• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.24
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• pp.91-123
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• 2010

The threat factors available for occurrence given G20 Summit Meeting are expected leader terrorism, hostage terrorism, bomb terrorism, public facilities terrorism, and aircraft terrorism. As for the threat groups, which are expected in Korea, the North Korea, Islam extremist group, and the group such as NGO organization of being opposed to international meeting are regarded as having possibility of causing hazard. Thus, the purpose of this study is to suggest VIP Security-measure plans in the main site in preparation for G20 Summit Meeting. Accordingly, each country in the world is adopting 'the principle of Triple Ring' in common. Thus, it elicited a coping plan by 1st line(inner ring) 2nd line(middle ring) 3rd line(outer ring) based on this principle, and proposed even an opinion together that will need to be reflected in light of policy for the VIP security measures. In conclusion, as for the VIP Security-measure plans in the main site in preparation for G20 Summit Meeting, In the inner ring(safety sector), first, an intercepting measure needs to be devised for a spot of getting into and out of vehicles given the Straight Street. Second, the Walking Formation needs to be reinforced boldly in the exposed area. In the middle ring(security sector), first, the control plan needs to be devised by considering particularity of the main site. Second, there is necessity for adopting the efficient security badge operation plan that is included RFID function within security badge. In the outer ring(aid protective sector), first, there is necessity of preparing for several VIP terrorisms, of collecting information and intelligence, and of reinforcing the information collection system against terrorism under the cooperation with the overseas information agency. Second, the urgent measure training in time of emergency needs to be carried out toward security agent event manpower. Third, to maintain the certain pace in VIP motorcade, the efficient traffic control system needs to be operated. Finally, as for what will need to be reflected in light of policy for VIP security measures, first, there is necessity for allowing VIP residence to be efficiently dispersed to be distributed and controlled. Second, there is necessity for allowing impure element to misjudge or attack to be failed by utilizing diverse deception operations. Third, according to the reorganization in North Korea's Organization of the South Directed Operations, the powerful 'military-support measure' needs to be driven from this G20 Summit Meeting. For this, the necessity was proposed for further reinforcing the front back defense posture under the supervision of the Ministry of National Defense and for positively coping even with detecting and removing poison in preparation for CBR (chemical, biological, and radio-logical) terrorism.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.5-36
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• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

• Journal of Welding and Joining
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.35-40
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• 2015

Recently, there have been the increase of ship size and the development of oil and gas in arctic region. These trends have led to the requirements such as high strength, good toughness at low temperature and good weldability for prevent of brittle fracture at service temperature. There has been the key issue of crack arrestability in large size structure such as container ship. In this report for the first time, crack arrest toughness of thick steel plate welds was evaluated by large scale ESSO test for estimate of brittle crack arrestability in thick steel plate. For large structures using thick steel plates, fracture toughness of welded joint is an important factor to obtain structural integrity. In general, there are two kinds of design concepts based on fracture toughness: crack initiation and crack arrest. So far, when steel structures such as buildings, bridges and ships were manufactured using thick steel plates (max. 80~100mm in thickness), they had to be designed in order to avoid crack initiation, especially in welded joint. However, crack arrest design has been considered as a second line of defense and applied to limited industries like pipelines and nuclear power plants. Although welded joint is the weakest part to brittle fracture, there are few results to investigate crack arrest toughness of welded joint. In this study, brittle crack arrest designs were developed for hatch side coaming of large container ships using arrest weld, hole, and insert technology.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aeronautical & Space Sciences
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• v.42 no.1
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• pp.20-28
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• 2014

In this paper, based on the characteristics of proportional navigation, a composite guidance law is proposed for impact angle control of passive homing missiles maintaining the lock-on condition of the seeker. The proposed law is composed of two guidance commands: the first command is to keep the look angle constant after converging to the specific look angle of the seeker, and the second is to impact the target with terminal angle constraint and is implemented after satisfying the specific line of sight(LOS) angle. Because the proposed law considers the seeker's filed-of-view(FOV) and acceleration limits simultaneously and requires neither time-to-go estimation nor relative range information, it can be easily applied to passive homing missiles. The performance and characteristics of the proposed law are investigated through nonlinear simulations with various engagement conditions.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.399-406
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• 2020

The R.O.K Army has developed and operated TM to maintain the operation of weapons systems since its establishment. As more modern weapons systems were developed, the more efficient operation was limited by a large quantity. As a countermeasure, the DAPA has operated the IETM using the KAIS TOOL since 2003. However, 16 years later, they were shunned by operators for software instability and other reasons. Based on the results of an operational test and evaluation team of the Army headquarters, the analysis results of software instability, limited compatibility and integration, limited real-time updates, etc. were analyzed. It was confirmed that KAIS development tools were urgently needed. Therefore, in order to solve this current problem for the Army IETM, the first phase of this paper focused on improving the IETM by maintaining the application present, the second of the Army Electronic Technology manual, phase going to propose improvement plans for operational test and evaluation by lining 11 elements of comprehensive logistics support with an electronic technology code.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.99-143
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• 2016

General aviation and air transport are two wings of the civil aviation industry. Chinese air transport is developing rapidly, and has become the world second air transport system only second to US since 2005. However, Chinese civil aviation is far behind the world average level, and cannot meet requirements of economic construction and social development. The transition and structural adjustment of Chinese economy provide the general aviation with a unprecedented broad market. The prospect of general aviation is promising and anticipated. The development of general aviation industry needs the legislative supports, and the current legislative conditions of Chinese general aviation are undoubtedly far behind the realistic requirements. Accelerating the legislation in Chinese general aviation industry requires scientific legislation concept. First, Legislation must promote development of general aviation industry. The general aviation will serves as a Chinese emerging industry that boosts domestic demand, promotes employment and expedite domestic economic development. We should, based on both the concept of promoting the industrial development of general aviation and national industrial planning, enact and rectify relative laws and regulations. And we should also straighten out the relationship between aviation security and industrial development and promote the revolution of low-altitude airspace management in an all-round way, in order to improve the utilization rate of airspace resources, classify and establish airspace, simplify examination and approval procedure and intensify operation management. In addition, what we should do is to expedite the infrastructure layout construction, guide the differentiated but coordinated development of general aviation industries in various areas, establish a united supervision mechanism of general aviation, redistrict the responsibilities of Chinese Air Control Agency and set up legislation, law enforcement and judicial systems with clarified institutions, clear positioning and classified responsibilities, so as to usher in a new era of the legislative management of Chinese general aviation industry. Second, shift the focus from regulations to both regulations and services. Considering the particularity of the general aviation, we should use American practices for reference and take into account both regulation and service functions when enacting general aviation laws. For example, we should reduce administrative licensing and market supervision, and adopt "criteria" and "approval" management systems for non-commercial and commercial aviation. Furthermore, pay attention to social benefits. Complete social rescuing mechanism through legislation. It should be clarified in legislation that general aviation operators should take the responsibilities of, and ensure to realize social benefits of environmental protection and ecological balance .Finally, rise in line with international standards. Modify Chinese regulations which is inconsistent with international ones to remove barriers to international cooperation. Specify basic legislative principles. One is the principle of coordination. Realize coordination between the civil aviation and general aviation, between military aviation and civil aviation, and among departments. Two is the principle of pertinence. The general aviation has its own rules and specialties, needing to be standardized using specialized laws and regulations. Three is the principle of efficiency. To realize time and space values of general aviation, we should complete rules in aerospace openness, general aviation airport construction, general aviation operations, and regulation enforcement. Four is the principle of security. Balance the maximum use of resources of Chinese airspace and the according potential threats to Chinese national interests and social security, and establish a complete insurance system which functions as security defense and indemnificatory measure. Establish a unified legal system. Currently, the system of Chinese general aviation laws consists of national legislation, administrative laws and regulations and civil aviation regulations (CAR). Some problems exist in three components of the system, including too general content, unclear guarantee measures, incomplete implementation details, and lacking corresponding pertinence and flexibility required by general aviation regulations, stringency of operation management and standards, and uniformity of standards. A law and regulation system, centered on laws and consisting of administrative laws regulations, industrial regulations, implementation details, industrial policies and local laws and regulations, should be established. It is suggested to modify the Civil Aviation Law to make general aviation laws complete, enact the Regulations of General Aviation Development, and accelerate the establishment, modification and abolition of Chinese general aviation laws to intensify the coordination and uniformity of regulations.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.287-325
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• 2017

Considering the development of aerospace, military science and technology since the 20th century, the sky is very important for the nation's existence and prosperity. The proverb "Whosoever commands the space commands the world itself!" emphasizes the need for the command of the air. This essay is the first study on the status of airspace after reunification. First, the territorial airspace is over the territory and territorial sea, and its horizontal extent is determined by the territorial boundary lines. Acceptance of the present order is most reasonable, rather than attempting to reconfigure through historical truths about border issues, and it could be supported by neighboring countries in the reunification period. For peace in Northeast Asia, the reunified Korea needs to respect the existing border agreement between North Korea and China or Russia. However, the North Korean straight baselines established in the East Sea and the Yellow Sea should be discarded because they are not available under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is desirable for the reunified Korea to redefine the straight baselines that comply with international law and determine the territorial waters up to and including the 12-nautical mile outside it. Second, the Flight Information Region (hereinafter "FIR") is a region defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter "ICAO") in order to provide information necessary for the safe and efficient flight of aircraft and the search and rescue of aircraft. At present, Korea is divided into Incheon FIR which is under the jurisdiction of South Korea and Pyongyang FIR which is under the jurisdiction of North Korea. If North Korea can not temporarily exercise control of Pyongyang FIR due to a sudden change of circumstances, it is desirable for South Korea to exercise control of Pyongyang FIR, and if it is unavoidable, ICAO should temporarily exercise it. In reunified Korea, it is desirable to abolish Pyongyang FIR and integrate it into Incheon FIR with the approval of ICAO, considering systematic management and control of FIR, establishment of route, and efficiency of management. Third, the Air Defense Identification Zone (hereinafter "ADIZ") is a zone that requires easy identification, positioning, and control of aircraft for national security purposes, and is set up unilaterally by the country concerned. The US unilaterally established the Korea Air Defense Identification Area (KADIZ) by the Declaration of Commitment on March 22, 1951. The Ministry of Defense proclaimed a new KADIZ which extended to the area including IEODO on December 13, 2013. At present, North Korea's military warning zone is set only at maritime boundaries such as the East Sea and the Yellow Sea. But in view of its lack of function as ADIZ in relations with China and Russia, the reunified Korea has no obligation to succeed it. Since the depth of the Korean peninsula is short, it is necessary to set ADIZ boundary on the outskirts of the territorial airspace to achieve the original purpose of ADIZ. Therefore, KADIZ of the reunified Korea should be newly established by the boundary line that coincides with the Incheon FIR of the reunified Korea. However, if there is no buffer zone overlapping with or adjacent to the ADIZs of neighboring countries, military tensions may rise. Therefore, through bilateral negotiations for peace in Northeast Asia, a buffer zone is established between adjacent ADIZs.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.321-325
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to re-concept the future battle of the Army, which combines the effects of advanced technology on the concept of combat and the AICBM technology. The "war concept" changes with the times, and can be seen through the following two examples. First, it is a concept that achieves relative superiority by analyzing enemies. A case in point is the U.S. military's development of a "public joint battle" into a "multi-domain operation." Second, it is 'science and technology' that leads to a change in the concept of combat. A case in point is that the firepower warfare on land and sea in World War I developed from World War II to "air warfare" due to the emergence of aircraft. In this regard, the U.S. military is focusing on the concept of fighting in line with the future operational environment based on high-tech science and technology and the construction of the future military through the creation of the "Future Command." Therefore, our military needs to utilize the major technologies of the fourth industrial revolution as an opportunity to develop the concept of future combat, and the future war will greatly affect the development of the concept of advanced science and technology carrying out war, as AIC technology based on the fourth industrial revolution will promote innovation in defense operations in the form of super-connected, super-intelligence and super-integration. Therefore, this study will present the impact of advanced technology on the concept of combat and the concept of battle of the future Army incorporating the technology of AICBM.