• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.63-98
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• 2017

This paper investigates the sales process of treasury stocks, while most previous research studies treasury stock repurchases. The sales of treasury stocks are an important measure to protect management rights only in Korea, as Korea's laws and systems allow treasury stock sales according to the board's resolution and not by the decisions made at the general shareholders' meetings. The board's resolution, which considers the owner-manager's interest on management rights, can cause damages to small shareholders. Considering (i) the economic characteristics of treasury stocks, (ii) other countries' institutions and experiences, (iii) a theoretical assessment of the possibility of small shareholder losses, and (iv) lessons from Korea's actual instances, Korea's present system should be corrected at least in the mid and long term. Even in the short-term, rules pertaining to sales enacted by the board's resolution inducing small shareholder losses should be overhauled. The autonomous discipline by various stakeholders could be an ideal measure by which to monitor ownermanager's decisions. In addition, temporary intervention measures, such as government examinations, could be implemented to protect small shareholders.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.59-66
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to review the quality of corporate governance from the prior empirical literature. This study finds that most of the researchers developed the self structured corporate governance index and few researchers used the corporate governance index provided by rating agencies. This study also finds that there is no uniform basis to measure the corporate governance quality and observed the variation in terms of overall and individual attributes of corporate governance; sub-indices of corporate governance; scoring system; weighted and un-weighted method; statistical method; time period; financial and non financial companies; code of corporate governance; listing requirement; disclosure practices; legal environment; firms characteristics; and country perspective. This study also observed that overall corporate governance quality is very low in most of the studies and even quality of corporate governance varies in the firms within the same country. This study recommends that the boundary of corporate governance quality should be defined based on the agreed set of rules and regulation, code of governance and practices. This study also suggests that the regulator and policy makers should more emphasize on code of corporate governance and regulatory framework and monitoring to improve the quality of corporate governance.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.313-325
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• 2023

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the process of determining control in a situation where investors hold less than a majority of the voting rights of the investee through case. Design/methodology/approach - In this study, the various and complex considerations presented in K-IFRS 1110 'Consolidated Financial Statements' were systematically classified and stratified. Findings - First, the agreement to delegate voting rights does not necessarily have to be documented, but it can be said to be substantive rights right only if it is not of the nature that one party can discontinue at any time. Second, if it is clear that investors do not have power due to the relative size of voting rights and the degree of stock dispersion, there is no need to review the past shareholders' meeting resolutions and additional facts and circumstances. Research implications or Originality - This study expects to minimize errors in applying the standards by classifying and stratifying the various considerations presented in K-IFRS 1110 into first and subsequent considerations. In addition, it is expected to contribute to reducing practical confusion in determining control by presenting a step-by-step review through case on whether or not to have power to judge control when holding voting rights of less than a majority.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.2
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• pp.95-107
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• 2019

The ICSID arbitral tribunal shall determine the suitability of investors in accordance with the Article 25 of the ICSID convention and the investment or investor's provisions under the BIT. The eligibility of investors has an important role in establishing jurisdiction under international investment disputes. Therefore, this study draws implications on issues related to investor qualification, focusing on ICSID arbitration. The investor's nationality shall be taken into consideration in determining whether the investor is eligible. The criteria for determining the nationality of a corporate investor include the place of incorporation, main business location, and substantial ownership or control. The criterion of the place of incorporation that is used in a number of BIT have the problem of protecting investors from third countries not involved in the BIT. So, in recent years it is stipulated that the actual economic activity or the main business location as well as the place of incorporation criteria. And this problem is complemented by the denial of benefit clause. When determining whether a local corporation is controlled by foreigner in the host state it considers the shareholding rate, voting rights, and the exercise of managerial rights. There is a tendency to recognize shareholder's right to petition. Thus the same damage should not cause problems such as duplicate repayment or double reimbursement between the shareholders and the company. Unexpected problems can arise if the scope of investments and investors is broadly specified in the BIT. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the scope of investment to be protected.