• Title/Summary/Keyword: Share Ownership

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Improving the Ownership Regulation in the Broadcasting Industry (방송사업의 소유겸영규제 개선)

  • LEE, Suil
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.33 no.4
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    • pp.85-118
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    • 2011
  • This paper uses the horizontal regulation system as the base analysis framework. The study clearly defines the regulatory goals of the followings: the horizontal cross-ownership regulations on program provider (PP) and platform provider, the vertical regulation on cross-ownership between PP and platform operator, the regulation on cross-ownership of program provider by terrestrial broadcasting company, and the regulation on cross-ownership between terrestrial broadcasting company and platform provider. Then, by analyzing the conformity between goals and criteria of regulations and the adequacy of the regulation level according to regulatory purposes, this paper examines the justifiability of each regulation and extracts improvement measures that suite regulatory purposes. This analysis finds following appropriate measures: replacing the horizontal cross-ownership regulation on PP with conduct regulations, such as designating major broadcasting programs or replacing the current criterion of cross-ownership regulation from sales to the audience market share; reshaping the horizontal cross-ownership regulation on platform provider so that system operator (SO), satellite broadcaster and Internet protocol television (IPTV) operator would be applied by the same regulation based on the number of subscribers of pay television services; and discontinuing other cross-ownership regulation. In this way, the study shows that with appropriate regulations on cross-ownership of PP, there would be no need for additional regulation on vertical integration between PP and platform operator. On the other hand, given that the regulation on terrestrial broadcasting cross-ownership of PP could be justified only by regulatory purpose of the protection of the diversity of public opinions, it would be desirable to replace the current criteria of the number of PPs with the criteria of the audience market share. Lastly, the study shows that when platform operator is targeted by the cross-ownership regulation based on the number of subscribers of pay television services, the regulation on cross-ownership between terrestrial broadcasting company and platform provider should be replaced with conduct regulations, such as designating must-offer channels and major broadcasting programs.

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Managerial Share Ownership and Capital Structure: Evidence from Panel Data (소유경영자지분율과 자본구조: 외환위기 이후기간 패널자료분석)

  • Kim, Byoung-Gon;Kim, Dong-Wook
    • The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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    • v.24 no.2
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    • pp.81-111
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    • 2007
  • The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Using an agency framework, we examine the relation between ownership structure and capital structure during post-IMF period. We used the balanced panel data for 378 korean listed companies during the 1999-2005. The panel data sets consist of time-series observation on each of 378 cross-sectional units. The results indicate a non-linear U-shaped relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage with the relation reaching a minimum at 58.48 per cent of management share ownership. As managerial share ownership increase from a low level, managers have incentive to reduce the debt level for decreasing the financial risk, resulting in a lower lever of debt. However, when corporate managers hold a significant proportion of a firm's shares, managers have incentive to increase the debt level for leverage effects, resulting in a higher lever of debt.

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Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: A Case Study of Banking Industry in Indonesia

  • ORBANINGSIH, Dwi;SAWITRI, Dyah;SUHARSONO, Riyanto Setiawan
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.8 no.5
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    • pp.91-97
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    • 2021
  • The disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an important part of the company. CSR disclosure (CSRD) is interesting to study because CSRD in the annual reports is very important in terms of attaining company objectives to satisfy the interests of stakeholders; protect employee's interests; clarify the extent of contribution of the company in both CSR activities and CSRD; assist appropriate investment decisions. This study examines the structure of share ownership and company size as determinants of CSRD in the banking industry. We use a quantitative approach in this approach, in which researchers start with hypotheses and then collect data that can be used to determine whether empirical evidence to support that hypothesis exists. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling so that the research sample was 14 banking companies that are listed on the Indonesian Capital Market Directory from 2015-2017. Data analysis techniques using multiple linear regression determined the relationship between research variables. The results of the study state that managerial ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, and company size affect CSRD. This demonstrates that the role of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership have an impact on CSRD and are deemed necessary for the corporate environment. Besides, company size determines the activities of CSRD so that it can increase public confidence in the company's operational activities.

An Exploratory Study on the Perception of Organizational Ownership of Explicit and Tacit Knowledge (조직 구성원이 보유한 형식지와 암묵지의 조직소유 인식에 관한 탐색적 연구)

  • 장시영;이정섭;오만석
    • Korean Management Science Review
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    • v.21 no.1
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    • pp.87-111
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    • 2004
  • Today's organizations make every effort to achieve effective knowledge management. under the recognition that knowledge is a powerful. competitive weapon. For knowledge management to be successful, however, not only should knowledge be voluntarily offered by organizational members but also the organizational ownership of knowledge be perceived among members. In this regard. this study explores antecedent factors of organizational ownership of knowledge based on the extension of previous studies. The analysis of two hundred and fifty-five survey data indicates that cohesion of department or team, propensity to share, and task interdependence are significantly related to organizational ownership. The relationship turns out to be stronger with tacit knowledge than with explicit knowledge. Some suggestions are proposed for enhancing effective knowledge management.

Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

  • VIJAYAKUMARAN, Sunitha;VIJAYAKUMARAN, Ratnam
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.6 no.3
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    • pp.67-79
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    • 2019
  • This study examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decisions based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms. Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and persistency in capital structure decisions, we document that the ownership structure plays a significant role in determining leverage ratios. More specially, we find that managerial ownership has a positive and significant impact on firms' leverage, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis. We also find that managerial ownership only affects the leverage decisions of private firms in the post-2005 split share reform period. State ownership negatively influence leverage decisions implying that SOEs may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance and may receive favourable treatments when applying for seasoned equity ¿nancing, thus use less debt. Furthermore, our results show that while foreign ownership negatively influences leverage decisions, legal person shareholding positively influences firms' leverage decisions only for state controlled firms. We also find that the board structure variables (board size and the proportion of independent directors) do not influence firms' capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that recent ownership reforms have been successful in terms of providing incentive to managers through managerial shareholdings to take risky financial choices.

The Impact of Foreign Ownership on Stock Price Volatility: Evidence from Thailand

  • THANATAWEE, Yordying
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.8 no.1
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    • pp.7-14
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    • 2021
  • This paper examines the impact of foreign ownership on stock price volatility in an emerging market, namely, Thailand. The data were obtained from SETSMART, the database of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). After removing financial firms, banks, and insurance companies as well as filtering outliers, the final sample covers 1,755 firm-year observations from 371 nonfinancial firms listed on the SET over the five-year period from 2014 to 2018. The regression model consists of stock price volatility, measured by two methods, as the dependent variable, foreign ownership as the main independent variable, and firm characteristics including firm size, leverage, market-to book ratio, and stock turnover as the control variables. The pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects estimations are employed to examine the relationship between foreign ownership and stock price volatility. The results reveal that foreign ownership has a negative and significant impact on stock price volatility. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) are also performed to address potential endogeneity problem. The results still indicate a negative relationship between foreign ownership and stock price volatility. Taken together, the findings of this study suggest that foreign investors help reduce stock price volatility and thus stabilize share price in the Thai stock market.

The Effect of New brand's Entry on the Price Strategy of Incumbent Retailers

  • Lee, Suhhyue
    • Asia Marketing Journal
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    • v.17 no.3
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    • pp.73-103
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    • 2015
  • According to Resource Dependence theory, an organization's behavior and strategy is affected by external resources. An organization has diverse resources interacting with environment. Because organization cannot focus on all those resources, it concentrates on its critical resources. In market environment, firm responds to other firms by controlling their internal critical resources or manages interdependency with environment to get market share. Thus Firm should choose best behavior and strategy when internal and external resources are change. When new brand enters, incumbents might change their strategy to protect their market share depending on critical value. More precisely, incumbents sharing market with entrant respond, but incumbents having competitive internal resources do not. In this article, we study incumbent's responses to a new brand entry and long-term effect. We show that how incumbents change their price strategy in reaction to the new brand' entry and also show these responses vary depending on interdependency of internal resources and external environments and ownership.

The Relationship between the National Pension Service's Shareholding and Dividend Propensity: Focus on the Changes since the Stewardship Code. (국민연금의 지분율과 기업 배당성향 간의 관계: 스튜어드십 코드 도입 이후 변화를 중심으로)

  • Won, Sang-Hee;Chun, Bong-Geul
    • Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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    • v.12 no.3
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    • pp.329-342
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    • 2021
  • Purpose - The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of investment by the National Pension Service, which has a high share as a single fund, on the dividend payout ratio. Design/methodology/approach - This study secured a share through DART of the Financial Supervisory Service and disclosure of the National Pension Service. We also used a fixed-effects model and 2SLS to analyze the data. Findings - First, it was found that there was a possibility of conflicting interests among shareholders concerning the company's dividend payment policy. Second, in the range of 3% to 4.9% of the National Pension Service shareholding, an additional increase in the holding ratio was found to have a positive (+) effect on the dividend rate. Third, after the introduction of the Stewardship Code, it was found that the increase in ownership of the fund had a positive (+) effect on the company's dividend payout ratio, regardless of the share ratio range. Moreover, the relationship between the fund ownership and the dividend payout ratio showed a clear positive relationship when free cash flow was high along investment opportunities were low. Research implications or Originality - First, This study included less than 5% of the share in the analysis. Second, We used the recent changes in fund shareholder activities. Third, We tested an instrumental variable to confirm the relationship between the National Pension Service share and the dividend ratio.

Corporate Governance, Family Ownership, and Earnings Management: A Case Study in Indonesia

  • WIDAGDO, Ari Kuncara;RAHMAWATI, Rahmawati;MURNI, Sri;RATNANINGRUM, Ratnaningrum
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.8 no.5
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    • pp.679-688
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    • 2021
  • This study aims to verify family ownership's effect on earnings management by using corporate governance as the moderation variable. This study uses data panel regression with the period of 2011-2017. Corporate governance consisted of three dimensions, namely the board of commissioners, share ownership and transparency, and disclosure and auditing. Discretionary accruals measure earnings management with a model that controls company performance. Samples are manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. Observations were conducted on 198 firms throughout the year. The results indicated that corporate governance significantly affected earnings management. However, it declined the significance of family ownership toward earnings management. Hence, corporate governance can reduce earnings management. Furthermore, of the three components of corporate governance: the board of commissioners, shareholding, and transparency, the term shareholding precisely encouraged managers to conduct earnings management. Besides, the three core bodies of corporate governance lowered the significance of shareholding toward earnings management. This study's findings suggest that in family firms in Indonesia, earnings management is becoming more intensive than in non-family firms. Additional tests show that there is an entrenchment effect on family firms in Indonesia. Furthermore, corporate governance leads to earnings management.

A Heuristic Method for Resolving Circular Shareholdings of Korean Large Business Groups (대규모 기업집단의 순환출자 해소를 위한 휴리스틱 기법)

  • Park, Chan-Kyoo
    • Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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    • v.38 no.4
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    • pp.65-78
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    • 2013
  • Circular shareholding is established when at least three member firms in a business group hold stock in other member firms and form a series of ownership in a circular way. Although there have been many studies which investigated a negative effect of circular shareholding on firm's value, few studies have discussed how to resolve the problem given complicated ownership structures of large business groups. This paper is based on a mixed integer programming model, which was proposed in the author's previous research and can identify the ownership share divested in order to resolve circular shareholding. Since the optimization model becomes too complicated for large business groups and requires a sophisticated software to solve it, we propose a simple heuristic method that can find a good approximate solution to the model. Its applications to twelve Korean large business groups show that the heuristic method is not just computationally attractive but also provides near-optimal solutions in most cases.