Space Development and Law in Asia (아시아의 우주개발과 우주법)
-
- The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
- /
- v.28 no.2
- /
- pp.349-384
- /
- 2013
The Sputnik 1 launching in 1957 made the world recognize the necessity of international regulations on space development and activities in outer space. The United Nations established COPUOS the very next year, and adopted the mandate to examine legal issues concerning the peaceful uses of outer space. At the time, the military sector of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union were in charge of the space development and they were not welcomed to discuss the prohibition of the military uses of outer space at the legal section in the COPUOS. Although both countries had common interests in securing the freedom of military uses in outer space. As the social and economic benefits derived from space activities have become more apparent, civil expenditures on space activities have continued to increase in several countries. Virtually all new spacefaring states explicitly place a priority on space-based applications to support social and economic development. Such space applications as satellite navigation and Earth imaging are core elements of almost every existing civil space program. Likewise, Moon exploration continues to be a priority for such established spacefaring states as China, Russia, India, and Japan. Recently, Companies that manufacture satellites and ground equipment have also seen significant growth. On 25 February 2012 China successfully launched the eleventh satellite for its indigenous global navigation and positioning satellite system, Beidou. Civil space activities began to grow in China when they were allocated to the China Great Wall Industry Corporation in 1986. China Aerospace Corporation was established in 1993, followed by the development of the China National Space Administration. In Japan civil space was initially coordinated by the National Space Activities Council formed in 1960. Most of the work was performed by the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of the University of Tokyo, the National Aerospace Laboratory, and, most importantly, the National Space Development Agency. In 2003 all this work was assumed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency(JAXA). Japan eases restrictions on military space development. On 20 June 2012 Japan passed the Partial Revision of the Cabinet Establishment Act, which restructured the authority to regulate Japanese space policy and budget, including the governance of the JAXA. Under this legislation, the Space Activities Commission of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, which was responsible for the development of Japanese space program, will be abolished. Regulation of space policy and budget will be handed over to the Space Strategy Headquarter formed under the Prime Minister's Cabinet. Space Strategy will be supported by a Consultative Policy Commission as an academics and independent observers. By revoking Article 4 (Objectives of the Agency) of a law that previously governed JAXA and mandated the development of space programs for "peaceful purposes only," the new legislation demonstrates consistency with Article 2 of the 2008 Basic Space Law. In conformity with the principles laid down in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty JAXA is now free to pursue the non-aggressive military use of space. New legislation is the culmination of a decade-long process that sought ways to "leverage Japan's space development programs and technologies for security purposes, to bolster the nation's defenses in the face of increased tensions in East Asia." In this connection it would also be very important and necessary to create an Asian Space Agency(ASA) for strengthening cooperation within the Asian space community towards joint undertakings.
The growing U.S.-China rivalry has placed the countries of Southeast Asia in exceedingly precarious positions. The Republic of Korea (ROK) likewise has been tasked with the challenge of "navigating the waters" between deepening geopolitical divides. It is in this context that the "New Southern Policy" (hereafter NSP) has become a key word in Korea's foreign policy circles. Through NSP, ROK aims to diversify its economic and security interests by strengthening ties with its southern partners, focusing on three key areas (termed as the "3 Ps"): People, Prosperity, and Peace. At the same time, the NSP seeks cooperation with other key diplomatic agendas such as the U.S.'s "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," rendering it crucial for the overall stability of the region. Considering such strategic significance, deeper analysis of the policy is more timely than ever. A brief assessment of the policy's outcome so far, however, reveals that relatively, the "Peace" pillar has been insufficient in achieving satisfactory outcomes. Here, this paper asks the question of: 1) How can the "Peace" pillar of South Korea's New Southern Policy be strengthened? Based on an analysis on the causes of the "Peace" pillar's weakness, this paper identifies counter-piracy cooperation as a solution. This paper then proceeds to answer the next question of: 2) How can ROK and ASEAN cooperate on counter-piracy, and how can these efforts be integrated into ROK's NSP? To answer the above question, this paper conducts in-depth case studies on ASEAN's and ROK's approaches to counter-piracy and identifies specific mechanisms of cooperation. In Chapter I, the paper begins with an overview of the NSP's strategic significance and an evaluation of its "Peace" pillar. Chapter II conducts a literature review on the causes of, and prescriptions for, the weakness of the "Peace" pillar. The paper then justifies why counter-piracy may be a solution. Chapter III examines ASEAN's and ROK's approaches to counter-piracy. By analyzing the general framework and each region's cases, the paper displays the strengths and weaknesses of each region's piracy responses. Based on this analysis, Chapter IV suggests ways to incorporate counter-piracy cooperation into the "Peace" pillar of the NSP. This research bears significance in that it identifies a specific area of cooperation (counter-piracy) to strengthen the "Peace" pillar of ROK's NSP. Such identification is based on a comprehensive study into the two parties' past and current experience in counter-piracy, making it contextual in nature. Furthermore, the study suggests practical mechanisms of cooperation, and considers ways of incorporation into the existing framework of NSP. This approach differs from existing literature that failed to generate case-specific, policy-oriented solutions. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated piracy issues and deepened geopolitical divides. Turbulent seas such as these call for careful navigation. When it comes to promoting "peace," the key lies in combating the pirates that sail those very waters.
The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.