• Pediatric Gastroenterology, Hepatology & Nutrition
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.199-206
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• 2009

Purpose: To analyze the clinical spectrum of posttransplantation lymphoproliferative disorder (PTLD) after liver transplantation in children. Methods: From January 1988 to June 2009, we retrospectively reviewed the medical records of 8 PTLD cases among 148 pediatric patients underwent liver transplantation. The age at transplantation, time of presentation after transplantation, clinical manifestations, histologic diagnosis, results of EBV (Epstein-Barr virus) assessments, managements and outcomes of PTLD were investigated. Results: The prevalence of PTLD in liver transplant pediatric recipients was 5.4% (8 of 148). The mean age of patients was 25.4${\pm}$21.3 months (range 10 to 67 months). Seven of 8 patients (87.5%) underwent liver transplantation before 1 year of age. The common clinical presentations were persistent fever (8 of 8, 100%) and bloody diarrhea (6 of 8, 75%). PTLD was diagnosed with gastrointestinal endoscopic biopsies in five patients and surgical biopsies in three. Histologic findings showed early lesion in three patients, polymorphic in two, and monomorphic in three. Burkitt lymphoma and lymphoblastic lymphoma were found in two of 3 monomorphic patients. Seven of 8 patients were found with EBV-positive. Eight patients were treated with dose reduction of immunosuppressants and infusion of ganciclovir. Rituximab was added to four patients. PTLD were successfully managed in all patients except one who died of sepsis during chemotherapy. Conclusion: Major risk factor of PTLD was to undergo liver transplantation before 1 year of age. Continuous monitoring for EBV viral load and gastrointestinal endoscopic biopsy may be useful to early detection of PTLD.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.1-16
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• 2020

The current tariff return system requires tax officials to calculate tax amount by themselves and pay the tax amount on their own responsibility. In other words, in principle, the duty and responsibility of reporting payment system are imposed only on the taxee who is required to calculate and pay the tax accurately. In case the tax payment system fails to fulfill the duty and responsibility, the additional tax is imposed on the taxee by collecting the tax shortfall and imposing the tax deduction on For this reason, item classifications, together with tariff assessments, are the most difficult and could pose a significant risk to entities if they are misclassified. For this reason, import reports are consigned to customs officials, who are customs experts, while paying a substantial fee. The purpose of this study is to classify HS items to be reported upon import declaration and to indicate HS codes to be recorded on import declaration. HS items were classified using the attached image in the case of item classification based on the case of the classification of items by the Korea Customs Service for classification of HS items. For image classification, CNN was used as a deep learning algorithm commonly used for image recognition and Vgg16, Vgg19, ResNet50 and Inception-V3 models were used among CNN models. To improve classification accuracy, two datasets were created. Dataset1 selected five types with the most HS code images, and Dataset2 was tested by dividing them into five types with 87 Chapter, the most among HS code 2 units. The classification accuracy was highest when HS item classification was performed by learning with dual database2, the corresponding model was Inception-V3, and the ResNet50 had the lowest classification accuracy. The study identified the possibility of HS item classification based on the first item image registered in the item classification determination case, and the second point of this study is that HS item classification, which has not been attempted before, was attempted through the CNN model.

• Journal of Life Science
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• v.24 no.9
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• pp.1030-1038
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• 2014

Platelet products are used to treat hemorrhagic or platelet dysfunction diseases. Plateletpheresis involves collecting the platelet components of blood using an apheresis blood-collection system. Various indicators are available for evaluating the qualities of the apheresis platelets. The productivity of platelet collection is evaluated through both the collection efficiency and collection rates. Platelet storage quality can be evaluated in vitro using several indicators, including visual appearance, metabolic activities, volume, platelet count, white blood cell count, microparticles, and various platelet activation markers. Platelet activation markers have been used as indicators of storage quality in various studies. Post-transfusion platelet quality can be evaluated based on the corrected count increment and the percentage of platelet recovery. Although various studies have investigated the aspects of plateletpheresis, no article has systemically presented assessments of the platelet products obtained from different plateletpheresis devices. The present study provides a review of plateletpheresis, including the specifics of the process, the types of devices employed, the platelet quality, the overall efficacy, and the evaluation indicator qualities. Furthermore, the differences in functionality among the different apheresis devices are discussed. Although adverse reactions to the citrate anti-coagulant have been reported, apheresis processing may provide a safer option for donors who are at a high risk for presyncopal or syncopal reactions related to whole blood collection.

• Korean Journal of Breeding Science
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• v.50 no.4
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• pp.406-414
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• 2018

This study was conducted to develop environmental risk assessments and biosafety guides for insect-resistant genetically modified rice in an LMO (Living Modified Organism) isolation field. In the LMO quarantine area of Kyungpook National University, the species diversities and population densities of non-target insects found on insect-resistant genetically modified rice (Bt-T), rice resistant to Cnaphalocrocis medinalis, and non-GM rice (Dongjin-byeo and Ilmi-byeo) were investigated. The Bt-T plants were, therefore, evaluated under field conditions to detect possible impacts on above ground insects and spiders. In 2016 and 2017, the study compared transgenic rice and two non-GM reference rice, namely Dongjin-byeo and Ilmi-byeo, at Gunwi. A total of 9,552 individuals from 51 families and 11 orders were collected from the LMO isolation field. From the three types of rice fields, a total of 3,042; 3,212; and 3,297 individuals from the Bt-T, Dongjin-byeo, and Ilmi-byeo were collected, respectively. There was no difference between the population densities of the non-target insect pests, natural enemies, and other insects on the Bt-T compared to non-GM rice. The data on insect species population densities were subjected to principal component analysis (PCA) without distinguishing between the three varieties, namely GM, non-GM, and reference cultivar, in all cultivation years. However, the PCA clearly separated the samples based on the cultivation years. These results suggest that insect species diversities and population densities during plant cultivation are determined by environmental factors (growing condition and seasons) rather than by genetic factors.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.