think that stock market responds to layoff positively, since the firm's labor productivity and profitability is improved after execution of layoff, I find that layoff variables effect on abnormal return positively in regression analysis. This means that layoff sends positive signal to the stock market for the firm's future performance. Therefore, layoff has a good effect on shareholders' wealth.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.63-98
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• 2017

This paper investigates the sales process of treasury stocks, while most previous research studies treasury stock repurchases. The sales of treasury stocks are an important measure to protect management rights only in Korea, as Korea's laws and systems allow treasury stock sales according to the board's resolution and not by the decisions made at the general shareholders' meetings. The board's resolution, which considers the owner-manager's interest on management rights, can cause damages to small shareholders. Considering (i) the economic characteristics of treasury stocks, (ii) other countries' institutions and experiences, (iii) a theoretical assessment of the possibility of small shareholder losses, and (iv) lessons from Korea's actual instances, Korea's present system should be corrected at least in the mid and long term. Even in the short-term, rules pertaining to sales enacted by the board's resolution inducing small shareholder losses should be overhauled. The autonomous discipline by various stakeholders could be an ideal measure by which to monitor ownermanager's decisions. In addition, temporary intervention measures, such as government examinations, could be implemented to protect small shareholders.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.75-93
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• 2001

The advantages of arbitration such as promptness, economy and flexibility apply to the disputes arising from corporate governance between shareholders and a corporation. The confidentiality of arbitration can be particularly highlighted in the disputes among the members inside corporation. But it appears that the shareholders believe litigation the best way to pursue liabilities of managers of corporation and improve the system of corporate governance. And it is claimed that the current litigation system lacks the implementation of shareholders rights due to structural deficiency and therefore need bring class actions into the system of Korean jurisprudence. The OECD, which afforded the rescue finances to Korea, also recommended shareholder class actions as a way to improve corporate governance. Class actions have merits but even advanced countries consider the changes of existing system or only stay class actions in the stage of discussion. Rather, legal experts urge arbitration to be used more frequently and the Courts also approved the dispute resolutions of the disputes as to corporate governance through arbitration. There is no report in Korea that arbitration was used to resolve the disputes between shareholders and the managers, or between shareholders and corporation, which is listed in the Stock Market. There only are the debates for bring class actions into the judicial system between NGOs and the organizations of corporate managers. But arbitration has greater advantages in resolving the disputes among the members of corporation that any other methods for dispute resolution. Arbitration can interpret flexibly the mandatory provisions of the Statutes of Security and the Code of Commerce to meet the needs of parties involved, which is not possible to the Courts. Arbitration can issue the award to meet the equity of the parties. And arbitration can avoid a resolution of All or Nothing by fully considering the specific situations of Korean corporations(such as family-dominated management) and can issue the award beneficial to all parties of shareholders, managers and corporation. Thus it should be sought to resolve the disputes as to corporate governance through arbitration.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.1-25
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• 2004

From the perspective of corporate governance, we examine the acquirers' performance of mergers and acquisitions. The empirical results of our study show that outside active shareholders, such as block shareholders or institutional shareholders, affect acquirers' performance in M&A's : the ownership of outside active shareholders is positively correlated with the performance of acquirers. However, the ownership of insiders, such as that of encumbent manners or major shareholders, does not have any significant effect on the performance of M&A's. We also found that the ownership of foreign investors increased its explanatory power after the financial crisis of Asia. Since the current literature concludes that the improvement of corporate governance would enhance the shareholders' wealth, the results of our study implies that outside active investors, rather than insiders, are playing an important role in the corporate governance.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.