Currently, atrial septal defect repair has been considered low risk operation duo to the development of open heart surgery Not only the operation itself, but also the cosmetic aspect is now focused. Though many methods exist as minimally invasive cardiac surgery in atrial septal defect repair, some surgeons advocate that right anterolateral thoracotomy is better than the others in the cosmetic aspect and we compared right anterolateral thoracotomy with median sternotomy. Material and Method: From January 1999 to August 2002, 43 patient underwent atrial septal defect repair by one operator, including 15 patients through right anterolateral thoracotomy(group A) and 15 patients through median sternotomy(group B) in Hanyang university Hospital. The data were randomized and operation outcomes were analyzed between these two groups. Result: The mean weight of group A was 38.77
To determine the incidence rate of child battering and related factors, a questionnaire survey was Conducted on 1,255 children in 4th and 5th grades of two elementary schools (one in the upper economic class area with 519 students and the other in the lower economic class area with 504 students) in Taegu and two schools in rural areas of Kyungpook province (120 and 112 students, respectively) from 1st May to 10th May 1990. Total number of children who were battered during one-month period (1-30 April 1990) prior to the survey was 918 (73.1%). Among the battered children 87 (6.9%) were severely battered (twice or more in a month by kicking or more severe method) and 831 children (66.2%) were moderately battered (all other battering than severe battering). The percentage of battered children and degree of battering were not significantly different between two schools in Taegu and between urban and rural areas. Common reasons for battering were disobediance (61.9%), making troubles (34.9%), and poor school performance (33.3%). However, 16.1% of severely battered children responded that the perpetrators battered them to wreak their anger and 5.7% of them did not know the reason why they were battered. A majority of the battered children (65%) regretted their fault after being battered but 20.7% of the severely battered children wanted to run away and 9.2% of them had an urge to commit suicide. While most of the physical injuries due to battering were minor as bruise (52.7%) but some of them were severe, e.g., bone fracture (2.5%), skin laceration (1.5%), and loss of consciousness. (0.2%). The common psycho-behavioral complaints of the severely battered children were unwillingness to study (31%), unwillingness to live (17.2%), and reluctance to go home (13.8%). The incidence rate of severe battering was significantly higher (p=0.018) among the children living in a quarter attached to a store (14.0%) than the children living in an apartment (6.6%) and individual house (6.2%). The incidence rate of severe battering was higher among children living in a rental house (8.4%) than children living in their own house 6.3%) (p=0.005). The children of father only working (5.1%) and mother only working (4.5%) had a lower incidence rate of severe battering than the children of both parents working (9.1%) and both parents unemployed (20.7%) (p=0.006). More children were battered when there was a sick family member (80.8%) compared with the children without a sick family member (71.4%) (p=0.001). The incidence rates of severe and moderate battering increased as the frequency of quarreling between mother and father increased (P=0.000). The percentage of unbattered children was higher among children whose father's occupation was professional (39.4%) than that of the total study subjects (26.9%) (p<0.001).
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
The main purpose of the investigation of an accident caused by aircraft is to be prevented the sudden and casual accidents caused by wilful misconduct and fault from pilots, air traffic controllers, hijack, trouble of engine and machinery of aircraft, turbulence during the bad weather, collision between birds and aircraft, near miss flight by aircrafts etc. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability for offender of aircraft accidents. Accidents to aircraft, especially those involving the general public and their property, are a matter of great concern to the aviation community. The system of international regulation exists to improve safety and minimize, as far as possible, the risk of accidents but when they do occur there is a web of systems and procedures to investigate and respond to them. I would like to trace the general line of regulation from an international source in the Chicago Convention of 1944. Article 26 of the Convention lays down the basic principle for the investigation of the aircraft accident. Where there has been an accident to an aircraft of a contracting state which occurs in the territory of another contracting state and which involves death or serious injury or indicates serious technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, the state in which the accident occurs must institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident. That inquiry will be in accordance, in so far as its law permits, with the procedure which may be recommended from time to time by the International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO). There are very general provisions but they state two essential principles: first, in certain circumstances there must be an investigation, and second, who is to be responsible for undertaking that investigation. The latter is an important point to establish otherwise there could be at least two states claiming jurisdiction on the inquiry. The Chicago Convention also provides that the state where the aircraft is registered is to be given the opportunity to appoint observers to be present at the inquiry and the state holding the inquiry must communicate the report and findings in the matter to that other state. It is worth noting that the Chicago Convention (Article 25) also makes provision for assisting aircraft in distress. Each contracting state undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable and to permit (subject to control by its own authorities) the owner of the aircraft or authorities of the state in which the aircraft is registered, to provide such measures of assistance as may be necessitated by circumstances. Significantly, the undertaking can only be given by contracting state but the duty to provide assistance is not limited to aircraft registered in another contracting state, but presumably any aircraft in distress in the territory of the contracting state. Finally, the Convention envisages further regulations (normally to be produced under the auspices of ICAO). In this case the Convention provides that each contracting state, when undertaking a search for missing aircraft, will collaborate in co-ordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time pursuant to the Convention. Since 1944 further international regulations relating to safety and investigation of accidents have been made, both pursuant to Chicago Convention and, in particular, through the vehicle of the ICAO which has, for example, set up an accident and reporting system. By requiring the reporting of certain accidents and incidents it is building up an information service for the benefit of member states. However, Chicago Convention provides that each contracting state undertakes collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation. To this end, ICAO is to adopt and amend from time to time, as may be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing with, among other things, aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents. Standards and Recommended Practices for Aircraft Accident Injuries were first adopted by the ICAO Council on 11 April 1951 pursuant to Article 37 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and were designated as Annex 13 to the Convention. The Standards Recommended Practices were based on Recommendations of the Accident Investigation Division at its first Session in February 1946 which were further developed at the Second Session of the Division in February 1947. The 2nd Edition (1966), 3rd Edition, (1973), 4th Edition (1976), 5th Edition (1979), 6th Edition (1981), 7th Edition (1988), 8th Edition (1992) of the Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation) of the Chicago Convention was amended eight times by the ICAO Council since 1966. Annex 13 sets out in detail the international standards and recommended practices to be adopted by contracting states in dealing with a serious accident to an aircraft of a contracting state occurring in the territory of another contracting state, known as the state of occurrence. It provides, principally, that the state in which the aircraft is registered is to be given the opportunity to appoint an accredited representative to be present at the inquiry conducted by the state in which the serious aircraft accident occurs. Article 26 of the Chicago Convention does not indicate what the accredited representative is to do but Annex 13 amplifies his rights and duties. In particular, the accredited representative participates in the inquiry by visiting the scene of the accident, examining the wreckage, questioning witnesses, having full access to all relevant evidence, receiving copies of all pertinent documents and making submissions in respect of the various elements of the inquiry. The main shortcomings of the present system for aircraft accident investigation are that some contracting sates are not applying Annex 13 within its express terms, although they are contracting states. Further, and much more important in practice, there are many countries which apply the letter of Annex 13 in such a way as to sterilise its spirit. This appears to be due to a number of causes often found in combination. Firstly, the requirements of the local law and of the local procedures are interpreted and applied so as preclude a more efficient investigation under Annex 13 in favour of a legalistic and sterile interpretation of its terms. Sometimes this results from a distrust of the motives of persons and bodies wishing to participate or from commercial or related to matters of liability and bodies. These may be political, commercial or related to matters of liability and insurance. Secondly, there is said to be a conscious desire to conduct the investigation in some contracting states in such a way as to absolve from any possibility of blame the authorities or nationals, whether manufacturers, operators or air traffic controllers, of the country in which the inquiry is held. The EEC has also had an input into accidents and investigations. In particular, a directive was issued in December 1980 encouraging the uniformity of standards within the EEC by means of joint co-operation of accident investigation. The sharing of and assisting with technical facilities and information was considered an important means of achieving these goals. It has since been proposed that a European accident investigation committee should be set up by the EEC (Council Directive 80/1266 of 1 December 1980). After I would like to introduce the summary of the legislation examples and system for aircraft accidents investigation of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, Swiss, New Zealand and Japan, and I am going to mention the present system, regulations and aviation act for the aircraft accident investigation in Korea. Furthermore I would like to point out the shortcomings of the present system and regulations and aviation act for the aircraft accident investigation and then I will suggest my personal opinion on the new and dramatic innovation on the system for aircraft accident investigation in Korea. I propose that it is necessary and desirable for us to make a new legislation or to revise the existing aviation act in order to establish the standing and independent Committee of Aircraft Accident Investigation under the Korean Government.
This project was a service-cum-research effort with a quasi-experimental study design to examine the health benefits of an integrated Family Planning (FP)/Maternal & Child health (MCH) Service approach that provides crucial factors missing in the present on-going programs. The specific objectives were: 1) To test the effectiveness of trained nurse/midwives (MW) assigned as change agents in the Health Sub-Center (HSC) to bring about the changes in the eight FP/MCH indicators, namely; (i)FP/MCH contacts between field workers and their clients (ii) the use of effective FP methods, (iii) the inter-birth interval and/or open interval, (iv) prenatal care by medically qualified personnel, (v) medically supervised deliveries, (vi) the rate of induced abortion, (vii) maternal and infant morbidity, and (viii) preinatal & infant mortality. 2) To measure the integrative linkage (contacts) between MW & HSC workers and between HSC and clients. 3) To examine the organizational or administrative factors influencing integrative linkage between health workers. Study design; The above objectives called for quasi-experimental design setting up a study and control area with and without a midwife. An active intervention program (FP/MCH minimum 'package' program) was conducted for a 2 year period from June 1982-July 1984 in Seosan County and 'before and after' surveys were conducted to measure the change. Service input; This study was undertaken by the Soonchunhyang University in collaboration with WHO. After a baseline survery in 1981, trained nurses/midwives were introduced into two health sub-centers in a rural setting (Seosan county) for a 2 year period from 1982 to 1984. A major service input was the establishment of midwifery services in the existing health delivery system with emphasis on nurse/midwife's role as the link between health workers (nurse aids) and village health workers, and the referral of risk patients to the private physician (OBGY specialist). An evaluation survey was made in August 1984 to assess the effectiveness of this alternative integrated approach in the study areas in comparison with the control area which had normal government services. Method of evaluation; a. In this study, the primary objective was first to examine to what extent the FP/MCH package program brought about changes in the pre-determined eight indicators (outcome and impact measures) and the following relationship was first analyzed; b. Nevertheless, this project did not automatically accept the assumption that if two or more activities were integrated, the results would automatically be better than a non-integrated or categorical program. There is a need to assess the 'integration process' itself within the package program. The process of integration was measured in terms of interactive linkages, or the quantity & quality of contacts between workers & clients and among workers. Intergrative linkages were hypothesized to be influenced by organizational factors at the HSC clinic level including HSC goals, sltrurture, authority, leadership style, resources, and personal characteristics of HSC staff. The extent or degree of integration, as measured by the intensity of integrative linkages, was in turn presumed to influence programme performance. Thus as indicated diagrammatically below, organizational factors constituted the independent variables, integration as the intervening variable and programme performance with respect to family planning and health services as the dependent variable: Concerning organizational factors, however, due to the limited number of HSCs (2 in the study area and 3 in the control area), they were studied by participatory observation of an anthropologist who was independent of the project. In this observation, we examined whether the assumed integration process actually occurred or not. If not, what were the constraints in producing an effective integration process. Summary of Findings; A) Program effects and impact 1. Effects on FP use: During this 2 year action period, FP acceptance increased from 58% in 1981 to 78% in 1984 in both the study and control areas. This increase in both areas was mainly due to the new family planning campaign driven by the Government for the same study period. Therefore, there was no increment of FP acceptance rate due to additional input of MW to the on-going FP program. But in the study area, quality aspects of FP were somewhat improved, having a better continuation rate of IUDs & pills and more use of effective Contraceptive methods in comparison with the control area. 2. Effects of use of MCH services: Between the study and control areas, however, there was a significant difference in maternal and child health care. For example, the coverage of prenatal care was increased from 53% for 1981 birth cohort to 75% for 1984 birth cohort in the study area. In the control area, the same increased from 41% (1981) to 65% (1984). It is noteworthy that almost two thirds of the recent birth cohort received prenatal care even in the control area, indicating that there is a growing demand of MCH care as the size of family norm becomes smaller 3. There has been a substantive increase in delivery care by medical professions in the study area, with an annual increase rate of 10% due to midwives input in the study areas. The project had about two times greater effect on postnatal care (68% vs. 33%) at delivery care(45.2% vs. 26.1%). 4. The study area had better reproductive efficiency (wanted pregancies with FP practice & healthy live births survived by one year old) than the control area, especially among women under 30 (14.1% vs. 9.6%). The proportion of women who preferred the 1st trimester for their first prenatal care rose significantly in the study area as compared to the control area (24% vs 13%). B) Effects on Interactive Linkage 1. This project made a contribution in making several useful steps in the direction of service integration, namely; i) The health workers have become familiar with procedures on how to work together with each other (especially with a midwife) in carrying out their work in FP/MCH and, ii) The health workers have gotten a feeling of the usefulness of family health records (statistical integration) in identifying targets in their own work and their usefulness in caring for family health. 2. On the other hand, because of a lack of required organizational factors, complete linkage was not obtained as the project intended. i) In regards to the government health worker's activities in terms of home visiting there was not much difference between the study & control areas though the MW did more home visiting than Government health workers. ii) In assessing the service performance of MW & health workers, the midwives balanced their workload between 40% FP, 40% MCH & 20% other activities (mainly immunization). However,