• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.37-56
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• 1997

Can the appropriately programmed computer think?I analyse,in this paper, argugments for and against strong AI-thesis,basically Turing's argument and Searle's chinese room argument.Through a cirtical review of these arguments, I try to show that the supportes of Al-thesis like Turing fail to explain the subjective nature of human consciousness.However,I do not think that subjective consciousness is a necessary condition for the ability to understand language.(In this respect my views are different from Searle's). But when we consider the conditions of humans as language users,we should presuppose that a human being is the unity of body and mind (or consciousness). Therefore, our subjective consciousness,together with human body(thus,way of our behavior and life). serve as a mark of person.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.146
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• pp.307-328
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• 2018

The use of thought experiments has a long history in many disciplines including science. In the field of philosophy, thought experiments have frequently appeared in the pre-existing literature on the contemporary Analytic Philosophy. A thought experiment refers to a synthetic environment where the designer of the experiment-with his or her intuition and imagination-tests common-sense knowledge. It can be understood as a conceptual tool for testing the validity of the common understanding of an issue or a phenomenon. However, we are not certain about the usefulness or efficacy of a thought experiment in knowledge production. The design of a thought experiment is meant to lure readers into believing as intended by the experiment itself. Thus, regardless of the purpose of a thought experiment, many readers who encounter the experiment could feel deceived. In this paper, to analyze the logic of thought experiments and to seek the source of uneasiness the readers and critics may feel about thought experiments, I draw lessons from three renowned thought-experiments: Thomson's 'ailing violinist', Putnam's 'brain in a vat', and Searle's 'Chinese room'. Imaginative thought experiments are usually constructed around a gap between the reality and the knowledge/information at hand. From the three experiments, several lessons can be learned. First, the evidence of the existence of a gap provided via thought experiments can serve as arguments for counterfactual situations. At the same time, the credibility and efficacy of the thought experiments can be damaged as soon as the thought-experiments are carried out with inappropriate and/or murky directions regarding the procedures of the experiment or the background of the study. According to D. R. Hofstadter and D. C. Dennett(1981), the 'knob setting' in a thought experiment can be altered in the middle of a simulation of the experimental condition, and then the implications of the thought experiment change altogether, indicating that an entirely different conclusion can be deduced from thought experiment. Lastly, some pre-suppositions and bias of the experiment designers play a considerable role in the validity and the chances of success of a thought experiment; thus, it is recommended that the experiment-designers refrain from exercising too much of their imagination in order to avoid contaminating the design of the experiment and/or wrongly accepting preconceived/misguided conclusions.