• ETRI Journal
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• 제37권1호
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• pp.197-202
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• 2015

A smart grid is a modernized electrical grid that uses information about the behaviors of suppliers and consumers in an automated fashion to improve the efficiency, reliability, economics, and sustainability of the production and distribution of electricity. In the operation of a smart grid, demand side management (DSM) plays an important role in allowing customers to make informed decisions regarding their energy consumption. In addition, it helps energy providers reduce peak load demand and reshapes the load profile. In this paper, we propose a new DSM scheduling scheme that makes use of the day-ahead pricing strategy. Based on the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining model, our pricing strategy allows consumers to make informed decisions regarding their power consumption, while reducing the peak-to-average ratio. With a simulation study, it is demonstrated that the proposed scheme can increase the sustainability of a smart grid and reduce overall operational costs.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제18권3호
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• pp.484-492
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• 2016

Smart grid (SG) technology is now elevating the conventional power grid system to one that functions more cooperatively, responsively, and economically. When applied in an SG the demand side management (DSM) technique can improve its reliability by dynamically changing electricity consumption or rescheduling it. In this paper, we propose a new SG scheduling scheme that uses the DSM technique. To achieve effective SG management, we adopt a mixed pricing strategy based on the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game and a repeated game model. The proposed game-based pricing strategy provides energy routing for effective energy sharing and allows consumers to make informed decisions regarding their power consumption. Our approach can encourage consumers to schedule their power consumption profiles independently while minimizing their payment and the peak-to-average ratio (PAR). Through a simulation study, it is demonstrated that the proposed scheme can obtain a better performance than other existing schemes in terms of power consumption, price, average payment, etc.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제13권1호
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• pp.152-171
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• 2019

In opportunistic networks, nodes may appear some selfishness while transmitting the message, however, most of the existing research works consider the individual selfishness or social selfishness respectively, and these two types of selfishness may coexist in opportunistic networks. In this paper, we propose an Incentive Aware Routing based on Game Theory for selfish OPPNETs, named IAR-GT, which uses Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game model to incentivize selfish nodes cooperation in data forwarding. IAR-GT scheme not only considers the resources of nodes, but also uses a new method to calculate the social ties between them. Trace-driven simulations show that our incentive aware routing scheme achieves better performances than comparing schemes under two types of selfishness coexistence environments.