• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
• /
• v.19 no.1
• /
• pp.317-326
• /
• 2024

Biometric recognition is a technology that determines whether a person is identified by extracting information on a person's biometric and behavioral characteristics with a specific device. Cyber threats such as forgery, duplication, and hacking of biometric characteristics are increasing in the field of biometrics. In response, the security system is strengthened and complex, and it is becoming difficult for individuals to use. To this end, multiple biometric models are being studied. Existing studies have suggested feature fusion methods, but comparisons between feature fusion methods are insufficient. Therefore, in this paper, we compared and evaluated the fusion method of multiple biometric models using fingerprint, face, and iris images. VGG-16, ResNet-50, EfficientNet-B1, EfficientNet-B4, EfficientNet-B7, and Inception-v3 were used for feature extraction, and the fusion methods of 'Sensor-Level', 'Feature-Level', 'Score-Level', and 'Rank-Level' were compared and evaluated for feature fusion. As a result of the comparative evaluation, the EfficientNet-B7 model showed 98.51% accuracy and high stability in the 'Feature-Level' fusion method. However, because the EfficietnNet-B7 model is large in size, model lightweight studies are needed for biocharacteristic fusion.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.30
• /
• pp.99-142
• /
• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.22
• /
• pp.37-64
• /
• 2010

Since the September 11, 2001, the motives and objectives of terrorism that have been targeted at hard targets such as key national facilities have now shifted towards soft targets such as subways, department stores, and tourist hotels; the attacks on these soft targets are steadily increasing. Simultaneous, unconventional, and indiscriminate terrorist attacks on civilians has also increased. In November, 2010, nearly forty states of the G20 and B20 (Business 20) will join in international summits to be hosted in Seoul. This coming July, an additional 350 troops will be deployed to Afghanistan for the sustainment of public security. Such events are sensitive topics, and there is the possibility of terrorist movement. Korea has successfully hosted various international events such as the APEC and ASEM Summits, and the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup. The experiences from these events must be applied to ensure the safety of public facilities against the dangers of terrorism. First, counter-terrorism center must be established for the long-term, above the General Officer level to ensure the safety and efficiency of multilateral, international summits, as well as promoting policies and legislation aimed at preventing terrorism. Second, a terrorist threat management system must be secured and safety measures must be emphasized. Third, a fundamental structure must be established for the prevention of terrorism on public facilities, as well as legal and government action against the new threat of IED. Fourth, the police and fire fighting networks' must have a firm rapid response posture on the scene of an attack. Fifth, the state of mentality on the recognition of terrorist threats must be changed and restructured by promoting to and educating the population. Sixth, prevention measures must be established via research and academia. Seventh, for the guarantee of security in public facilities, safety management should employ cutting edge technology such as the 3D SICS and further develop and apply such technology. All methods and resources must be fully utilized for the establishment and strengthening terrorism prevention measures.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare Studies
• /
• v.42 no.4
• /
• pp.239-262
• /
• 2011

The Korean government's recent large-scale termination and modification of welfare benefits revealed a procedural problem under the National Basic Living Security Act. Under the Act, welfare recipients have a legal right to make complaints only after the termination or modification is enforced; the Act fails to provide the recipients with an opportunity for a hearing before termination or modification, and this creates serious threats to the recipients, whose livelihoods are dependent on welfare benefits. Korean jurisprudence has adopted the due process of law principle. The principle originated from the due process in US jurisprudence, and Korea has applied it broadly to any government actions that restrict individuals' constitutional or legal rights. This paper reviews the termination or modification procedure under the Act with the lens of the due process principle and criticizes that the current law is not in compliance with the principle. In supporting that such termination and modification procedure infringes on welfare recipients' protected rights, this paper discusses two theories as to what rights are protected. First, termination or modification of welfare benefits can be considered as deprivation of property. The 'property' theory may be weak under Korean jurisprudence, because the concept of property under the Korean Constitution is narrowly construed. Second, this paper relies on the constitutional provision that recognizes "the right to a life worthy of human beings," which requires the State to guarantee minimum standard of living for all. As welfare recipients are deemed to receive benefits as a right under the Constitution, any deviation from the minimum requirement would constitute a violation of constitutional rights. In any case, termination or modification of welfare benefits that are concretized under the Act should be protected under the due process principle, because the principle would cover any government actions that restrict established legal rights. This paper argues that the procedural due process requires the recipients be guaranteed an opportunity to have a hearing before the termination or modification is enforced. An independent decision-maker should hear the proceedings, and the recipients should have an option to orally present their opinions in front of the decision-maker. The hearing process under the Administrative Procedures Act of Korea offers elements that would satisfy these procedural requirements. Thus, this paper concludes that the National Basic Living Security Act should be amended to adopt the hearing process under the Administrative Procedures Act in its termination and modification procedure.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
• /
• v.20 no.1
• /
• pp.177-193
• /
• 2014

Over the past decade, there has been a rapid diffusion of electronic commerce and a rising number of interconnected networks, resulting in an escalation of security threats and privacy concerns. Electronic commerce has a built-in trade-off between the necessity of providing at least some personal information to consummate an online transaction, and the risk of negative consequences from providing such information. More recently, the frequent disclosure of private information has raised concerns about privacy and its impacts. This has motivated researchers in various fields to explore information privacy issues to address these concerns. Accordingly, the necessity for information privacy policies and technologies for collecting and storing data, and information privacy research in various fields such as medicine, computer science, business, and statistics has increased. The occurrence of various information security accidents have made finding experts in the information security field an important issue. Objective measures for finding such experts are required, as it is currently rather subjective. Based on social network analysis, this paper focused on a framework to evaluate the process of finding experts in the information security field. We collected data from the National Discovery for Science Leaders (NDSL) database, initially collecting about 2000 papers covering the period between 2005 and 2013. Outliers and the data of irrelevant papers were dropped, leaving 784 papers to test the suggested hypotheses. The co-authorship network data for co-author relationship, publisher, affiliation, and so on were analyzed using social network measures including centrality and structural hole. The results of our model estimation are as follows. With the exception of Hypothesis 3, which deals with the relationship between eigenvector centrality and performance, all of our hypotheses were supported. In line with our hypothesis, degree centrality (H1) was supported with its positive influence on the researchers' publishing performance (p<0.001). This finding indicates that as the degree of cooperation increased, the more the publishing performance of researchers increased. In addition, closeness centrality (H2) was also positively associated with researchers' publishing performance (p<0.001), suggesting that, as the efficiency of information acquisition increased, the more the researchers' publishing performance increased. This paper identified the difference in publishing performance among researchers. The analysis can be used to identify core experts and evaluate their performance in the information privacy research field. The co-authorship network for information privacy can aid in understanding the deep relationships among researchers. In addition, extracting characteristics of publishers and affiliations, this paper suggested an understanding of the social network measures and their potential for finding experts in the information privacy field. Social concerns about securing the objectivity of experts have increased, because experts in the information privacy field frequently participate in political consultation, and business education support and evaluation. In terms of practical implications, this research suggests an objective framework for experts in the information privacy field, and is useful for people who are in charge of managing research human resources. This study has some limitations, providing opportunities and suggestions for future research. Presenting the difference in information diffusion according to media and proximity presents difficulties for the generalization of the theory due to the small sample size. Therefore, further studies could consider an increased sample size and media diversity, the difference in information diffusion according to the media type, and information proximity could be explored in more detail. Moreover, previous network research has commonly observed a causal relationship between the independent and dependent variable (Kadushin, 2012). In this study, degree centrality as an independent variable might have causal relationship with performance as a dependent variable. However, in the case of network analysis research, network indices could be computed after the network relationship is created. An annual analysis could help mitigate this limitation.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.5 no.1
• /
• pp.1-53
• /
• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.34
• /
• pp.58-92
• /
• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.22
• /
• pp.113-144
• /
• 2010

Bioterrorism is becoming more attractive to terrorist groups owing to the dramatic increase in the utility and lethality of biological weapons in line with today's cutting-edge biological science and technology. The Republic of Korea is facing both internal and external terrorist threats, as well as the possible biological warfare by North Korea. Therefore, it is essential to establish an effective bioterrorism response system in the ROK. In order to come up with the adequate response system for the ROK, an in-depth study has been conducted on the current bioterrorism response system of the U.S. whose preparedness is considered relatively adamant. As a result, the following facts have been found: (1)the legislation with regard to bioterrorism has been established or amended according to the current situation in the U.S., (2)the counter terrorism activities have been integrated with the Department of the Homeland Security as the central agency in order to maximize the national CT capacity, (3)Specific procedures and instructions to cope with bioterrorism have been made into manuals so as to enhance the working-level response capabilities. Next, the analysis on the ROK's bioterrorism response system has been performed in various categories, including the legislation system, task role distribution, cooperative relations, and resource application. It turned out that the ROK's legislation basis is relatively weak and it lacks the apparatus to integrate the bioterrorism response activities on the national level. The shortage of the adequate response facilities and resources, as well as the poor management of manpower have also emerged as problems that hinder the effective CT implementations. Through an analytical and comparative study of the U.S. and the ROK systems, this paper presents several ways to ameliorate improve the current system in the ROK as follows: (1)establish the anti-terrorism law, which would be the basic legal basis for the bioterrorism-related matters; and make revisions to the disaster-related legislation, relevant to bioterrorism response activities, (2)establish an integrated body that has a powerful authority to coordinate the relevant CT agencies; and converge the decentralized functions to maximize the overall response capacity, (3)install the laboratories with a high biosafety level and secure enough of the strategic medical stock-pile, (4)enhance the ability of the inexperienced response personnel by providing with a manual that has detailed instructions.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.20
• /
• pp.339-363
• /
• 2009

The 9.11 demonstrated that terrorist attack could be more serious problem than the war in our modern life. No countries in the world have evaded being a target for terrorists today. As well as South Korea, the whole world must share attentions and responsibilities for fighting against the terrorism. Since the international terrorist groups have expanded their targets from Western countries to Koreans, civilian hostages are no longer other's affair; it became a serious threat to public. Increased Korean investment, trade, missionary, and travel overseas also expanded activity regions worldwide. It also result increased terrorist threats and possible abduction. The number of kidnapping crisis has increased since the terrorists use it as an effective method of sending a message. Piracy refers to a broad range of violent acts at sea, and has traditionally been regarded as common enemies. Piracy constitutes a great threat to the security of navigation as well as to the safety of vessels and crews. Lessons from hostage issues such as Korean hostage crisis in Somalia and Afghanistan show that it can cause criticism on moral issues if armed rescue missions fail or hostages are killed, so the governments and related corporations try to solve it by paying ransom. Terrorists and use these advantages in order to put a huge pressure on the governments. In this study we will look at essential characteristics and types of hostage abductions and recognition of national safety, lessons and solutions to previous Korean hostage cases in overseas. At the same time, it provides a guidelines of the direction in the fighting against terrorist groups and Piracy.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.52
• /
• pp.73-91
• /
• 2017

This study is based on the political and economic standpoint of each country, Use advanced equipment to prevent new terrorism from causing widespread damage, In order to establish a countermeasures against terrorism in accordance with the reality of Korea, which is effective in responding to terrorist attacks, Korea conducted a SWOT analysis of the terrorist environment and terrorist environment through specialists. First, internal strengths of Korea 's terrorist environment include stable security situation, weakness of religious and ethnic conflicts, strong regulation and control of firearms, and counter terrorism capabilities and know - how accumulated during major international events. Second, the internal weaknesses of the terrorist environment in Korea include the insecurity of the people, the instability caused by the military confrontation with North Korea, the absence of anti-terrorism law system, the difficulty of terrorism control and management by the development of the Internet and IT technology. Third, the external opportunities for Korea 's terrorist environment are as follows: ease of supplementation and learning through cases of foreign terrorism failure, ease of increase of terrorist budget and support with higher terrorism issues, strengthening of counterterrorism through military cooperation with allied nationsRespectively. Fourth, the external threats to the terrorist environment in Korea are the increase of social dissatisfaction due to the continuous influx of defectors and foreign workers, the goal of terrorism from international terrorist organizations through alliance with the United States,Increased frequency of incidents, and increased IS coverage of terrorism around the world. In addition, the SWOT in - depth interviews on the terrorist environment of the expert group were conducted to diagnose and analyze the problems, terrorism awareness and legal system in the Korean terror environment. The results of the study are summarized as follows.First, the basic law on terrorism should be enacted.Second, the establishment of an integrated anti-terrorism organization.Third, securing and nurturing specialized personnel in response to terrorism.