• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2007년도 심포지엄 논문집 정보 및 제어부문
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• pp.240-242
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• 2007

The game theoretic analysis in wireless networks can be classified into the jamming game of the physical layer, the multiple access game of the medium access layer, the forwarder's dilemma and joint packet forwarding game of the network layer, and etc. In this paper, the game theoretic analysis about the multiple access game that selfish nodes exist in the IEEE 802.11 DCF(Distributed Coordination Function) wireless networks is addressed. In this' wireless networks, the modeling of the CSMA/CA protocol based DCF, the utility or payoff function calculation of the game, the system optimization (using optimization theory or convex optimization), and selection of Pareto-optimality and Nash Equilibrium in game strategies are the important elements for analyzing how nodes are operated in the steady state of system. Finally, the main issues about the game theory in the wireless network are introduced.

• 한국디지털건축인테리어학회논문집
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• 제7권2호
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• pp.25-32
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• 2007

Cities should be developed and managed deliberately since reckless development and selfish expansion deteriorate the quality of life in the cities by creating various problems in transportation, residence and environment. In particular, the semi-agricultural zones have been designated in order to address such problems as the overpopulation caused by the influx of people into the cities and promote balanced regional development and eco-friendly cultivation of the land across the nation. But the problems of metropolitan areas, such as the overpopulation and lack of infrastructure, are spreading even to the semi-agricultural zones, which should be the last areas to be developed into cities. We should blame the indolence of our policies on land first, rather than the selfish cities that slip from the grip of the law. This study concludes that the self-agricultural zones should be developed and managed with plans by the public sector rather than the autonomous development by the private sector.

• International Journal of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• 제13권4호
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• pp.1-10
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• 2021

The purpose of the study is to contribute to the positive development of blockchain technology by providing data to examine security vulnerabilities and threats to blockchain-based services and review countermeasures. The findings of this study are as follows. Threats to the security of blockchain-based services can be classified into application security threats, smart contract security threats, and network (P2P) security threats. First, application security threats include wallet theft (e-wallet stealing), double spending (double payment attack), and cryptojacking (mining malware infection). Second, smart contract security threats are divided into reentrancy attacks, replay attacks, and balance increasing attacks. Third, network (P2P) security threats are divided into the 51% control attack, Sybil attack, balance attack, eclipse attack (spread false information attack), selfish mining (selfish mining monopoly), block withholding attack, DDoS attack (distributed service denial attack) and DNS/BGP hijacks. Through this study, it is possible to discuss the future plans of the blockchain technology-based ecosystem through understanding the functional characteristics of transparency or some privacy that can be obtained within the blockchain. It also supports effective coping with various security threats.

• 한국정보과학회논문지:정보통신
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• 제35권2호
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• pp.120-129
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• 2008

정보 수집이 목적인 센서 네트워크에서 자신의 전력을 절약하기 위해 다른 노드들의 패킷을 의도적으로 전송하지 않는 이기적인 노드가 포함되어 있을 수 있다. 이를 해결하기 위해 크레딧을 이용한 패킷 전송에 따른 지불 방법을 제안하였다. 센서 노드들이 패킷을 전송할 때, 크레딧을 사용하게 하고, 다른 노드들의 패킷을 전송하는 것을 통해 크레딧을 얻을 수 있게 하였다. 크레딧의 신뢰성을 보장하기 위해서 싱크 노드와 서버의 역할을 통합하고 piggybacking 기법을 이용하여 추가적인 리포트 메시지를 송신하지 않도록 하였다. 또 위치상의 이유로 다른 노드들이 전송하는 패킷을 받지 못하여 크레딧을 얻지 못하는 노드를 찾아 크레딧을 추가 지급함으로써 부당하게 대우를 받는 문제를 해결하였다. 제안된 방법의 성능 평가를 위하여 네트워크 시뮬레이션(ns2)를 이용하여 구현하였으며. 실험 결과, 이기적인 노드를 처리하기 위해 패킷 지불 방식만을 이용한 것보다 패킷 전송률이 높게 유지되었고, 시뮬레이션 시간 내 도착된 패킷의 총 개수 또한 증가하였다. 그리고 센서 노드의 전력 소모량이 줄어들어 노드들이 살아 있는 시간이 길어짐을 확인할 수 있었다.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제13권3호
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• pp.266-276
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• 2011

In wireless networks, it is well-known that intermediate nodes can be used as cooperative relays to reduce the transmission energy required to reliably deliver a message to an intended destination. When the network is under a central authority, energy allocations and cooperative pairings can be assigned to optimize the overall energy efficiency of the network. In networks with autonomous selfish nodes, however, nodes may not be willing to expend energy to relay messages for others. This problem has been previously addressed through the development of extrinsic incentive mechanisms, e.g., virtual currency, or the insertion of altruistic nodes in the network to enforce cooperative behavior. This paper considers the problem of how selfish nodes can decide on an efficient energy allocation and endogenously form cooperative partnerships in wireless networks without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes. Using tools from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, the three main contributions of this paper are (i) the development of Pareto-efficient cooperative energy allocations that can be agreed upon by selfish nodes, based on axiomatic bargaining techniques, (ii) the development of necessary and sufficient conditions under which "natural" cooperation is possible in systems with fading and non-fading channels without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes, and (iii) the development of techniques to endogenously form cooperative partnerships without central control. Numerical results with orthogonal amplify-and-forward cooperation are also provided to quantify the energy efficiency of a wireless network with sources selfishly allocating transmission/relaying energy and endogenously forming cooperative partnerships with respect to a network with centrally optimized energy allocations and pairing assignments.

• 정보처리학회논문지B
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• 제17B권3호
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• pp.189-196
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• 2010

인터넷 상에서의 비디오 스트리밍을 위한 대안으로서 P2P(Peer-to-Peer)가 관심을 받고 있다. P2P 시스템은 피어들의 대역폭 기여에 의존하고 있지만, 피어들은 자신의 대역폭을 제공하는 것을 꺼리는 경향이 있다. 본 논문에서 우리는 상향 대역폭 기여를 촉진하는 P2P 스트리밍 시스템을 제안한다. 제안 시스템에서 피어들 간의 공평성을 유지하고, 제어 가능한 방법으로 협력적인 피어와 이기적인 피어에게 다른 품질의 비디오를 제공한다. 제안 시스템은 기여한 상향 대역폭에 기초한 평가 기법으로 피어가 협력적인지 이기적인지를 결정하고, 협력적인 피어들에게는 인센티브로서 고품질의 비디오를 제공한다. 또한 제안시스템이 효과적으로 동작할 수 있도록 트리 재건조 알고리즘을 제안한다. 시뮬레이션을 통해, 트리 재건조 알고리즘이 효과적으로 동작하며, 인센티브 기법이 협력적인 피어에게 더 많은 하향 대역폭을 할당하고 이기적인 피어에게는 저품질 비디오를 제공함을 보인다.

• 한국지능시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국지능시스템학회 2008년도 춘계학술대회 학술발표회 논문집
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• pp.266-267
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• 2008

We argue that agents may benefit from strategic ignorance in argumentation-based negotiation (ABN). We assume our agents are selfish, myopic, and residing in open systems. Some analytical results that can be used for designing agent reasoning on strategic ignorance are provided.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제9권1호
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• pp.56-66
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• 2007

Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) have attracted great research interest in recent years. Among many issues, lack of motivation for participating nodes to collaborate forms a major obstacle to the adoption of MANETs. Many contemporary collaboration enforcement techniques employ reputation mechanisms for nodes to avoid and penalize malicious participants. Reputation information is propagated among participants and updated based on complicated trust relationships to thwart false accusation of benign nodes. The aforementioned strategy suffers from low scalability and is likely to be exploited by adversaries. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to address these problems. With the proposed technique, no reputation information is propagated in the network and malicious nodes cannot cause false penalty to benign hosts. Nodes classify their one-hop neighbors through direct observation and misbehaving nodes are penalized within their localities. Data packets are dynamically rerouted to circumvent selfish nodes. As a result, overall network performance is greatly enhanced. This approach significantly simplifies the collaboration enforcement process, incurs low overhead, and is robust against various malicious behaviors. Simulation results based on different system configurations indicate that the proposed technique can significantly improve network performance with very low communication cost.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제6권4호
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• pp.973-988
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• 2012

Delay tolerant networks (DTNs) characterized by the lack of guaranteed end-to-end paths exploit opportunistic data forwarding mechanism, which depends on the hypothesis that nodes are willing to store, carry, and forward the in-transit messages in an opportunistic way. However, this hypothesis might easily be violated by the presence of selfish nodes constrained with energy, bandwidth, and processing power. To address this problem, we propose a practical reputation-based incentive scheme, named PRI, to stimulate honest forwarding and discipline selfish behavior. A novel concept of successful forwarding credential and an observation protocol are presented to cope with the detection of nodes' behavior, and a reputation model is proposed to determine egoistic individuals. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of our proposal.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제6권9호
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• pp.2202-2217
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• 2012

The transmission opportunities between nodes in Delay Tolerant Network (DTNs) are uncertain, and routing algorithms in DTNs often need nodes serving as relays for others to carry and forward messages. Due to selfishness, nodes may ask the source to pay a certain reward, and the reward may be varying with time. Moreover, the reward that the source obtains from the destination may also be varying with time. For example, the sooner the destination gets the message, the more rewards the source may obtain. The goal of this paper is to explore efficient ways for the source to maximize its total reward in such complex applications when it uses the probabilistic two-hop routing policy. We first propose a theoretical framework, which can be used to evaluate the total reward that the source can obtain. Then based on the model, we prove that the optimal forwarding policy confirms to the threshold form by the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. Simulations based on both synthetic and real motion traces show the accuracy of our theoretical framework. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the performance of the optimal forwarding policy with threshold form is better through extensive numerical results, which conforms to the result obtained by the Maximum Principle.